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3Abstract
How are we to think creation today when such an act is understood as the 
making of something out of nothing? Insisting that genuine creation happens ex 
nihilo brings us into direct confrontation with much of contemporary philosophi-
cal thought, be it critical or analytic, since the latter predominantly rules out the 
possibility of making reasonable statements about nothingness, or, indeed, about 
any kind of radical outside to what exists. This thesis attempts to formulate a 
speculative, rudimentary model of creation that proceeds from the consequences 
of affirming the possibility to not only think a radical outside, but to also instan-
tiate ‘some’ of the latter in the form of genuine novelty. The terms for this model 
are developed from, and via a close examination of, Alain Badiou’s Being and 
Event and Logics of Worlds. Ultimately, however, it becomes necessary to take a 
critical distance to Badiou’s system on the basis of some foundational inconsist-
encies that arise from his unrelenting Platonism. In its place, this thesis proposes 
an alternative generic conception of creation, which, although following Badiou’s 
idea of subjective formalisms, transposes the latter onto a materialist foundation 
with the help of Quentin Meillassoux’s work in After Finitude and the late work of 
Michel Foucault. It is then demonstrated how this new model can itself be mate-
rially effective, or, more specifically, how its enactment in any particular world 
can be thought to work. The argument is also made, contra Badiou, that the 
event – that which establishes the possibility for radical difference – is something 
we can intentionally induce or work towards. In summary, the aim of this thesis 
is to reinvigorate the notion of radical novelty and the process of its instantiation 
through the act of creation. In doing so it proposes a rational basis for the belief 
that genuinely different worlds are indeed possible – and how such possibilities 
can be thought, occasioned and enacted.
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5Mit der Veränderung der Verhältnisse geht die des Verhaltens nicht 
parallel. Die das Neue schaffen, sind noch nicht neue Menschen. Erst 
das von ihnen Geschaffene formt sie selbst.1
— Heiner Müller 
1 The transformation of conduct proceeds not side by side with that of the conditions. The ones 
that create the new are not yet new men. Only that which they created forms themselves. 
(Müller, 2005: 54; my translation).
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7Introduction
Creation: The Quest for Radical Novelty
Despair seems to be the dominant sentiment of the contemporary Left, whose 
crisis perversely mimics its foe, consoling itself either with the minor pleasures 
of shrill denunciation, mediatised protest and ludic disruptions, or with the 
scarcely credible notion that maintaining a grim ‘critical’ vigilance on the 
total subsumption of human life under capital, from the safehouse of theory, 
or from within contemporary art’s self-congratulatory fog of ‘indeterminacy’, 
constitutes resistance. Hegemonic neoliberalism claims there is no alternative, 
and established Left political thinking, careful to desist from Enlightenment 
‘grand narratives’, wary of any truck with a technological infrastructure 
tainted by capital, and allergic to an entire civilizational heritage that it 
lumps together and discards as ‘instrumental thinking’, patently fails to offer 
the alternative it insists must be possible, except in the form of counterfactual 
histories and all-too-local interventions into a decentred, globally-integrated 
system that is at best indifferent to them. (Mackay and Avanessian, 
2014: 5)
In our contemporary moment it is indeed difficult, despite the pandemonium 
of ever-proliferating communication and accelerating technological development, 
to ignore an all-pervading feeling of stasis, of something having come to a close. 
Socio-political progress and emancipation, political imagination, these terms 
appear to not only have lost their currency but also exhausted their capacity to 
8elicit enthusiasm, to draw engagement. The future itself has been, it feels, if not 
suspended then transformed into the anaemic, even if restless, repetition of the 
same – an endless iteration performed through consumer product releases, gov-
ernmental reforms, trade agreements, communication protocols – spiced up only 
by the ever-more frequent crises of financial, humanitarian, ecological, (and so 
forth) nature. Political movements and activism, mainstream critical discourses, 
contemporary art and cultural production, and so on, have predominantly lost 
purchase on the development of any sort of positive construction of the future of 
humanity. The paralysis of emancipatory movements and the political left seems 
near total.
In the face of such a devastating diagnosis of our present, a small range of 
responses have recently developed within the fields of contemporary philosophy 
and political theory, of which speculative realism and communisation, and to 
a lesser degree accelerationism are the key examples – and each of which to a 
certain extent provide a loose context for this thesis,1 alongside the more central 
role of Alain Badiou. What unites these otherwise divergent theories is, generally 
speaking, a refusal to succumb to the limitations of human experience within 
and as determined by the aforementioned impasses whilst reclaiming, in distinct 
ways, forms of realism or positions of immanence within this problematised pres-
ent.2 The enabling consequences thereof are a decoupling of thought from its 
anthropocentric restrictions – a decoupling in the form of, on the one side, a 
shared critique, amongst these currents, of thought limiting itself to the general 
conditions of experience,3 and on the other side Quentin Meillassoux’s critique of 
1 Chapter 3 will discuss the work of Quentin Meillassoux, one proponent of speculative realism, 
whilst the Conclusion will offer a brief situating of this thesis in relation to communisation 
theory. Although the author generally shares the analyses and critiques of the present condi-
tion by proponents of accelerationism – especially the laying out of a Promethean impulse for 
politics contra one that accepts various limits – there will be no engagement with their diverse 
proposals in this thesis beyond this introduction. 
2 See also Joshua Johnson’s introduction to The Politics of the Outside: “With the rise of Speculative 
Realism, Object Oriented Ontology, and other realist projects there has been a turn away from 
anthropocentrically hardened philosophies of the last thirty years and a re-consideration of the 
outside.” (Johnson, 2013: 6)
3 In the context of discussing Badiou’s subtractive ontology, Sam Gillespie puts the problem 
of thought being conditioned by experience in the following, succinct, even if polemic way: 
“If philosophy confines itself to the conditions that are set to it by experience, it is of course 
inevitable that it will fall prey to either a postmodern, moribund cynicism or an ethical reg-
ulation of a smooth-running state of affairs. The first repudiates any hope of thinking that 
9correlationism – the idea that we have no access to reality in-itself but only ever 
to the correlation between thinking and being, which relativises this access to the 
realm of the ‘for-us’ (I will return to this in Chapter 3). A further, more gener-
alised upshot is the rejection of the idea of the present as mere point of passage 
within a presumed linear history, and, instead, an affirmation “toward having a 
history”, as Reza Negarestani puts it. To have a history means nothing other than 
“reorienting and repurposing it toward future ends unseen by the past whose rec-
ognition should never be an impediment but merely a way to liberate the present 
from its past commitments, either by collectively revising or abandoning them” 
(Negarestani, forthcoming). The present thesis is set in this two-fold contextuali-
sation – of our dejected present on one side and the rational belief in non-linear, 
interruptive processes on the other, where the latter promotes an understanding 
“that we are at the beginning of a political project, rather than at the bleak terminus 
of history” (Mackay and Avanessian, 2014: 5). 
‘Outside within’ versus radical outside
Whereas contemporary struggles, in socio-political as well as theoretical arenas, 
are certainly not under-invested with the rhetoric of altogether different futures, 
they appear to be, by and large, incapable or unwilling to decouple such visions, 
and particularly their processes of realisation, from the present they are supposed 
to differ from. One major aspect that obstructs the necessity for this separation is 
arguably the mode of positive imagination, of wanting to put forward and follow 
graspable alternatives or particular changes. The emphasis on concrete images or 
conceptions of another world, of a different future is, however, what encodes the 
present into these possible futures. More precisely is it the very way in which the 
present makes sense that necessarily provides the basis for such projections into 
the future, for them to make sense in the present, for them to be precisely grasp-
a different world is possible, while the latter position consigns itself to preserving the status 
quo of mediocrity that defines the world today (few could credibly argue that medical ethics, 
business ethics and multinational governing bodies as ‘ethical’ commissions have improved the 
standards of living for the majority of the world in the latter half of the twentieth century). It 
is only by radically separating itself from the world—so radically, in fact, that the question of 
a philosophical application of thought onto the world becomes an afterthought of sorts—that 
philosophy becomes an imperative to try out through militant activity.” (Gillespie, 2008: 148)
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able or concrete for us today. By infecting the future with the logic of the present, 
positive imagination passes on, rather than breaks with the present impasses it 
allegedly aims to overcome. 
Another aspect of such undertakings is an accompanying assumption of an 
‘outside within’, as it were – that there be, within this world, an alternative sphere, 
power or capacity over which capitalism has no hold. What goes unaccounted for 
here are our intricate complicities with, and determinations by, what is to be abol-
ished yet is also so defining of our world down to the most intimate levels of our 
existence. This means to misconstrue capitalism and more precisely its reproduc-
tion as external to us, therefore misleadingly granting us an uncorrupted agency 
for ridding the world of it. Contrary to this position, Benjamin Noys remarks:
The recognition of capitalism as an antagonistic and contradictory totality 
is more useful to chart resistance than a perpetual stand-off between the 
immanent powers of the multitude and the transcendent forms of capitalist 
capture. (Noys, 2013: 37-8)
Understanding the problem of capitalism as posing itself on the level of the total-
ity of our world implies that we are ourselves determined by, as well as reproduc-
ing, this totality. By consequence there is no way ‘out of’ capitalism other than by 
a complete break with the totality it constitutes, starting with its reproduction and 
the latter’s agents – us ourselves. The position this thesis takes is that there is no 
alternative, no ‘outside within’, and that only a creative rupture on the level of the 
world’s totality stands a chance of genuinely transforming the latter.
It will be argued that both the novelty such a truly transformed world pres-
ents vis-à-vis the given world, as well as the means of achieving it are properly 
outside of the given field of possibilities within the world to be ruptured. For these 
reasons, it makes sense to qualify the novelty that true change brings about as 
radical novelty, since it does not merely concern a new – in the restricted sense 
of modified or reformed – organisation, structure, or way of living or thinking 
within this world but precisely the discontinuity of the world itself and the field 
of possibility it presents. Radical novelty as the result of rupture, of discontinuity, 
needs therefore be understood as productive of a genuinely new world. From the 
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perspective of the given world, the basis of a genuinely new world can only made 
sense of as something radically outside the given world, outside of the totality that 
enforces its specific sense before such a rupture. The process apt to instantiate, to 
bring about such radical novelty – it will be argued in the following chapters – is 
what I term the procedure of creation.
Preliminaries on creation
All creations, all novelties, are in some sense the affirmative part of a nega-
tion. “Negation”, because if something happens as new, it cannot be reduced 
to the objectivity of the situation where it happens. (Badiou, 2007a)
The hypothesis that initiates my enquiry, simply put, is that genuine novelty and 
radical change can happen, be evoked and enacted in the form of a procedure of 
creation. The aim for the following chapters is to validate this still vague assump-
tion by considering, discussing and developing a conceptual framework for cre-
ation’s foundation, its generic formalism and worldly capacity. What is then the 
problem that justifies exploring this simple hypothesis? It lies in the difficulty of 
grasping the radical notion of genuine novelty, which is to say that it should be 
possible for something to come to exist that has not even been conceivable or 
possible until its creation. However, novelty is not merely subjectively inconceiv-
able, but needs to be understood in the strong sense of not being intelligible and 
possible within the world it will have been created from – so that the world itself 
has to transform in order for such a novelty to acquire proper sense and place. 
Creation, which gives form to genuine novelty, is therefore to be considered a 
procedure that differs in kind from any other, in that it cannot rely on the same 
basic processes that are exercised in a world – as, for example, in production, 
cultivation, and so forth. Unlike creation, these latter processes aim at making 
sense in the world as it is and thereby uphold the latter, regardless of whether they 
are repetitions, recombinations or modifications of what already exists. Creation, 
on the other hand, effectuates radical difference in regard to the world it arises 
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from, in regard to that world’s framework of intelligibility.4 That the procedure 
of creation instantiates radical difference as novelty means that it operates not 
exclusively within the world it sets out from. If we want to uphold the notion of 
creation in this strong sense, we are required to assert that at least some part of the 
procedure of creation draws from the outside of its world.5 The apparent problem 
with this statement is that any specified outside of a world is inaccessible to thought, 
since concrete thought is enabled by but also limited to the logic that governs its 
world – we can know or think nothing specific or consistent outside our world.
The radical outside that is required for thinking creation in its strong sense is 
what the major currents in contemporary philosophy prove inadequate to account 
for.6 Whether in the form of problematising the framework of logical and gram-
matical rules of language (analytic philosophy), of interpretation of the imme-
diately given (hermeneutics), or of deconstruction of the totalities of modernity 
(postmodernism), these orientations foreground the question of meaning and the 
conditions on which we can acquire or uncover and rationally use it, or the sense 
in which meaning and knowledge can ever only be partial and specific, never 
absolute and universal. The general problem that concern all these strains is their 
exclusive reflection on and of the world as it is, disallowing for any conception 
that interrupts and breaks with the given. In short, they “are too compatible with 
our world to be able to sustain the rupture or distance that philosophy requires” 
(Badiou, 2005a: 37) – the distance that is required for thinking the creation of 
radical novelty.
Whereas the majority of currents in contemporary philosophy take our inabil-
ity to think any specified outside as thought’s incapacity in the face of outer-worldly 
4 As we will come to see in Chapter 2 and beyond, this difference concerns the logic or general 
laws of a world: “The general laws of a world are not laws of the things themselves. They are 
laws of the relations between things in a determinate world. … A truth [the kernel of novelty 
for Badiou] is a transgression of the law. ‘Transgression’ first signifies that a truth depends on 
the law, and second is nevertheless a negation of the law.“ (Badiou, 2008a: 1880, 1878; my 
addition)
5 As Peter Hallward recapitulates Badiou’s stance: “truly radical change can in a certain sense 
only proceed ex nihilo, from something that apparently counts for nothing, from something 
uncountable.” (Hallward, 2004: 4)
6 For a more elaborate critique of the shortcomings of modern philosophy to think novelty, truth 
and the outside of thought, see amongst others: Badiou’s “Philosophy and desire” (Badiou, 
2005a) or his preface to Logics of Worlds (LW: 1-40) and Meillassoux’s After Finitude.
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difference, we can discern in this nothing that is generically thinkable of the outside 
the proper capacity of thought to found radical novelty and creation. This leads 
us to assert that creation necessarily proceeds ex nihilo, that it operates out of 
nothing. For now, the notion of creation ex nihilo is still hypothetical, since we 
posited that the nothing from which creation supposedly proceeds is generically 
thinkable. This assumed ability of thought needs to be demonstrated and given 
form as a conceptual framework of the procedure of creation. The following chap-
ters will attempt exactly this.
What is at stake in maintaining that genuine novelty be possible and thinkable 
as creation ex nihilo? The significance of this assertion, in general terms, is that it 
provides an affirmation of the possibility of radical change and presents a rational 
basis for the hope for genuine transformation of the world in the form of the cre-
ation of a radically new present. What is the further relevance today of develop-
ing a conceptual framework of the procedure of creation on an abstract, generic 
level of thought? Not only does a generic conception aim at general applicability 
beyond the scope of always specific struggles and situations, but, in ‘stepping 
back’ from the specifics of given situations, it also allows for an understanding 
that the difficulties of going beyond our present have to be grasped on the level of 
the totality of the world – and that since we reproduce this totality, we are impli-
cated in the problem rather than simply independent agents of its overcoming. 
This sort of distancing is then not only useful for abstract conceptual thought 
but also in regard of the practices that this thought, ultimately, seeks to get a 
hold on – first of all the practices by which we reproduce the world that we 
want to change.7 The benefit of a conceptual model of creation that is attained 
through and based on this abstraction is then, to repeat, that it can operate as a 
rational basis for faith in the procedure it declares thinkable – thereby serving as 
an authorisation for the engagement in the radical transformation of the world, 
since, as Gillespie concludes, “the way philosophy becomes experience is not 
through a reflection upon the world, but through human activity that effectively 
transforms it” (Gillespie, 2008: 148).
7 This two-fold employment of abstraction will be developed from Chapter 4 onwards, under 
the name of materialist abstraction.
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From Badiou to materialist abstraction
The principle work discussed in this thesis is the onto-logical8 system of Alain 
Badiou. His philosophy presents a stark counterpoint to the prevalent currents of 
modern and postmodern thought in that it refuses to succumb to the mere inter-
pretation of meaning of what is given to experience and the postulated impossibil-
ity of universal statements by the proliferation of languages and cultural diversity. 
Central to his work is the insistence that radical change is not only possible but 
indeed generically thinkable, under the name of the event. An event according to 
Badiou is a rupture in the state of affairs that exposes, for a brief moment, a truth 
of the situation that is not accessible in any other way than by a chance encounter 
with this event. For such an event to have consequences for a situation, a subject 
must recognise and name it as such and act in fidelity to this event, unfolding 
the truth the event exposed to its situation and thus creating a new situation that 
was hitherto unthinkable. That a truth needs to be understood as a process that 
breaks with the consistent presentation of the world radically opposes (as has 
been outlined above) the intuition of prevalent philosophies which, if at all, think 
truth merely in diluted forms as either a veridical statement or fact or something 
to be discovered or uncovered, implying that this something necessarily already 
exists – just is somehow ‘blurred’ by imprecisions in language, ‘covered’ by power 
or ‘barred’ from knowledge, forever incomplete in endless deferral, and so on.9
The problem of true change is no longer to find glitches in our determinations 
by language, power or history (via understanding, interpretation, judgement or 
critique) that would allow for a little difference in what exists, in our world, in 
our lives. Rather, by asserting the existence and occasional emergence of truths, 
 
8 This is Badiou’s shorthand for ‘ontologico-logical’, naming his combined system of mathemat-
ical ontology and mathematised logic (see TO, 115).
9 Consider Brassier and Toscano on this point: “Short of the resort to the unintuitable and the 
absolute alterity of some sublime instance, such postmodern thinking remains incapable, from 
Badiou’s perspective, of thinking the determinate emergence of an exception and its systematic 
yet aleatory disfigurement of an established situation. Situated excess is here pitted against the 
universal variability which, in its amorphous constitution, remains a profoundly conservative 
image of thought since it precludes the subtractive specificity of a truth – that which renders 
truth at once ‘illegitimate’ (it is irreducible to the language governing a situation, bereft of any 
proof or guarantee in the domain of knowledge) and rational (it proceeds through a strict, 
albeit decisionistic, logic of consequences).” (Brassier and Toscano, 2004: 270)
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Badiou shifts the efforts of thought to the ontological conditions and formalisms 
that allow for truths to come to exist in general: 
If all truth is something new, what is the essential philosophical problem 
pertaining to truth? It is the problem of its appearance and its ‘becoming’. A 
truth must be submitted to thought, not as a judgement, but as a process in 
the real. (Badiou, 2001: 249)
Adapting his notion of the Real from Lacan – the Real being the outside of lan-
guage, outside the Symbolic, indeed outside any given situation – for Badiou to 
think truths requires thinking them in strictly generic terms, by “‘subtraction’ of 
whatever passes for reality so as to clear the way for a formalization of the real” 
as Hallward puts it (BST, xxxi). Such a formalisation allows thinking genuine 
novelty as the consequence in reality of the process of a truth in the real. The 
formalisations of the event and of the procedure of a truth posit, on the basis of a 
subtractive ontology, generic descriptions of how something that is not can come 
to be. That these formalisms are generic is to say that they present a way to think 
their occurrence or enactment independent of whatever specific reality or situa-
tion they may take place in. This is what makes Badiou’s philosophy a principal 
choice in the present exploration to understand the ontological possibility of and 
foundation for the act of creation.
The aim of the following chapters is to outline a generic concept of the proce-
dure of creation, laying out its foundational framework and operations in thought 
and to make the case for its efficacy, its possible enactment, in any worldly sit-
uation. The terms for this conception will be developed from, and via a close 
examination of, two major works of Badiou, Being and Event and Logics of Worlds. 
The first two chapters consist primarily of a close reading of these two works, 
which will allow the accurate employment, and indeed retooling, of certain 
concepts of Badiou’s philosophical edifice. These close readings on one hand 
prepare the ground in regard of terminology and render sensible the components 
and general workings of Badiou’s intricate system. On the other hand, only by 
working through the details of his oeuvre in the first two chapters are we then 
in the position to recognise and unravel some fundamental inconsistencies – as 
well as to understand which concepts are not directly affected by those issues and 
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how they need to be repurposed in order to retain their conceptual efficacy. The 
discussion of Badiou’s system makes it necessary to refrain from it as it stands, on 
the basis of the discovered foundational inconsistency that ultimately stems from 
his unrelenting Platonism. In its place, the remaining chapters attempt to develop 
an alternative conception of creation, which, although closely following Badiou’s 
idea of subjective formalisms, transposes the latter onto a materialist foundation 
with the help of Quentin Meillassoux’s work in After Finitude. On this new foun-
dation, the necessary framework and procedure of creation will be outlined and 
linked to subjective capacities in the world so as to ensure their material efficacy. 
Against Badiou, the argument is eventually made that the event – that which 
establishes the possibility for the creation of a genuine novelty – is something we 
can intentionally and pragmatically induce or work towards.
Synopsis
The development of this generic model of creation proceeds in two steps. First 
with the exegesis and discussion of Badiou’s Being and Event and Logics of Worlds, in 
Chapter 1 and 2, respectively. 
Chapter 3 consist of an excursus into the late work of Michel Foucault, which 
is intended to provide a expanded perspective on the subject, both in terms of its 
complicity in the reproduction of a given world as well as its ability to go beyond 
that world by breaking with this affirmative reproduction.
The second part of the thesis, Chapters 4 and 5, consists of a more experi-
mental, inventive construction of a model of creation, which entails a materialist 
foundation for and retooling of some of the central notions of Badiou’s system 
under an approach we will term materialist abstraction. That this model of creation 
is enabled only by the partial invalidation of Badiou’s fundamental assumptions 
does not diminish his overall importance for the former. On the contrary, what 
will come to stand as the model of creation in the end of this thesis reads at times 
very close to Badiou’s own, although with significant alterations to both its foun-
dation and operations. 
17
In summary then, the aim of this thesis is to reinvigorate the notion of radical 
novelty and the process of its instantiation through the act of creation. In doing so 
it proposes a rational basis for the belief that genuinely different worlds are indeed 
possible and how such possibilities can be thought, occasioned and enacted.
One last remark concerns the absence of examples in this thesis. Considering 
the present aim to generically think an act that is by necessity situated in a world, 
that can only operate on the grounds of a capacity specific to its world, this deci-
sion not to engage in exemplary discussions of the components of our conceptual 
model may appear odd. On the other hand, the employment of examples to illus-
trate some particular part of a generic conception is problematic in that it often 
narrows the conceptual idea too quickly to the very specificity of its exemplifica-
tion – attracting counterproductive inferences from the diverging details and logics 
that any example might suggest. In the end though, it is the oftentimes iterative 
and fragile mode in which we will proceed in the development of our conceptual 
model that makes it effectively counter-productive to provide examples, at least 
during the process of construction that thesis records. Finally, whilst limiting the 
text to an exclusively abstract (and, at times, highly technical) discussion makes 
it at times more difficult to follow, the hope therein is to preserve a certain clarity 
and precision in the conceptual construction of our model of creation.
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Badiou’s Ontological Foundation of Novelty
[A]rt, science and politics do change the world, not by what they discern, 
but what they indiscern therein. (BE: 343)
How are we to think creation as the act that gives form to genuine novelty? The 
principal problem raised by this question is that it demands us to think an act 
that brings to exist a radical difference vis-à-vis the world it is created from. Such 
difference, as has been elaborated in the introduction, can neither be entirely 
constructed from nor founded in the world it is created from if it is to qualify as 
radical difference.1 To reiterate the argument briefly, it is by assigning the outside 
a foundational, necessary status for creation that we are faced with two major 
problems in regard of the mainstream of contemporary philosophy. First, that a 
proper outside – to any given world, discourse, intelligibility or field of possibility 
altogether – is an impossible notion, since, even if we assume its existence, it is by 
necessity unintelligible, indiscernible and inaccessible (for if it would be discerni-
ble, intelligible and accessible, it would be localisable within a world, or discourse 
in general). Second, that subjects, as assumed doers of the act of creation, are 
thought to be subjects of their worldly, discursive setting, which is to say that their 
subjectivation delimits their agency to the field of possibility and intelligibility of 
1 According to our initial definition that opens the field of this investigation it is precisely 
through the positing of an outside that both foundation and construction of radical difference 
is enabled.
19
the given, subjectivating situation. As subjects of a given world then, they have 
no possible means to either think or practically access and instantiate from the 
assumed outside of this world, which therefore forecloses the possibility of them 
acting as subjects of creation (creation ex nihilo, strictly defined). From such a per-
spective, the notion of the outside can only be diagnosed as proper non-sense, and 
the same goes for the notion of a subject not entirely conditioned by its world, as 
this deprives such a subject of its constitutive ground, and thereby its basic intelli-
gibility. Instead of prematurely concluding from this an ultimate limit of reason or 
thought’s inability to think the outside at all though, we should rather understand 
‘non-sense’ to be a central property of the outside – which disqualifies any attempt 
to think of the latter in terms of empirical specificity, requiring us to shift to think-
ing the outside in generic terms. Today, the work of Alain Badiou presents one of 
the most rigorous attacks on the mainstream of contemporary philosophy, which 
is carried out on the basis of his subtractive ontology. His ontological model 
enables the thought of the outside in terms of inconsistent multiplicity, where the 
latter can come to be consistently presented by an evental supplementation (from 
the void/outside) and the subsequent transformation of the situation in fidelity to 
the truth of this evental trace/supplementation. The subject that comes to carry 
out this truth procedure is precisely not subjectivated by the given world or sit-
uation but by the event that irrupts into the latter – which is why, for Badiou, 
subjects, like events, are rare occurrences. This renewed possibility for thought to 
conceptualise the outside, and by extension the creation of radical novelty, makes 
Badiou’s philosophy a principal choice for this chapter, which aims to understand 
the ontological foundation and possibility for the act of creation.
The main question to be explored below is how novelty can come into being. 
The objective is to demonstrate the ontological possibility for genuine novelty and 
the procedure that brings such novelty to be. Since these are the central questions 
of Badiou’s Being and Event, the following section will primarily give a summary 
and exegesis of the crucial arguments of the book – so as to lay the foundation for 
its discussion and the subsequent development of a more rudimentary – but also, 
I will claim, materialist, model of creation in Chapters 4 and 5.2 
2 A discussion of Badiou’s first major work, Theory of the Subject, is omitted here in spite of its 
more situated account because, first, it includes many of Being and Event’s main concepts in 
early form that are more developed in the later work (see Badiou, 2009a and Bosteels, 2001, 
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How can something new come to be?
[O]ntology does not speak being or participate in its revelation; it artic-
ulates, on the basis of a conceptual framework indifferent to poetry and 
intuition, the precise way in which being is withdrawn or subtracted from 
articulation. (Hallward, 2004: 5)
Our first problem is to think the possibility of creation, that is, the possibility of 
giving form to something genuinely new in the world. Given that novelty is what 
is not conceivable – in the knowledge and language of a situation – prior to its 
instantiation, we need to turn our focus away from what exists (from what is-there) 
toward an ontological framework that allows us to think being itself, stripped 
from any specifics. Regarding the question of worldly situated creation this shift 
implies that we have to postpone the question of how novelty appears in a world 
in order to first think its generic, ontological possibility.
Badiou’s subtractive ontology starts with the statement that “mathematics is 
ontology” (BE: 4). This is not, however, saying that being is itself mathematical 
but rather that ”mathematics … pronounces what is expressible of being qua 
being” (BE: 8). With this meta-ontological claim Badiou tries to establish philoso-
phy as “the thinkable articulation of two discourses (and practices) which are not it: 
mathematics, science of being, and the intervening doctrines of the event, which, 
precisely, designate ‘that-which-is-not-being-qua-being’” (BE: 13). The problem in 
philosophy then becomes to think, on the basis of the mathematical formalisation 
of being, the possibility of intervening sequences capable of instantiating novelty 
in being, as traces of ‘that-which-is-not-being-qua-being’. Such sequences Badiou 
calls truths. A truth is founded not in the knowledge or encyclopaedia of a specific 
situation but in what is indiscernible in this situation, what is not presented in it 
as something we could discern and therefore know or point to. As such, a truth 
cannot be decided or verified against the consistency of what exists but rather 
2002 and 2011). And second, as Oliver Feltham argues, by shifting away from Marxist ter-
minology and dialectics to a completely subtractive approach, Badiou on the one hand “con-
structs an elaborate ontology that is at once more solid and more complicated than the struc-
tures of dialectical materialism. On the other hand, … here we have an infinite proliferation of 
processes of radical change, whether political, artistic, scientific or amorous, all for philosophy 
to think and invent from” (Feltham, 2008: 86). 
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needs to be affirmed and instantiated according to its own conditions, founded in 
the real of the situation in which it is deployed. We will come to see that an instan-
tiation of a truth is founded in the real of its situation because a truth procedure is 
conditioned by ‘some real’ of the situation that makes up the event itself. In other 
words a truth does not confirm to a world but creates a new world in confirma-
tion to itself. It is “the process that, sparked by a break with routine, persists in an 
affirmation whose progressive imposition transforms the very way things appear 
in a situation” (Hallward, 2004: 2).
The break that starts such a process is, in Badiou’s terms, an event. It is a rare 
and exceptional occurrence which, again, does not register according to estab-
lished criteria but can only be named retroactively by those that recognise it as 
having taken place and henceforth cannot but bring its truth into being, making 
themselves subjects to its truth. Hence the narrow definition of the subject in Badi-
ou’s thought as only those individuals that act in fidelity to an event, that decide 
their lives are liveable only as the labour of bringing a truth to exist in the world.
The central thought for Badiou’s work is the generic, a concept appropriated 
from the mathematician Paul Cohen. The generic is understood to be the being 
of any truth (once mathematics is posited as the proper discourse on being), sub-
tracted from knowledge and as such unrepresentable but – and this is the endeav-
our of Being and Event – possible to be thought. With the generic as the being of 
truths and the foundation of what is not yet, Badiou lays out a rigorous frame-
work for thinking the supplementation of being, that is the possibility for radical 
novelty to come to be.
By equating mathematics with ontology, Badiou posits that mathematics is the 
only discourse that allows for the articulation of being qua being, subtracted from 
the specificities of any being-something. More so, mathematics and specifically 
set theory is the only discourse that is suitable for the discussion of being as 
pure multiplicity, a requirement that follows from his refutation of ontologies of 
the One. To think being as one means to ultimately rely on a foundational One 
(resulting in theology) or all-inclusive unity (immanence). Both forms, according 
to Badiou, cannot admit subject-driven creation of novelty in the strict sense of 
allowing an outside of the One, since anything that could be already is, either 
as units of which everything is necessarily composed or as unity within which 
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everything is given. Maintaining (with modern science) that God is dead and 
(with Cantor’s theorem) that numerical totality or any thought of an all-inclusive 
whole is incoherent, the only reasonable way to think being is as pure, inconsist-
ent multiplicity (BE: 28). For this, set theory’s formal axiom-system3 provides the 
only way to think multiplicity without any reference to the one, as it does not 
posit any-thing, no property in the strict sense but expresses solely the relation of 
belonging between variables of a single type, the multiple, with the requirement 
that the multiples under discussion be already presented (BE: 43-5).
In Badiou’s ‘translation’ of set theory into ontology, he terms situation any pre-
sented multiplicity (of multiples). But since the one is not, everything that can 
be discerned to belong to a situation are multiples resulting from an operation of 
counting, the count-as-one: “What has to be declared is that the one, which is 
not, solely exists as operation. In other words: there is no one, only the count-as-
one” (BE: 24). Every situation has its own particular operator or regime of the 
count-as-one, which produces its structure and that makes it a specific situation, 
presenting the multiples it presents and not others. Such a composed multiplicity, 
the effect of structure, is consistent multiplicity since every-thing that is presented in 
it is necessarily counted as one thing, thereby producing consistency according to 
the regime of the count-as-one. With consistency being the result of the operation 
of the count-as-one, what is being counted can be established only in retroaction 
or as after-effect of the count (as it is not), as not-one and therefore as multiplicity, 
anterior to any count (BE: 24). Not being presented before the operation of the 
count that itself results in any discernible and presentable one-terms, all we can 
say about this multiplicity is that it is inconsistent multiplicity. Since everything in a 
situation is the result of its count-as-one, inconsistent multiplicity is both excluded 
from presentation (not counted) and included, as ‘phantom’ of the counting oper-
ation, as a must-be-counted (BE: 53). It is therefore necessary, “from the stand-
point of the immanence of the situation, that the pure multiple, absolutely unpre-
sentable according to the count, be nothing.” (ibid.) This being-nothing, crucially 
distinct from non-being, is what any count-as-one composes its situation from. 
The void is the name Badiou gives to this unlocalisable “nothing particular to 
3 Badiou uses Zermelo–Fraenkel’s system with the axiom of choice, in short ZFC, which is the 
most common foundation of mathematics today.
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the situation, … in which it is manifest both that the situation is sutured to being 
and that the that-which-presents-itself wanders in the presentation in the form of a 
subtraction from the count” (BE: 55). Although the void is not presented within 
a situation – as it is uncountable not-one – it is nonetheless specific to a situation, 
from the perspective of the situation under consideration (its structure), “inas-
much as presentation gives us therein an unpresentable access, thus non-access, 
to this access, in the mode of what is not-one, nor composable of ones; thus what 
is qualifiable within the situation solely as the errancy of the nothing” (BE: 56). 
Not being presented, the void is nonetheless that which is necessary for anything 
to be presented and in that way is what sutures, according to Badiou’s vocabulary, 
any given situation, via subtraction, to being. We can see now how Badiou can 
posit that the void is “the sole term from which ontology’s compositions without concept weave 
themselves” (BE: 57). If the void ‘is’ nothing and multiple, the only way to grasp it 
is that all presented terms “be ‘void’ such that they are composed from the void 
alone” (ibid.). In set-theoretical terms this presentation/non-presentation of the 
void is the empty set, which is posited by the axiom of the void-set, stating the 
existence of a set to which no elements belong.
To all presentation, the void poses the danger of inconsistency. Although struc-
tured by the count-as-one, everything in a situation is counted except the count 
itself. In order to ward off the “catastrophe of presentation” – that presentation be 
exposed to its own void – the count needs itself to be counted; structure needs, 
itself, to be structured (BE: 93). This need is based more precisely in the set-the-
oretical impossibility “for everything which is included (every subset) to belong 
to the situation”, because there is “an irremediable excess of sub-multiples over 
terms” (BE: 97). This excess of parts (subsets) over elements shows that there are 
always parts included in a situation that are not counted as terms in that situation. 
In order to secure the structure of presentation, the excess of parts (inclusion) over 
elements (belonging) needs to be counted again, resulting in a second structure. 
This metastructure is what Badiou calls the state of a situation and it consists 
in a second count of all subsets of the situation which amounts to all the possi-
ble recombinations of its elements, thus producing its powerset, in set-theoretical 
terms. What the state does is to secure presentation with the seal of representation 
by counting all the possible subsets of what belongs to the situation as parts included 
in it (BE: 81, 96). 
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Terms that are both presented and represented are called normal, whereas repre-
sented but not presented ones are termed excrescent and those presented but not 
represented singular (BE: 99). From these different relations between presentation 
(belonging) and representation (inclusion), only singular multiples, since they are 
subtracted from the re-securement via the state, harbour the potential to destabi-
lise structure, and therefore for change and novelty, in a situation. More precisely, 
this can only be attributed to what Badiou calls an evental site, which is a singu-
lar (presented) multiple of which none of the elements that compose it belong 
themselves to the situation. An evental site is said to be on the edge of the void since 
although it belongs to the situation, ‘beneath’ it there is nothing presentable (BE: 
175). This implies that an evental site is also foundational insofar as it presents 
(should it be ‘officially’ noticed), for the count-as-one, some primary yet-to-be-
counted. It is in this way that a site opens the situation to radical re-structuring 
(genuine change) based on the possibility for what is included in but does not 
belong to a situation, to be “‘admitted’ into the count” (ibid.). This is then the 
creation of something genuinely new in the situation, which means, also, a new 
situation altogether. For such radical change to take place an event has to happen 
at the evental site; to rupture not merely the state of affairs but the very struc-
ture of the situation by exposing presentation to inconsistency, the situation to its 
void. But although an event can be localised within presentation, it is itself never 
presented or presentable: “It is – not being – supernumerary” (BE: 178). As such 
it is extra-ontological, concerning ‘that-which-is-not-being-qua-being’, as are the 
interventions it might prompt. 
We can already recognise, at this point, how Badiou’s ontological project can 
provide for a foundation, in thought, for the praxis of creation. The concept of the 
evental site is what presents the un-ground from which novelty can arise, which 
therefore, for a situation, means that creation proceeds ex nihilo. It is important 
however to note that the void to which the evental site borders is specific to the 
situation of the site, it is-not in regard of what the situation presents. What we 
need to turn to now is the very ‘how’ of creation, how the void or specific nothing 
of a situation is summoned into a genuinely new situation, or simply, how some 
of what inconsists is made consistent. What will become apparent is, that on the 
basis of set theory ontology, Badiou can propose a formalism of the act of creation 
(the coming into being of a truth) which itself is strictly and necessarily extra-on-
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tological.  If ontology is what thinks the presentation of presentation, whatever 
radically transforms the being of a presented situation can only be imposed by 
an inconceivable, illegal outside to not only a singular presentation (a situation) 
but also the presentation of presentation as such (ontology). In the following par-
agraphs we will therefore work towards Badiou’s extra-ontological interventionist 
formalism of the subject of creation.
For Badiou, an event is a purely “hazardous”, aleatory exception, one “which 
cannot be inferred from the situation” itself (BE: 193). And although an evental 
site can be localised within a situation, it presents “only ever a condition of being for 
the event” (BE: 179). Furthermore, positing that an event is a paradoxical mul-
tiple “that is composed of, on the one hand, elements of the site” (which are indiscernible 
within the site’s situation), “and on the other hand, itself” (ibid.), the event proves to 
be properly impossible to the discourse of ontology. It is so since, as a multiple 
that necessarily belongs to itself, it is in violation of the axiom of foundation (BE: 
190). The axiom states that within every non-void multiple, there always exists a 
multiple that is presented (belongs) but whose elements in turn do not belong to 
the initial multiple, are not presented in it. In other words, the assumed multiple 
and the multiple that belongs to it have no element in common, they have nothing 
in common apart from being multiples (BE: 185-6). An event violates this axiom 
because it is a multiple that belongs to itself, which means that the multiple and its 
element, being both the same multiple, do have an element in common, namely 
the multiple they both are (BE: 190). Being barred from both presentation (the 
situation) and presentation of presentation (ontology), the event is both undecidable 
in regard to its situation and unfounded in regard to ontology (BE: 181; TO: 61). 
“What truly happens” writes Peter Hallward, “is always unfounded” (BST: 116) 
and only by means of breaching what founds presentation can a new situation 
come to be. 
Since from the standpoint of a situation, the belonging of an event to this sit-
uation is undecidable, “only an interpretative intervention can declare that an event 
is presented in a situation” (BE: 181). Such a decision of a ‘there is’ of an event, 
that an event does belong to the situation, is always a wager. Hence the ephemeral 
nature of any event, as once decided that it belongs to its situation, it is annulled 
as such an exception, having implied nothing other than a new term of the situ-
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ation (BE: 202). In order for an event to be effective, it has to be recognised and 
nominated as such. This is what Badiou understands as intervention: the recog-
nition and decision that something (not of this situation) did indeed take place, 
naming this evental occurrence and subsequently unfolding its consequences in 
the situation to which its site belongs (BE: 203), thereby radically transforming 
the situation. For a nomination of an event, an intervention has to “make a name out 
of an unpresented element of the site to qualify the event whose site is the site” (BE: 204). This 
naming is complex, since it involves a double function of the unpresented element 
that comes to bear the name the event. On the one hand, this element, from the 
viewpoint of the situation, remains unpresented and therefore anonymous – all we 
can say about it is that it belongs to the evental site, in which we can discern 
nothing. On the other hand, this element, as supernumerary name, is the result 
of an illegal act of nomination, since, as unpresented element in the situation, it 
cannot conform to any law of representation (BE: 205). The state of the situation, 
once it encounters the supernumerary name of an event, tries to re-secure this 
name’s belonging to the situation. The only parts the state can ‘know’ in regard of 
an event is its site and the suspicion that there is some novelty in the situation. In 
order to properly register the self-belonging name of the event, the state produces 
(forms-into-one) a singleton of the name of the event – which is to say a multiple 
to which only the name of the event belongs (BE: 207). On this basis, the state 
fixes a term as the canonical name of the event, which is made up of the evental 
“site (already marked out) and the singleton of the event (put into circulation 
by the intervention)” (BE: 208). What the intervention, by the declaration of an 
event, thus introduces to its situation is the name of the event as “incoherent state 
excrescence,” as an as of yet empty multiple that is represented (included) but not 
presented (belonging) in the situation (BE: 208-9).
Badiou draws the form of this post-evental intervention from the set theoretical 
idea of the axiom of choice. This axiom states that “given a multiple of multiples, 
there exists a multiple composed of a ‘representative’ of each non-void multiple 
whose presentation is assured by the first multiple” (BE: 224). This is to say that 
from a set of multiples, one can choose an element (representative) of each of 
these multiples and gather them together in a new set; this set so constructed is 
consistent. But since, for an infinite set, the construction of this function of choos-
ing representatives cannot be given a rule in order to be defined, precisely because 
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the multiple is infinite (BE: 225), the existence of the representative multiple is 
“indistinguishable insofar as the condition it obeys (choosing representatives) says 
nothing to us about the ‘how’ of its realization” (BE: 227). In a way, the func-
tion of choice, the concrete procedure of choosing representatives is suspended 
from existence since its operation cannot be decided and presented. As such, the 
function of choice is both illegal in regard to what structures presentation and 
anonymous in regard to its result, the representative multiple (BE: 229). These two 
characteristics link the axiom of choice to Badiou’s notion of the intervention, 
as the intervention is outside the law of the count (it is an illegal decision) and 
declares the name of the event from the void (from indiscernible anonymity) 
(BE: 230). We can see how the axiom of choice describes the existential form of 
any intervention, or in other words intervention thought in its being, without the 
event. But in order to come into being, an instantiation of an intervention draws 
its singularity from the event (ibid.). Badiou concludes that the “most profound 
lesson delivered by the axiom of choice is therefore that it is on the basis of the 
couple of the undecidable event and the interventional decision that time and his-
torical novelty result” (BE: 231).
On this basis, an intervention starts a truth procedure, since what is at stake is 
precisely the bringing into presentation of a truth, a specific truth of the situation 
in which the event was decided to have taken place. The unfolding of the conse-
quences of an event is what Badiou calls the procedure of fidelity. Fidelity consists 
in a series of enquiries evaluating which of the elements from the existing situation 
connect to the truth of the event, element by element (BE: 232-4). Badiou identifies 
deduction as the operational principle of fidelity (BE: 242). In order to determine 
the connection of a presented element to the event, a subject places herself in the 
fictive situation constructed out of the evental truth supplemented by the element 
under investigation in the form of an axiom (BE: 246). From this fictional placing, 
it can then be deduced, according to the criteria of the assumed (fictionally sup-
plemented) situation, if the presented term is compatible with the evental truth – 
either by reasoning via a hypothesis (ibid.) or by reasoning via the absurd (reductio 
ad absurdum) (BE: 251). Only if the term does indeed connect will it be added to 
the result-multiple – the excrescent multiple created by the event’s nomination – 
that collects all positively evaluated elements (termed conditions) of the situation. In 
this way, a procedure of fidelity traverses the existing situation erratically, without 
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concept, by chance, submitting each encountered element to its evaluation and 
thereby constructing, step by step, from the elements that prove to connect to its 
truth, “the new-multiple that is a post-evental truth” (BE: 335). 
Badiou takes the concept of this multiple – that “will found the very being of 
any truth” (BE: 327) – from the corpus of Cohen: the generic. What Badiou sets 
out to demonstrate is nothing less than the compatibility of ontology and truth, 
implying that “the being of a truth, as generic multiplicity, is ontologically think-
able, even if a truth is not” (BE: 355). The meditations in Being and Event devoted 
to the description and demonstration of the generic subset are rather complex and 
are discussed here only in a general but condensed fashion.4 The problem that the 
concept of the generic addresses is that of the relation “– which is rather a non-re-
lation – between, on the one hand, a post-evental fidelity, and on the other hand, 
a fixed state of knowledge, or what I term below the encyclopaedia of the situa-
tion” (BE: 327). Given that the generic subset indiscerns a truth in its situation, it 
cannot be constructed according to the knowledge of the situation, the counting 
by the state, because the latter would every time lurch forward to “trump fidelity 
with a peremptory ‘already-counted!’” (BE: 333). Therefore, the generic subset 
needs to be infinite (ibid.), to ‘evade’ its capture or its being counted by the state. 
Also, the generic subset needs to contain at least one enquiry that avoids the ency-
clopaedic determinant (BE: 337-8), in order to be subtracted from the knowledge 
of its situation. Such a subset is then indiscernible because it harbours something 
that is already known, together with something that is not, something that is 
subtracted from the language and encyclopaedia of the situation itself (BE: 370). 
It thereby designates “that what does not allow itself to be discerned is in reality 
the truth of a situation, the truth of its being, as considered as foundation of all 
knowledge to come” (BE: 327). It then follows that in order to construct a generic 
subset, it is in vain to try to rely on already available principles for grouping a 
situation’s elements. Rather – and this constitutes the generic procedure, the very 
doing of truth – every element of the situation has to be evaluated for its positive 
connection to the event, one at a time, in order that it come to belong, as condi- 
 
4 For the detailed argument the reader be referred to Meditations 31, 33 and 34 of Being and 
Event, as well as to Hallward’s lucid outline in the second half of Chapter 5 in his Badiou: A 
Subject to Truth.
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tion, to the generic subset. This demanded rigour, as opposed to reliance on or 
the repetition of what is known, is what Badiou understands as militancy.
The generic procedure constructs the generic subset and thereby makes it 
immanent to the situation, yet the generic subset is still indiscernible therein (BE: 
342). In order to become discernable, the generic subset, being an indiscernible 
part, has to become an element of the situation; it needs to be counted as one 
to come to belong to the situation. In a sense, it needs to be ‘legalised’ by the 
count-as-one but since it constitutes what the current situation cannot discern or 
know, it is the language of the situation that must be altered radically to accept 
(i.e. discern) this new term into its encyclopaedia, to make sense of it (ibid., 375). 
Badiou names this procedure forcing – a concept again appropriated from Cohen 
– and its exposition presents probably the most challenging part of Being and 
Event, and, as such, we will sketch it out here in a rudimentary fashion only.5 The 
supplementation of a situation with a new truth – for the former to recognise the 
latter as belonging to it – necessitates the complete transformation of this situation 
on the level of its regime of counting. For a generic subset to come to belong or 
be counted as one in a situation, the language of the situation needs to be trans-
formed to accommodate it, that is, the situation has to be ‘forced’ to discern it. 
“The striking paradox” of this undertaking, Badiou points out, “is that we are 
going to name the very thing which is impossible to discern” (BE: 376). In order 
for this to work, a name that already exists in the situation must be able to hypo-
thetically designate elements of the generic extension – the situation supplemented 
with the generic subset. This can be achieved by binding together in a name a 
multiple of the situation with a condition that intersects with that multiple (ibid.). 
Such a condition, resulting from the procedure of fidelity (a positively evaluated 
element resulting from a truth procedure), encodes information about the multi-
ple of the existing situation in regard of the multiple’s belonging to the situation to 
come. Therefore, a condition, resulting from a positive enquiry that connects it to 
the event, “forces a statement of the subject-language” (BE: 403), a statement that 
involves the name it helped to construct. Which means, “that the veracity of this 
statement in the situation to come is equivalent to the belonging of this term to the 
5 Building on the Meditations on the generic (primarily 33 and 34), Badiou’s adoption of forcing 
is outlined in the last two sections of Meditation 35, discussed in depth in Meditation 36 and 
given a ‘calculatory’ example of in Appendix 7 of Being and Event.
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indiscernible part which results from the generic procedure” (ibid.). A new name 
informs, so to say, via the condition, the sense of the existing multiple it concerns 
so as to verify its referred (but still indiscernible) term of the generic extension, in 
the supplemented situation to come (BE: 411). Having no referents in the existing 
situation – because they refer to terms of the generic subset, which is indiscerni-
ble – the new names designate terms “which ‘will have been’ presented in a new 
situation: the one which results from the addition to the situation of a truth (an 
indiscernible) of that situation” (BE: 398). In this way, forcing creates terms that 
are verifiable by the future knowledge of the situation to come, or as Badiou puts 
it: “The essential character of the names, the names of the subject-language, is 
itself tied to the subjective capacity to anticipate, by forcing, what will have been 
veridical from the standpoint of a supposed truth” (BE: 433).
An important note concerns the extent of the transformation the use of forcing 
implies. Namely that, being an extension of the situation, the generic extension 
maintains many (or most) of the situation’s terms, especially its ‘natural part’ 
(in mathematical terms: all its ordinals) (BE: 384) and the laws of the multiple 
themselves (ontology), which therefore guarantees consistency for the generic 
extension, meaning that a generic procedure cannot ruin the situation or presenta-
tion in general (BE: 417, 426). Certain statements though cannot be established 
as veridical in the situation (as has been shown above) nor be demonstrated by 
ontology, yet they can retroactively be proven to belong to (be veridical in) the 
generic extension. Such statements are undecidable from the standpoint of the situ-
ation (BE: 419). 
The particular connection “between an indiscernible part of a situation and 
the forcing of a statement whose veracity is undecidable in the situation” – but 
veridical in the situation-to-come and thus decided (in the future anterior) – is 
what presents us with the “possibility of the being of the Subject” (BE: 417). Only 
a subject, whose being depends on the fidelity to an event and which is therefore 
extra-ontological – ‘that-which-is-not-being-qua-being’ – is able to make such deci-
sions concerning the situation to come. In the meditation that Badiou dedicates to 
the theory of the subject, he makes a number of preliminary remarks that concern 
the attachment to modern metaphysics by which subjectivity is still thought – 
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unsurprisingly dismissing any such orientation.6 In short, a subject cannot be 
thought as either substance or meaning or void point because a generic procedure 
draws from what is indiscernible and is realised as multiplicity. A subject is also 
not an organisation of experience, since experience, in ontological thought, might 
at most designate presentation as such but can say nothing of a truth – which is 
both subtracted from presentation and the constitutive possibility of being of a 
subject – since a truth is, again, indiscernible. The subject is not a structural neces-
sity or principle of situations, since generic procedures are exceptional and rare, 
nor is it thinkable as being removed from or somehow independent in regard to 
a situation (having an essence by or in itself), since it only emerges as subject of 
a truth that is necessarily specific to a situation. And lastly, a subject is neither 
result nor origin, since the procedure that constitutes it is infinite and begins with 
an event. What a subject is, according to Badiou, is “any local configuration of 
a generic procedure from which a truth is supported” (BE: 391), a configuration 
that is in excess of its situation (BE: 392). Let’s clarify this last point by recapitu-
lating the procedure of a truth from the perspective of the subject, step by step. In 
response to an exceptional occurrence, an intervention is what names this event 
as having happened and the operator of faithful connection to the nominated 
event is what founds the generic procedure. The subject, “as local situated con-
figuration, is neither the intervention nor the operator of fidelity, but the advent 
of their Two, that is, the incorporation of the event into the situation in the mode 
of a generic procedure” (BE: 393). Considering the local status of a generic pro-
cedure, it becomes clear that the former depends on the procedure’s encounters 
with terms of the situation, one after another. If we assume these enquired terms, 
as multiples, to be “the matter of the subject” (BE: 394), this matter is not what the 
subject is reducible to, since the subject exists as procedure. A subject, being finite, 
can neither be coextensive with the infinite truth it supports, nor coincide with the 
statist knowledge of a situation, since the subject’s being unfolds in the aleatory 
encounter of those terms that form its ‘matter’ by chance. As Badiou puts it: “If 
the subject does not have any other being-in-situation than the term-multiples it 
encounters and evaluates, its essence, since it has to include the chance of these 
encounters, is rather the trajectory which links them” (BE: 395-6). 
6 See Meditation 35, specifically pp. 391-2. Hallward provides a concise overview, see: BST, 140.
32
In supporting the realisation of a truth that it can never ultimately know (since 
being finite, it cannot have access to a completed truth, whose procedure is infinite), 
the only relation a subject can entertain to the truth whose construction it sustains 
is the ‘knowing belief’ that there is a truth, which Badiou also refers to as confidence 
(BE: 397). What supports this belief are the nominations a subject generates, the 
names of which are from the situation (therefore discernible) but whose referents 
are in the future anterior, their signification being suspended “from the ‘to-come’ 
of a truth” (BE: 398). With these names, a subject-language makes hypotheses 
about that unfinishable result that a truth is by “displac[ing] established signifi-
cations and leave[ing] the referent void: this void will have been filled if a truth 
comes to pass as a new situation” (BE: 399). Only by having come into presenta-
tion can an indiscernible part retroactively assign the meaning of such names 
according to its truth or verify a statement from a subject-language. As has been 
touched upon above, a subject can force veracity at the point of an indiscernible 
(BE: 411), since, after Cohen, it is possible “to determine under what conditions 
such or such a statement is veridical in the generic extension obtained by the 
addition of an indiscernible part of the situation” (BE: 410). 
For every encounter in a procedure of fidelity, a subject can therefore know, 
under condition, if a statement will prove either certainly wrong, or has at least 
the chance to be veridical, still being “suspended from the will-have-taken-place of 
one positive enquiry” (BE: 404). If then, for a statement that has the chance to be 
veridical, certain terms force it and others force its negation, the decision of this 
undecidable statement depends on an enquiry “in which a term which forces the 
statement, in one sense or another, is reported to be connected to the name of the 
event” (BE: 407). Belonging to the indiscernible truth, this term allows a subject 
to know that the statement it forces will have been veridical or not in the generic 
extension. Whereas for a ‘normal’ inhabitant of the situation there is neither such 
term or name nor, of course, any access to the indiscernible truth that would allow 
it to recognise the disruptive sense of a forced statement. Badiou condenses this in 
yet another definition of the subject as “that which decides an undecidable from 
the standpoint of an indiscernible” (ibid.). 
Finally, Badiou insists, against Lacan, on the rarity of the subject. With Lacan, 
we could still hold that there always are some subjects, thinking them as delo-
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calised, empty places within representation. The issue here, Badiou argues, con-
cerns the localisation of the void. Lacan sides with “a structural recurrence, which 
thinks the subject-effect as void-set, thus as identifiable within the uniform net-
works of experience” (BE: 432), which ultimately presents a structure dependent 
on language, however ex-centred or delocalised. For Badiou, the subject is born 
from the rare occurrence of an event, which returns “the void to, and reinsuring 
it within, a function of suture to being, the knowledge of which is deployed by 
mathematics alone”, which is to say dissociated from language and networks of 
experience (ibid.). The subject is what supports the infinite and aleatory proce-
dure of a truth – a truth is rather the matter of the subject than its cause. If we 
were to ask for the cause of a subject, we would ultimately have to return to the 
event itself (BE: 433), as it is the event that ‘causes’ the conditions of the subject: 
the indiscernible, a generic procedure, fidelity, an intervention (BE: 434). For 
these reasons, Badiou states that:
The ‘there-is’ of the subject is the coming-into-being of the event, via the 
ideal occurrence of a truth, in its finite modalities. By consequence, what 
must always be grasped is that there is no subject, that there are no longer 
some subjects. What Lacan still owed to Descartes, a debt whose account 
must be closed, was the idea that there were always some subjects. (ibid.)
This conception of the subject presents, in a way, the inversion of the constitutive 
role it takes up in relation to conventional theories of agency. Rather than trying 
to think how an existing subject can initiate radical change – an undertaking that 
has been outlined at the beginning of this chapter as impossible within the bound-
aries of mainstream contemporary thought – Badiou shows how the subject is 
born from its affirmation of an evental irruption.7 Contrary to the notion of the 
subject of Descartes, Kant or Hegel, he writes, “this subject will be singular and 
not universal, and it will be singular because it will always be an event that consti-
tutes the subject as a truth” (Badiou, 2005a: 42). In being constituted as the oper-
7 There is, however, a problem of circular reasoning in the foundation of both the subject and 
the event. Sam Gillespie briefly discusses this point in his The Mathematics of Novelty, stating that: 
“The problem with this [incomplete foundation of the conditions of an event] is that it is tau-
tological: subjects constitute events at the same time that subjects are miraculously constituted 
by the naming and recognition of events” (Gillespie, 2008: 102).
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ative part of the truth it participates in unfolding, Badiou’s subject is purged of the 
immense obstacles that common notions of the subject face in the task of radical 
change – at least on the completely subtracted, generic level of the conception at 
hand. Put bluntly, a subject that is instantiated from the seed of the future that it 
cannot but bring about is never confronted with the limitations of the situation 
it is born to subtractively transform. The militancy of a faithful subject never 
meets a limitation but only ever a next evaluation of terms in the infinite series 
of enquiries (truth procedure) that is already founded on and informed by the 
radical difference (truth) that it is to bring about. This practical annihilation of the 
question of subjective agency then shifts the foundational problem of creation of 
radical novelty to the conception of the event and its (non-)relation to both being 
as such and the situation from which it arises and that it comes to rupture.
To recapitulate: On the one side (the side of the situation), the event can only 
be axiomatically posited as exception, an impossible, illegal occurrence in regard 
to being as such, since it presents “that-which-is-not-being-qua-being” (BE: 13), 
that which disrupts the consistency of presentation of being. On the other side, it 
is because being is founded on the void that the event – as a multiple constructed 
from the specific void of the evental site of a situation – can both be thought and 
gain traction on the situation that a faithful subject is consequentially to trans-
form. The void (inconsistent multiplicity) is the condition of possibility for both, 
a situation (consistent multiplicity) and that which comes to supplement it (the 
event and the following generic procedure), which eventually requires that situa-
tion’s radical, structural transformation (by way of forcing). The way consistent 
presentation of being comes to be, we recall, is that the operation of the count 
discerns and makes consistent some inconsistent multiplicity. Such resulting mul-
tiples make up the elements of the situation for which the count is the structuring 
operator, by coming to belong to the situation-multiple. In order to secure the 
situation from the excess of parts over elements (of what is included over what 
belongs), a second structure needs to be established (state of the situation) which 
counts all the parts of the elements of a situation, resulting in the representa-
tion (powerset) of the situation. When an event occurs, it is precisely this level 
of representation or inclusion that the evental multiple surges from: the evental 
site, the multiple that belongs to the situation but of which nothing is included 
in that situation, therefore presenting the edge of the void. That an event is con-
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sequential though requires a subjective intervention, a decision and wager by a 
subject that something indeed took place, which is properly undecidable in regard 
to the situation and unfounded in regard to being. This assertion of the event 
will itself “bring about the conditions for its own verification: in drawing the 
consequences of that assertion, we slowly transform the parameters of cognitive 
possibility governing the logic of the situation in such a way as to render what 
was previously unthinkable thinkable (the situation’s generic truth) and what was 
previously unknowable knowable (‘forcing’ the generic supplement of the situa-
tion)” (Brassier and Toscano, 2004: 263-4). The conceptual rationalisation of this 
unfounded decision – Badiou terms this an intervention, which is formalised in 
the axiom of choice – is itself made possible by his own meta-ontological decision 
that exceptions, in form of events, can occur. With this postulation, the void is not 
only the foundation of structured being but becomes also the thinkable (even if 
anonymous) foundation for the former’s radical transformation. 
The force of Badiou’s argument in Being and Event, as we have come to see, 
lies in what follows from the void as foundation of being. That being is not-all, 
untotalisable, means that what is is not all there can be, that our situation is but 
one contingent instantiation ‘out of’ inconsistent multiplicity, out of nothing, and 
that what is not can be thought in terms of the void and can rupture into being as 
exceptional event. The simple and undeniably powerful upshot thereof lies in the 
affirmation that radical novelty (truth) is indeed possible and can come to be. In 
this way, Badiou separates the question of creation and novelty from the limita-
tions of human experience (language, finitude, meaning, perception, etc.), demon-
strating that radical novelty can come to be via an event, based on our capacity 
to think an outside as nothing, as inconsistent multiplicity. For this crucial point 
of affirmation of the possibility of radical change, it is of no importance that Badi-
ou’s system, as an exercise of maximal subtraction, is without any real relation 
to existing worlds and with often debatable connections to historical events. As 
Gillespie remarks: “Whether or not there has ever been a true event is therefore 
beside the point: it is simply enough to know that there can be events insofar as 
we are capable of thinking nothing” (Gillespie, 2008: 148). 
36
At the same time, the severe subtraction of Badiou’s ontological system presents 
difficulties once it is to inform practices and subjective enactments in actual exist-
ing situations, like our world today. By exclusively considering being as such in 
set theoretical terms, it is far from clear how some of the central notions of his 
system are to be understood in a worldly situation.8 It is nearly twenty years later, 
in the second volume of Being and Event titled Logics of Worlds, that Badiou comes 
to address many of the questions and problems raised by the first volume – some 
of which have been outlined above and will be discussed at end of the Chapter 2. 
Its discussion will take place in the following chapter.
8 This difficulty can be illustrated with one of the examples Hallward uses on more than one 
occasion when trying to clarify what the central notion of a singular term is (an element that 
belongs but is not included in the situation, i.e. an evental site). For Hallward, the proletariat 
is a prime example for an evental site in that “the working class occupies the edge of the (pro-
letarian) void: the situation certainly counts this class as one of its elements, but has no signifi-
cant ways of counting individual workers as thinking or creative people, as opposed to more or 
less diligent and deferential employees, or as consumers, or as patriots …” (Hallward, 2004: 
9). Or in a slightly different version: “The canonical example, of course, is the evental location 
of the proletariat … in the site defined by the exploitation of waged laborers. Having nothing 
than its own being … the proletariat is the void that sutures the capitalist situation to its be-ing; 
it is the one fragile link between this situation and the general inconsistency of human be-ing 
as such” (Hallward, 2003: 118-9). The major problem here is the radical simplification, or the 
metaphorical employment, of the central assumption of the evental site and the void. That the 
individual worker would not in any significant way count in the capitalist situation grossly 
ignores that it is precisely by keeping count of individuals, in the quantification of the work-
force, that capitalism not only acknowledges every worker (probably not as individual human 
being but as number) but quantifies her every move, efficiency, etc. (For this simple objection, 
one only needs to consider capitalisms own milestones in the exploitation of its workforce, for 
which Taylorism might be one obvious historical reference.) If Hallward is simply to point out 
that capitalist exploitation produces a whole class of (systemically highly relevant) individuals 
that are denied full recognition as human beings and deprived of the means to unfold their 
human potential, then why force this correct assessment onto a conceptual construct whose 
central claim is precisely that there is no way, from within a situation, to distinguish these 
elements of an evental site – which either renders the possibility of any such assessment void 
in the first place (unless one occupies a transcendental position) or implicitly enforces, on the 
other hand, the maxim of human fulfillment (vaguely detectable in Hallward’s formulation) as 
the criteria for the count of the situation. Taking the proletariat with its long history in strug-
gles and theoretisation even before its appearance as subject of history (1917) as an example 
for something that is not representable, or void (as in the second quote), is simply not taking 
serious the conceptual notion that is to be exemplified. The evental site, as that which is not 
representable in a situation, cannot have a name, and what is void cannot only not be named 
but simply doesn’t exist at all in a situation. 
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2
The Appearance of Novelty in Existence
In the previous chapter an account has been given of how, within Badiou’s set 
theory ontology, we can think generic situations (the presentation of being), as 
well as that which can rupture such situations and initiates their transfiguration 
into radical new situations under the name of the event. This ontological model 
provides a foundation for the act of creation by asserting the latter’s generic 
possibility and operation subtracted from all worldly contexts. This assertion is 
based on Badiou’s postulate that what is is consistent multiplicity, presenting what 
results (is made discernible) from inconsistent multiplicity or the void by a regime 
of counting (the operator of structure), whereas what is not can come to erupt 
and be constituted (as genuine novelty) by way of truth procedures enacted by 
subjects in the wake of (and in fidelity to) an event. Whilst Badiou presents a 
forceful reinvigoration of ontology within contemporary philosophy – combined 
with his pronounced insistence on the notions of event, truth and subject freed 
from discourse, experience, knowledge and language – his ontological model as 
formulated in Being and Event cannot readily be connected with procedures of 
change and creation in actual existing worlds. As Sam Gillespie writes, “it seems 
that it is not enough to have a formal system that could work to produce change 
and innovation in and through the production of truth – it also has to account 
for the very real possibility of change occurring under these conditions [the limit 
conditions of experience, in a world]” (Gillespie, 2008: 147). What is required 
here is on one side a clarification of the relation between the ontological and the 
ontic realm – between being and being-there, existence – and on the other, a sup-
plementation of the ontological model with a compatible concept of existence, in 
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which the former provides the conditions in thought for genuine novelty through 
creation that is linked with a transfigurative capacity in existence, for any kind of 
situated world.
Regarding our central concern with the act of creation, the guiding trajectory 
for the remaining chapters can be subsumed under the question of how radical 
novelty comes to appear in existence. After the assertion and conceptualisation 
of the ontological possibility of genuine novelty in the previous chapter, what 
needs to be laid out is how radical novelty (that which hitherto in-existed) can 
break into and manifest itself in existence. In order to develop the question of 
what constitutes such a novelty and what causes it in a world, an account has 
to be given of what existence is, how it can be thought and how it relates to the 
ontological realm, so as to base our further investigations on this foundation. To 
outline such an ontic extension, following Badiou’s more recent work, is the task 
of this chapter.
To address such an extension of his subtractive ontology is the objective of Logics 
of Worlds, and the collection of essays leading up to this second volume of Being 
and Event, namely Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology. Before 
turning to those two books, let us briefly clarify what we need such a conception 
of existence to accomplish. First, and again, existence is reinvigorated as problem 
for thought (and not mere analysis) once we shift our efforts from merely inter-
preting the world, what is given to us in experience, to thinking existence as such, 
taking on whatever worldly form (including our world today). This orientation 
results from the assertion that genuine novelty can indeed come to exist, imposing 
on us the task to account for the conditions and constitution of the appearance of 
worlds in general, so that we gain a foundation to think radically new instances 
of existence as consistent worlds. The decision to think genuine novelty under 
the name of creation therefore entails a non-specific, generic concept of exist-
ence, which understands existence as the framework of presentation of whatever 
specific instance of it, in the form of a world. Existence is therefore thought to 
be the framework within which radical change can come to appear. As regards 
the phenomena that appear as existing within a world, we are then looking for 
a way to understand their appearance in general, abstracted from the phenome-
na’s worldly context, that defines their being-there. Badiou terms this undertaking, 
which lies at the heart of his Logics of Worlds, a calculated or objective phenomenology 
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(LW: 38). To term his undertaking objective phenomenology is to express that 
the existence of the objects that appear (that are-there) is thought independently 
of any consciousness that might perceive them, and is instead purely based on the 
immanent existential organisation that governs the appearance of an ontological 
situation as world. This does not mean that there might not be a problem in the 
different ways we individually perceive and understand the objects of a shared 
world or this world itself. But this question of perception, with Badiou’s approach, 
poses rather a complication than a challenge to the more fundamental questions 
regarding the possibility and mode of appearance in general.  In that sense, we can 
posit that first of all, ‘stuff’ exists as the being-there of some multiple-being and 
only second, that there might be an inherent problem for consciousness to fully 
access objects in existence. The way in which ‘stuff exists’ can be understood, 
again in Badiou’s term, as appearance, as the generic way that allows any multiple 
of an ontological situation to appear as material or non-material object in the 
consistent, ordered presentation it is situated in – a world. On the one hand, this 
is a powerful claim of Badiou’s: to understand worlds according to some order-
ing principle that is inherent to the specific world in question, whilst stating that 
what appears is precisely the elements of its ontological situation. This amounts 
to postponing the problem of perception, since the ontological situation prescribes 
exactly what is and therefore what comes to appear (rendering subjective percep-
tions of what appears unproblematic, or at least secondary). On the other hand, 
this raises the question or problem of how to justify such an ontological ‘primacy’ 
over existence, meaning that the being of anything that appears is primary to its 
appearance. In order to discuss this assumption properly we need to elaborate 
on the general relation between being and being-there, between Badiou’s ontol-
ogy and objective phenomenology. In order to do this we need to delineate their 
respective realms (in thought and existence) as well as to delineate their points of 
connection and the ways these connections are to be understood.
The decision for a generic approach to thinking existence means once again 
(similar to set theory ontology) an abstraction from all specifics of what there 
is, except at the topological level of appearance itself, as that which makes being 
appear as one consistent world in the first place, that which localises being so it 
be-there. It is therefore again a matter of abstraction – although in a different way 
than that performed in ontology – where we want to abstract from all specifics of 
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a world, but still maintain the category of ‘world’ as the being-there of an ontolog-
ical situation. At the same time we need to account for everything that makes it 
possible for a world to exist as a specific world (including objects, relations, logical 
consistency, etc.). In this understanding the level of abstraction is less ‘severe’ than 
it was exercised in Badiou’s set theoretical conception of being in that it needs 
to provide a model of how a world can exist in its specificity, without this model 
being determined by any specifics of a particular world, e.g. ours today.
Now what is the precise sense of the abstraction Badiou employs in order to 
think being-there generically? The question here is, as Badiou puts it, “to under-
stand the birth of objectivity” (Badiou, 2007b: 66), which is to say the foundation 
of the appearance of things (as objects) in a world. He continues:
How can a pure multiplicity, a set, appear in a world, in a very complex 
network of differences, identities, qualities, intensities and so on? 
It is impossible to deduce something like that from the purely mathematical 
thinking of the multiplicities as set of sets, ultimately composed of the purity 
of the void. If ontology as a theory of things without qualities is mathe-
matics, phenomenology as the theory of appearing and objectivity concerns 
the relationship between qualitative differences, problems of identities and 
of existence. And all that is on the basis of a place for appearance, or for 
being-there, a place we name: a world. 
After the mathematics of being qua being we have to develop the logic of 
the worlds. Unlike the logic of things, which are composed of sets of sets, the 
logic of worlds cannot be purely extensional. The logic must be that of the 
distribution of intensities in the field where multiplicities not only are, but 
also appear here, in a world. The law of things is to be as pure multiplici-
ties (as things), but also to be-there as appearing (as objects). The rational 
science of the first point is mathematical ontology. The rational science of the 
second point is logical phenomenology … Existence is a general category of 
the logic of appearance, and we can talk about existence completely apart 
from any consideration about subjectivity. … “existence” is an a-subjective 
concept. (Badiou, 2007b: 66-7)
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Contrary to the set-theoretical conception of being-qua-being, where consistency 
is the result of an operation of counting that exposes inconsistency as the real 
principle of being, the “mathematics of appearing consists in detecting, beneath 
the qualitative disorder of worlds, the logic that holds together the differences of 
existence and intensity” (LW: 39). In other words, the central issue in the concep-
tion of being-there is to posit a framework that can account for the consistency of 
a world, that can explain the constitution, by appearing, of “an always linked and 
connected world” (TO: 163). If we consider a set of objects in a world, we can say 
that they appear in different intensities in this world – more or less ‘prominent’ 
or ‘recognisable’ – and that the degrees of intensity of appearance are specific to 
the configuration of that world. This presents us with “a system of degrees, with 
an elementary structure which authorizes the comparison of degrees” (Badiou, 
2007b: 67). These degrees can be thought of as being organised in the formal 
structure of an order of intensities of appearing, which Badiou names the transcen-
dental of a world. The transcendental is the ordering principle that makes a world 
appear as coherent and as one, a principle that is both objective and internal to the 
world it orders. Hallward clarifies that unlike “Kant’s idealist conception of the 
transcendental (attributed to the structural, a priori operation of a subject), Badi-
ou’s transcendental regime is entirely a function of the objective world it governs 
and in which it is itself included; it is part of the sphere occupied … by an ‘object 
without subject’” (BST: 297). The transcendental regime orders its objects by 
their intensity of appearance, which Badiou understands as their self-affirmation 
in the world, representing their degree of self-identity that ranges from non-exist-
ent to maximally existent. Although the structure of any transcendental regime 
is understood to be uniform, its “sophistication or range of degrees is infinitely 
variable” (BST: 299). Which is to say that the structure of order is simply one 
from minimal to maximal intensity of appearing, whereas the infinite complexity 
and relational multi-dimensionality of what a world’s appearance is constituted 
by can be understood as being inherent to the specific world under consideration. 
In summary, worlds, “as infinitely diversified figures of being-there, … effectively 
absorb the infinite nuances of qualitative intensities into a transcendental frame-
work whose operations are invariant” (LW: 38). Where the invariance is the fact 
that there is always an immanent, singular logic and transcendental to a world 
that orders the objects of this world into one coherent appearance. This is, in a 
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nutshell, the sort of abstraction Badiou performs in his conception of being-there, 
which is to think “the being of appearing” (TO: 164).
In as far as “appearing is an intrinsic determination of Being” (TO: 162), and 
objective phenomenology is the rational science of appearing, we need to clarify 
how being-there or appearing is conceptualised by Badiou to be connected or 
compatible with his mathematical ontology presented in Being and Event – and 
moreover how such thought prescribes this determination of being (to appear) to 
be intrinsic to being itself. For logic to be compatible with set theory ontology, it 
has “itself to be a component of the science of Being, and hence of mathematics. 
Logic is required to be mathematical logic” (TO: 164). The problem Badiou faces 
is epitomised in the understanding of logic as formalisation of language or form 
of syntax, which was popularised under the banner of the linguistic turn and by 
analytic philosophy. The kind of mathematisation of logic resulting from the for-
malisation of language authorised the seizure of philosophy by language and “the 
cost of this was the destitution of ontology itself: either in the shape given to it 
by Wittgenstein, namely, statements of ontology are non-sense; or in the version 
Heidegger gives to it, namely, statements of metaphysics are in the epoch of their 
nihilistic closure” (TO: 110). The event in thought that, according to Badiou, 
allows philosophy to wrest itself from the consequences of this disastrous math-
ematisation of logics (i.e. the dominion of linguistics) is the development of cate-
gory theory (ibid.). This new mathematical framework heralds a “complete shift 
in perspective” (TO: 113), which allows for a mathematised logic to emerge from 
and be enveloped by a mathematical (ontological) decision. It is worth quoting 
Badiou at length here:
The theory of Categories proposes a complete reversal of perspectives. 
Whereas the syntactical presentation of logic as formal language disposes its 
universes, or models, as semantic interpretations, in the categorical presenta-
tion what exists are Universes, of which logic is an internal dimension. … 
Logic now appears as an immanent constraint enveloped by mathematics. 
And above all, logic is localized. It is a presented, situated dimension of 
universes whose possibility mathematics describes. … The problem of the 
delimitation of mathematics and logic thus takes on a completely different 
turn. This delimitation no longer lets itself be decided by linguistic criteria 
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that would exhaust its power. It is referred back to distinctions, themselves 
ontological, that are far more fundamental, and that concern two conceptual 
pairs: that of the real and the possible, and that of the global and the local. 
It marks out what we might call an essential ontological geometrization of 
the relationship between logic and mathematics.1
In advancing a strictly formalised, logical conception of structures, their abstract 
properties and regulated relations between them, category theory is a description 
of possible mathematical universes (TO: 145). In this way logic structures the 
field of global possibility for any specific mathematical and ontological universe. 
On the other hand side “it is also, by the same token, a merely possible dimen-
sion, and thus empty of any real prescriptive force” (BST: 303). A mathematical 
or ontological universe has to be decided upon, and for this, logics in the form of 
the descriptive framework of possible universes provides no means to infer such 
a decision. Operating not in a merely descriptive or definitional mode but axio-
matically, only real mathematics decides a universe (TO: 119) in a primary and 
self-foundational manner, and thereby determines the local logic of its particular 
universe as a consequence. In this sense, logic cannot found any mathematical or 
ontological universe, “and as soon as we begin speaking of the real rather than the 
merely possible, we speak from the practical priority of mathematics over logic” 
(BST: 303).
The condition under which Badiou placed his ontology within the first volume 
of Being and Event is prescribed exclusively by the mathematical developments of 
set theory. With his more recent investigations into logic and category theory this 
commitment in no way suffers, indeed, its domination has even been bolstered to 
envelop the condition of the thought of being-there by logics. As Hallward sum-
marises, Badiou “accepted the condition imposed by a duly mathematized logic, 
but in such a way as to make this condition itself subordinate to the more funda-
mental condition of mathematics itself (i.e., of mathematics as truth procedure) 
… In this way, the hierarchy of decision over logic and truth over language is pre-
served and reinforced” (BST: 312-3). Badiou terms this double condition of his 
1 This is Hallward’s more lucid translation as it appears in BST: 302-3. The same section can be 
found in Madarasz’ complete but slightly confusing translation here: TO: 113.
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endeavour around Logics of Worlds “onto-logical” which “is the domain described, 
by category theory, of the logical consequences of an ontological decision” (BST: 
308-9). 
What of existence can be apprehended with Badiou’s objective phenomenol-
ogy? What kind of perspective on being-there does it establish? For Badiou, as 
we came to understand above, the problem in thinking being-there or existence 
hinges on the question of consistency, of how an infinitely complex world none-
theless appears as one consistent world. His conception is again abstracted from 
whatever qualities a specific world would present in order to formalise the generic 
and objective laws of appearance that apply for the appearing of any being as 
being-somewhere. This is how a world can then become “a transcendental frame-
work whose operations are invariant” (LW: 38) at the same time as the transcen-
dental organisation of any world is immanent to this world, allowing for poten-
tially infinitely many ways of being-there for even a single multiplicity in being 
(LW: 114). The consequence of this abstraction is that Badiou can now more or 
less easily link the procedures of real change developed in Being and Event (con-
cerning the radical reconfiguration of a situation in being) to the transfiguration 
of the transcendental order of a world. In short, he thereby succeeds in giving an 
elaborate answer to the question of how novelty can appear, how radical change 
can occur in general. 
Logics of Worlds: How can genuine novelty appear?
The issues that Logics of Worlds sets out to resolve concern both the appearance 
of radical novelty and the local support, in a world, of a truth procedure that 
enacts such a radical transformation of its world. Badiou subdivides the work 
into seven books, starting with a refinement of his theory of the subject, a theory 
that is “essentially formal” (LW: 46) and can therefore be formulated before and 
independent of any principles of the logics of appearing that take up the next 
three books, subsumed under the title of a Greater Logic. Proceeding from the 
transcendental organisation of worlds to a new thinking of objects to what consti-
tutes relations, the Greater Logic presents the core of Logics of Worlds and Badiou’s 
theory of the being of appearing, or objective phenomenology. In a somewhat 
similar broadening gesture that refined the theory of the subject in Book I, Book 
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IV attends to the notion of change, ranging now from simple becoming to true 
change. It follows a theory of ‘points’, which concerns the localisation or crys-
tallisation of decisions in a world. The last book discusses the body as material 
support of a subject in a world, capable of treating such points.
Turning now to an exegesis of Badiou’s sequel to Being and Event we will 
proceed again by first engaging in a close and rather technical reading of Logics 
which is then followed by a discussion that focuses on a problematic and funda-
mental inconsistency in Badiou’s system. The lengthy engagement is necessary 
in order to present the intricacies that, in the end, unbind some of the founda-
tional assumption of not only Logics but also Being and Event. Regarding Logics of 
Worlds, we shall concentrate on the conceptual expositions and, for the most 
part, skip over the formal, mathematical sections. This omission starts with and 
mainly concerns the Greater Logic (Books II-IV) and is for two ultimately related 
reasons: First, the considerable level of abstraction and formalisation that allows 
Badiou to put forward a generic concept of the appearance of worlds (his objec-
tive phenomenology) also makes it quite impossible to establish any tangible con-
nection for his overall thought to the situated concerns and struggles taking place 
in the world of ours today. As such, although the elucidation of the question of 
appearance or being-there promises to clarify the question if and how we can 
wilfully ‘provoke’ and enact procedures of radical change, Badiou himself notes 
that the “transcendental analytic of being-there, or formal theory of worlds, or 
Greater Logic, leaves the question of change untouched” (LW: 357). This eval-
uation accentuates an undertone of the whole of Logics, namely Badiou’s vague 
(but effective) reluctance to envisage any kind of meaningful connection of the 
set-theoretical, ontological framework of his theory of radical change to any spe-
cific, actual worldly situation and transformational enactments therein. As we will 
come to see, this is connected to the second reason for our cursory treatment of 
the Greater Logic, namely Badiou’s insistence on the primacy of ontology over 
existence or of being over being-there.2 Arguably this choice is also what necessi-
2 An assumption that is indebted to Badiou’s commitment to Plato, on which Hallward notes: 
“Badiou’s own neoplatonic option, then, implies (at various stages of the argument) the des-
titution of the categories of ‘substance,’ ‘thing,’ ‘object’ and ‘relation’; the ontological primacy 
of mathematical over physical reality; the distinction of mathematics from logic and the clear 
priority of the former over the latter. In this Platonic tradition, that mathematics is a form of 
thought means, first of all, that it ‘breaks with sensory immediacy,’  so as to move entirely 
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tates Badiou to propose such an intricate and complex apparatus of appearance 
(in the form of his Greater Logic), a choice and consequence that Hallward sums 
up as follows:
By adding a ‘phenomenological’ and ‘objective’ dimension to his system, 
Badiou can fairly claim to have addressed a good many of the questions put 
to his extra-worldly ontology. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose 
that the occasional arcane intricacy of Badiou’s logic in any sense attenuates 
his fundamental Platonic commitment to abstraction and simplification. On 
the contrary, it is precisely in order to compensate for the consequences of his 
enthusiastically simple if not simplistic conceptions of being (without beings), 
of appearing (without perception), of relation (without relation), of change 
(without history), of decision (without alternatives), of exception (without 
mediation), that Badiou must develop such an elaborate and laborious 
theory of logical worlds. (Hallward, 2008: 120).
We briefly encountered Badiou’s general reasoning for the subordination of logics 
(of appearing) under mathematics (as ontology, the thought of being) above in the 
short discussion of his Briefings on Existence. More to the point, the implicit leaning 
of ontological primacy over existence suggests that what is-there (objects, worlds) 
is what exists or appears locally of being (consistent multiplicity). Which is to say 
that being not exactly pre-exists being-there (in the sense of cause or time) but 
that the being of an existent is still primary to that existent’s being-there. Or on 
the level of a world, that a worldly situation is predetermined by its ontological 
structure – in terms of both, the counted (but abstract) multiples that belong to a 
situation and the structure of belonging and inclusion of this situation – and not 
simply coextensive with it. Badiou expresses this, for example, as “the inscription 
of a multiplicity in a world” (LW: 36), or “the realization of being-qua-being as 
being-there-in-a-world” (ibid.) – in every case, “Being has the last word” (LW: 
302). 
within the pure sufficiency of the Ideal” (BST: 53).
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The major problem with this tendency of ontological primacy is that Badiou at 
no point in his oeuvre gives an account of how exactly an ontological situation 
comes to be, how it acquires its structure – other than stating that its structure 
is the result of an operation of counting, which is the mechanism that produces 
consistency. This mechanism, and crucially its operation, would need to be thor-
oughly exposed if the construction of an ontological situation (and by conse-
quence a world) is to be assumed a purely ontological affair. Otherwise Badiou 
would need to concede that either being is not primary, that ontological situations 
are abstractions of what is-there and hence that what is-there is primary. Or he 
would relinquish the singular and most central question – what creates a situation 
– effectively to mysticism, which, considering his principal commitments would 
be utterly absurd. 
On a less severe level, the assumption of ontological primacy also poses a 
problem of credibility to Badiou’s labelling of his undertakings in Logics of Worlds 
as being a “materialist dialectic” (LW: 3). What this points to is less a belated set 
of second thoughts regarding Badiou’s strong ontological orientation in general 
than a need to clarify the general relation between being and being-there. We will 
return to this question towards the end of this chapter, once we have acquired 
the necessary foundation for its discussion. For now, this problematisation of the 
overly complex, formalised and abstract conception of appearance, as well as the 
assumption of ontological primacy in all of Badiou’s thought, is merely raised in 
order to prepare for the brevity of the foremost conceptual – and not formal – 
discussion of the books constituting the Greater Logic.
With the preface, Badiou opens Logic of Worlds by laying out the general orien-
tation or “ideological atmosphere” (LW: 3) of his undertaking by opposing it to 
what he identifies as the conviction of our present time, the statement “there are 
only bodies and languages” (LW: 1). He names this contemporary conviction 
democratic materialism, for the term combines the beliefs that today, on one side, the 
recognition of the plurality of languages goes hand in hand with the assumption 
of their juridical equality – hence democratic materialism. On the other side, the 
recognition of “the objective existence of bodies alone” (ibid.) and the dogmas 
of finitude, carnal enjoyments and sufferings that come with equating the body 
with finite life as individual existence – resulting in the humanist protection of 
all bodies under the banner of human rights as the norm of contemporary mate-
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rialism. Badiou notes that “democratic materialism does stipulate a global halting 
point for its multiform tolerance,” a halting point that enforces unrestrained inter-
ventions on those languages that do “not recognize the universal juridical and 
normative equality of languages” (LW: 2) or languages that claim hold over all 
bodies, thus asserting themselves as universal. Which in other words means that 
“bodies will have to pay for their excess of language” (LW: 3).
Badiou opposes the conviction of democratic materialism with his own materi-
alist dialectic. The need to counter democratic materialism arises from his under-
standing of philosophy to develop the means to affirm precisely the previously 
unknown, unregulated thoughts “that hesitate to become the truths that they 
are” (ibid.) – which is precisely what democratic materialism does not admit. 
The gesture with which the refutation of democratic materialism is carried out 
is the dialectic, which is to be understood, “following Hegel,” in the way “… that 
the essence of all difference is the third term that marks the gap between the two 
others” (LW: 4). Hence, the statement of the materialist dialectic reads: “There 
are only bodies and languages, except that there are truths” (ibid.). Unsurpris-
ingly, as in Being and Event, the status of a truth takes the form of an exception. For 
Badiou, the objection of the “there are truths” reflects nonetheless, with “no doubt 
whatsoever,” an empirical and materialist evidence, since “in our worlds, as they 
are, truths advance. These truths are incorporeal bodies, languages devoid of 
meaning, generic infinities, unconditioned supplements” (ibid.). Badiou presents 
four didactic examples of such appearances of truths that match the four realms 
he assumes truths to advance from: science, art, politics and love. 
With his polemics against the ideology of democratic materialism, Badiou effec-
tively positions Logics of Worlds as a counter-project to the omnipresent relativist 
imperatives of today’s prevalent belief systems. As in Being and Event, the core of 
this counter-project is the ‘except that’ of truths, this time with the extension that 
truths not only are (ontologically) but indeed appear in worlds – or rather result 
in new worlds. With a twist in his introductory argument, he attempts to wrest 
the notion of ‘life’ from the annihilating conception democratic materialism has 
of it by promising to respond to the question ‘What is it to live?’ from the some-
what speculative position that affirms the exceptional existence of truths (LW: 
35). Obviously, the active ‘to live’ in question demands a subject, embodied in a 
world, which Badiou refers to as “bodies-of-truths, or subjectivizable bodies. This 
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definition,” he continues, “forbids any capture by the hegemony of democratic 
materialism” (ibid.). Bodies are to be understood as material and situated in order 
to be capable of unfolding truths in their worlds, of making truths appear. Which 
is why he can modify his question once more, in anticipation of the book’s con-
clusion, asking what it is “to live, that is, ‘as an Immortal’” (LW: 40).
Book I: Formal Theory of the Subject (Meta-physics)
The intention of Book I – entitled ‘Formal Theory of the Subject (Meta-physics)’ 
– is to lay out a refined theory of the subject, that is of the general efficacy of a 
subject in a world. Badiou remarks that this meditation is carried out, on one 
side, as if the mechanisms of appearance and change within it would already be 
in place but that, on the other side, such a theory is essentially formal, that it con-
cerns a system of forms and operations that are generic and that can therefore be 
formulated before and independent of a framework of appearance (his Greater 
Logic) and of the subjective enactments therein. What makes this reconsideration 
different from his conception of the subject in Being and Event is that he extends 
this ontological concept with linkages to worldly situations, more precisely with 
linkages to worldly situated bodies. In line with the statement of his materialist 
dialectic, Badiou insists that the “‘except that’ [of truths] exists qua subject” (LW: 
45). The subject is still the exceptional occurrence that arises in the wake of an 
event but is now considered to also have a material side, as it were: the body. 
In short, “the subject is that which imposes the legibility of a unified orientation 
onto a multiplicity of bodies. The body is a composite element of the world; the 
subject is what fixes in the body the secret of the effects it produces” (LW: 46-7). 
According to Badiou – and this presents the second major addition to his thinking 
of the subject – such effects express three types of dealing with a truth: its actual-
isation or production (by a faithful subject), its denial (by a reactive subject) or its 
occultation (by an obscure subject). Considering that what is at stake here is the 
subject-form (or rather formalism), “it suffices to assume that the subjective for-
malism supported by a body is that which exposes a truth in the world” (LW: 47). 
In what is somewhat reminiscent of his critique in Being and Event,3 Badiou stresses 
3 See Mediation 35 ‘Theory of the Subject’, BE: 391-2.
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the need to oppose the dominant determinations of the subject that understand 
‘subject’ as either a register of experience (as in phenomenology), a category of 
morality (as in neo-Kantianism) or an ideological fiction (as in Althusser’s struc-
turalist heritage). If we are to stay true to the exceptional character of the subject 
it then follows that the subject cannot be deduced or experimented but only be 
decided in the empirical dimension of an occurring event, which means both that 
the theory of the subject is axiomatic – is the affirmation of its own form – and 
that a subject is always only a subject in regard to a truth (LW: 50). To formulate 
a theory of the subject in absence of his Greater Logic – explaining appearance 
and founding his theory of the body – and in opposition to the aforementioned 
dominant discourses, all Badiou assumes is the subject’s “pure act: to endow an 
efficacious body with an appropriate formalism” (LW: 49), an act that originates 
in the empirical trace of an event under the materialist condition of a body. Such 
a theory of the subject is then “a theory of operations (figures) and destinations 
(acts)” (LW: 50). The exposition of the three proposed subjective figures proceeds 
by first reworking the conception of the faithful subject (which Badiou, until now, 
maintained more or less unchanged since Being and Event) so it can accommodate 
the promised linkages to a body. In a second step, the reactive and the obscure 
subjects are deduced from the faithful subject because, as Badiou argues, both are 
essentially reactions to a coming into being of a truth and therefore require the 
initial faithful commitment to an event in order to spark their own operations. 
In one sense, the formal relation between a subject and the body that supports 
it can be found in the operation whereby a body connects to the trace of the event 
that constitutes that subject. Such operations are borne by a worldly situated 
body that is determined by the trace of an event. But in another sense, the formal 
relation between a subject and the body is not reducible to or exhaustive in any 
‘identitarian’ nomination of the evental trace or its enactments – especially not if 
fantasised or idealised as univocal expression. A subjectivated body presents the 
‘living proof’ to the world of a former impossibility become possible, in and as a 
new present. “This institution of the possible as present,” writes Badiou, “is typ-
ically a subjective production. Its materiality is constituted by the consequences 
drawn day after day from the event’s course, that is from a [new] principle indexed 
to the possible” (LW: 51; my addition). The consequences drawn from such a prin-
ciple manifest themselves in the world as treatments of points within the situation, 
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where ‘point’ is what confronts the global situation with a singular, binary choice.4 
But the treatment of points also affects and reorganises the body, which is to say 
that this operation unfolds “the subjective formalism that this body is capable of 
bearing … That is why the treatment of points is the becoming-true of the subject, 
at the same time as it serves to filter the aptitudes of the body” (LW: 52). The set 
of consequences drawn from an evental trace, in the form of their treatment point 
by point, is what Badiou calls a present. The instantiation of a body is then “the 
realization in the present of a hitherto unknown possibility” that follows from the 
subordination of that body to an evental trace, but only under the condition of 
the production of its consequences, and therefore as literal “incorporation into the 
present” (ibid.). Since the subjectivation of a body is a matter of treating singular 
points, a body should be understood to never be entirely in the present, because 
the active part or organ of a body suitable (or efficacious) for treating a point stands 
vis-à-vis a large region of the body that is passive and insensible or even obstruc-
tive in regard to the points under consideration. In this sense, “notwithstanding 
its subjection to the generality of the principle derived from the trace, the body 
is always divided by the points it treats” (LW: 53). Badiou goes on to summarise 
these pieces of conceptual formalisation into the matheme of the faithful subject, 
which reads (LW: 53):5 
For the conceptual explanation, or reading of the formalised matheme of the faith-
ful subject, it is worth quoting Badiou at length:
It is important to understand that the faithful subject as such is not contained 
in any of the letters of its matheme, but that it is the formula as a whole. It 
is a formula in which a divided (and new) body becomes, under the bar, 
4 In this ‘treatment of points’ in a world we can recognise the worldly equivalent to ‘enquiries of 
terms’ within a generic procedure in ontology (BE: 329-31).
5 I decided to include the mathemes for the three figures of the subject, as they are almost intu-
itively graspable with the brief explanation that follows or precedes each matheme. From the 
Greater Logic and onwards (in Logics of Worlds) we will not engage in the more demanding 






something like the active unconscious of a trace of the event—an activity 
which, by exploring the consequences of what has happened, engenders the 
expansion of the present and exposes, fragment by fragment, a truth. Such 
a subject realizes itself in the production of consequences, which is why it can 
be called faithful—faithful to ε and thus to that vanished event of which ε 
is the trace. The product of this fidelity is the new present which welcomes, 
point by point, the new truth. We could also say that it is the subject in the 
present. (LW: 53)
The necessity to conceptualise a reactive subject-form arises from the realisation 
that what resists the new is not simply the old – an assumption that underesti-
mates what Badiou terms reactionary novelties. In order to effectively resist a novelty 
it is important, as Badiou writes, “to create arguments of resistance appropriate 
to the novelty itself.” In this sense, “every reactive disposition is the contempo-
rary of the present to which it reacts” (LW: 54). Since we saw that a new present 
is the product of the operation of a faithful subject, the reaction to such a new 
present can easily be understood as a formalism deducible from the faithful sub-
ject-form. What the reactive subject reacts to is the productive operation that is 
the faithful subject. Therefore, to use Badiou’s vocabulary, the latter – the faithful 
subject – forms the (active) unconscious of the reactive figure and finds its place 
in the matheme under the bar. Still, the mode of the reactive subject is both one of 
negation and of production. On one side it is founded on the negation of the cre-
ative power of an event and its trace, whilst on the other side it is productive of a 
“measured present, a negative present, a present ‘a little less worse’ than the past, 
if only because it resisted the catastrophic temptation which the reactive subject 
declares is contained in the event” (LW: 55). Badiou calls this kind of present an 
extinguished present. The matheme of the reactive subject is therefore written the 
following way (LW: 56): 
Therein, the imposition of the negation of any trace of the event forces the form 
of the faithful subject under the bar, and the resulting present is one of deletion of 






The case is different with the obscure subject, where we do not find any kind 
of production but “are required to conceive of an abolition of the new present, 
considered in its entirety as malevolent and de jure inexistent” (LW: 58-9). The 
operation of this figure is focused uniquely on the suppression of the new present, 
where such obscurantism is achieved through “the invocation of a full and pure 
transcendent Body, an ahistorical or anti-evental body (City, God, Race…) from 
which it follows that the trace (of the event) will be denied (here, the labour of the 
reactive subject is useful to the obscure subject) and, as a consequence, the real 
body, the divided body, will also be suppressed” (LW: 59-60). The appearance or 
exposition of this double annihilation (of the trace and the faithful body) is what 
occults the new present being produced by the faithful subject. What legitimates 
or demands this destruction is the invocation of a fictional transcendent body, 
or atemporal fetish, which is paradoxically posited as “the contemporary of the 
present that demands to be occulted” (LW: 60). The matheme of the obscure 
subject is thus (ibid.): 
Contrary to the reactive subject, which in some way preserves the faithful subject 
as its active unconscious (under the bar), the obscure subject, whose unconscious 
part is the new present, exerts the destruction of the spiritual and material support 
of fidelity, in the name of the transcendent Body. The obscure subject offers, 
according to Badiou, a hitherto un-subjectivated, ordinary existence “the chance 
of a new destiny, under the incomprehensible but salvific sign of an absolute 
body, whose only demand is that one serves it by nurturing everywhere and at 
all times the hatred of every living thought, every transparent language and every 
uncertain becoming” (LW: 61).
Badiou goes on to explain what he calls the destination of a subjective figure, 
which is the “synthetic operation in which the subject reveals itself as the con-
temporary of the evental present, without necessarily incorporating itself into it” 
(ibid.). Three destinations we just encountered in the subject forms, and after their 
brief examination it is rather evident that they demand a certain order, namely 
that production is necessary for denial which in turn is necessary for occultation: 
“the denial of the present supposes its production, and its occultation supposes a 
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formula of denial” (LW: 63). The fourth subjective destination becomes discern-
ible only once we regard the subjective field in a broader historical scale. What 
Badiou terms the resurrection of a truth is now easily graspable: it is the reactivation 
of “a subject in another logic of its appearing-in-truth” (LW: 65). Since every truth 
is eternal, it can never be said of any occulted or lost truth that it is lost forever. 
The extraction of an occulted or forgotten truth and its ‘return to life’ in form of 
a new subject-body, this is what Badiou understands as the subjective destination 
of resurrection. 
In order to complete the classification of subjective formalisms it is finally 
required to give an account of the different types of truths that inaugurate and 
determine subjective formalisms borne by a body in its specific world. Badiou here 
reiterates what he laid out already in Being and Event, namely that there are four 
domains of truth, which are: science, love, politics and art. An interesting remark 
concerns the contingency of types of truths since, Badiou explains, “a truth proce-
dure has nothing to do with the limits of the human species, our ‘consciousness’, 
or ‘finitude’, our ‘faculties’ and other determinations of democratic materialism. 
… In fact, a truth is that by which ‘we’, of the human species, are committed to 
a trans-specific procedure, a procedure which opens us to the possibility of being 
Immortals”” (LW: 71). As such, there might exist an infinity of types of truths 
“but we humans know only four” (ibid.). Badiou goes on to sketch out and name 
the combinations of subjective figures, subjective destinations and types of truths.6
Although it has been put to use in the mathemes of all three subjective figures, 
the body still awaits its conceptual explanation. In Logics of Worlds, the book on 
the body comes last, after the Greater Logic, the forms of change and the theory 
of points. At this point – from the perspective of the formal theory of subjective 
figures – what can be said about the body concerns (more or less) simply its 
supportive capabilities for a subject in a world. Badiou writes: “The attributes of 
a body-of-truth must be capable of serving as the basis for thinking the visibility 
of the True in the manifestness of a world, point by point” (LW: 67). Moreover, 
the production of this visibility depends on the existence of appropriate organs 
for treating points in the world, or in general that there be traits of organicity in a 
body. In order to formally think (instead of empirically deduct) the questions that 
6 See LW: 72-8, in particular the two tables on pp. 77-8.
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the body poses, “we must establish the logic of the body” Badiou writes: “rules of 
compatibility among its elements, real synthesis exhibited in appearing, dominant 
terms, efficacious parts or organs…” (LW: 68). This requires, again, the Greater 
Logic as well as some (general) elaborations about how logic can work together 
or supplement his already existing mathematical framework of ontology.7 
Besides further specifying the faithful subject and introducing reactive and 
obscure formalisms to his list of subjective operations, what seems most prom-
ising in Badiou’s re-take on the question of the subject (as ontological concept 
and formalism) are its points of connection to the body and to its present. As we 
encountered above, the issue of appearing (or existence in general) poses a very 
immediate, very justified if not essential challenge to any form of ontological 
thought, but with a particular urgency to a subtracted, mathematical ontology 
like Badiou’s. It is the question how, if at all, ontological concepts are reflected, 
work together, or have corresponding concepts in the ontic domain. At this stage 
of Logics, when justifying his re-examination of the theory of the subject as a 
formal theory, Badiou still performs a simple projection of his ontological cat-
egories onto the realm of appearance: “It is enough for us to suppose that a 
real rupture has taken place in the world, a rupture which we will call an event, 
together with a trace of this rupture, ε, and finally a body C, correlated to ε (only 
existing as a body under the condition of an evental trace)” (LW: 50). The reso-
lution of this mere projection into a properly formulated connection will happen 
in his Greater Logic, via the ‘postulates of materialism’. But as we will come to see 
in the discussion of the Greater Logic, this proposed connection proves to be very 
problematic and in the end untenable because it does not reach far enough down 
into the messiness of actual worlds and instead stays on the level of their general 
possibility in thought. In what has the ring of an acknowledgement of this issue, 
Badiou writes already in the preface that between the projects in Being and Event 
and Logics of Worlds “problems of connection and continuity do remain … I leave 
them for another time, or for others to solve” (LW: 39). Still, when looking for 
points of connection, Badiou does provide slightly cryptic hints like the following 
one: “Besides the conjunction of the body and the trace, the subject is a relation to 
the present, which is effective to the extent that the body possesses the subjective 
7 For Badiou’s elaborations on the general relation between logic and mathematics see also the 
discussion of his Briefings on Existence at the beginning of this chapter.
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aptitudes for this relation, that is, once it disposes of or is able to impose some 
organs of the present” (LW: 52). To be brief, what a suggestion like this expresses 
is still an utterly formal side of the efficacy of a subject-body or its enactment of 
a truth procedure in a worldly situation. Whilst being completely in line with his 
conception in Being and Event, these additions to thinking the subject are neither 
surprisingly different, nor substantially less abstract. Indeed, less abstraction is 
perhaps something one would expect when dealing with appearing worlds vis-à-
vis set theory ontology – but, if anything, the level of abstraction remains consist-
ent across Being and Event and Logics of Worlds (albeit it is, in each case, a different 
operation of abstraction).
The part of Logics that Badiou subsumes under the title of the Greater Logic 
examines the conditions under which we can think pure multiples to appear as 
multiple-beings in a world. The domain of such thought is declared by Badiou 
to be that of logic, being the discourse appropriate to formulate a general theory 
of objects and relations. Above all, he notes, the Greater Logic is “an exhaustive 
theory concerned with the materialist thinking of worlds, or—since ‘appearing’ 
and ‘logic’ are one and the same—a materialist theory of the coherence of what 
appears” (LW: 94). The development of this theory takes three stages (Books 
II-IV): First the examination of the transcendental organisation of worlds, the logic of 
the latter’s consistent and ordered appearance. This is followed by a theory of the 
object, which also includes the crucial connection between being and appearing. 
The third part is concerned with the concept of relation within appearing, within 
determinate worlds. 
Book II: The transcendental
Stating that “‘logic’ signifies purely and simply the cohesion of appearing” (LW: 
100), Badiou again posits logic as the proper discourse of appearing and moreover 
as the terrain for its formalised thought. He sets out to conceptualise appearing 
with the notion of the transcendental organisation of a world. Every world is 
immanently ordered by a transcendental. That every world contains its transcen-
dental means that this organisation of the world is immanent to the respective 
world, that it is made possible by immanent operations. This also makes clear that 
the transcendental has nothing to do with a subject or with subjectivity in general: 
57
it “is altogether anterior to every subjective constitution, for it is an immanent 
given of any situation whatever” (LW: 101). On the grounds of the essential dis-
junction of being and appearing (LW: 102, 156) and the proof of the inexistence 
of the Whole (LW: 109-12, 153-5), Badiou makes the point “that every singular 
being is only manifested in its being locally: the appearing of the being of beings is 
being-there” (LW: 102; my emphases). That there exists no uniform or universal 
operation of identification and differentiation of what appears means that such 
“identifications and relations of multiples are always local” (LW: 112). Having 
always only a local scope, operations of identification or localisation of any par-
ticular being are carried out (or ‘measured’) against other existing beings, since 
there exists no universal mode, or system of reference, for such an operation. On 
this basis, a world is then the place in which a being “inscribes a local procedure 
of access to its identity on the basis of other beings” (LW: 114). As we will come 
to see, the identification of a being depends on the difference to its own being (its 
being-qua-being) and to other beings of the same world (LW: 117). One more 
aspect of the locality of being-there is that, because of the inexistence of a universe 
(the Whole), there are a plurality of worlds, which also means that “the same mul-
tiple—the ‘same’ ontologically—in general co-belongs to different worlds” (LW: 
114). What Badiou puts forward here is a “minimal phenomenology of abstract 
appearing,” which means an operational framework identifying “the condition of 
possibility for the worldliness of a world, or the logic of the localization for the 
being-there of any being whatever” (LW: 103).
A world, taken as a uniquely structured place, is identified with the singularity 
of its logic, the latter “articulates the cohesion of multiples around a structured 
operator (the transcendental)” (LW: 102). The order that the transcendental oper-
ator evaluates relies on the intensity of the difference of appearing – or identities (LW: 
123, 127) – between beings in the world, which is measured by their degrees of 
identity (and consequently difference). The conceptual core of the transcendental 
is actually not difficult to grasp and Badiou puts it in a concise way: it is required 
“that in the situation there exist a scale of these degrees [of identity]—the transcen-
dental of the situation—and that every being is in a world only to the extent that 
it is indexed to this transcendental” (LW: 119). The measurement of degrees of 
identity is performed by a function of appearing, which compares two elements 
of a world by their intensity of appearing. Since there does not exist a uniform ref-
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erence or scale for this measurement, the “scale of evaluation, of appearing, and 
thus the logic of a world, depends on the singularity of that world itself” (LW: 
156). The transcendental is itself a multiple that belongs to the situation of which 
it is the ordering principle. 
This level of abstraction (and its disconnectedness from any actually appearing 
situation or world) makes it relatively straightforward to understand and agree 
with what is at stake in the concept of a transcendental organisation of any world. 
The concept states that, however complex and multi-dimensional a world, its 
objects and the constitutive relations between everything that appears in it, are 
ordered according to a principle that is itself of that world. Additionally, the tran-
scendental organisation is not even total, or uniform (LW: 157, 159). Indeed, 
it might be understood in a non-linear sense, that is to say, as bearing internal 
shifts and breaks of reference, domains, criteria, yet still constituting one complex 
system of coherence. Although Badiou invests in providing complete formal sec-
tions for all three parts of the Greater Logic, it is perhaps clear at this point why 
an engagement with them might not be of primary interest here. Put bluntly, 
since the overall conception makes sense of and allows, if needed, for ever more 
internal diversifications, we might rather focus on engaging and formulating a cri-
tique on a more fundamental level than that of the formal workings of the general 
concept under scrutiny.
Badiou dedicates one section to the question how logic, understood in its 
common sense, differs from the logic he is putting forward under the banner of 
his Greater Logic. In confronting his notion of logic with Husserl’s, he notes that 
Husserl in the end grounds the operations of logic on human consciousness, on 
a constituent subject. As we have seen in both Being and Event and the first book 
of Logics, Badiou’s subject is always constituted by a truth that appears as excep-
tion, and as such, cannot be used to base a theory of appearance on. Appearance 
has to be explained without the exceptional occurrence of a subject. For Badiou, 
his project of a materialist dialectic goes against not only phenomenology (for 
which Husserl served here as his opponent) but also analytic philosophy, refuting 
their claim on the originariness of consciousness and language. “The materialist 
dialectic undermines this schema” of this originariness, he writes, “replacing it 
with the pre-linguistic operations which ground the consistency of appearing. As 
a consequence, logic, formal logic included, not to mention rhetoric, all appear 
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for what they are: derivative constructions, whose detailed study is a matter for 
anthropology” (LW: 174). What this establishes in the end is, that “logic, in its 
usual linguistic sense, is entirely reducible to transcendental operations” (LW: 
100), which means being reducible to linguistic appropriations of certain princi-
ples of coherence of appearing from the world such logic is constructed from.
Book III: The object
The second stage of the Greater Logic concerns a novel conception of the object. 
The object is understood as an instance of the One, of what can be counted as 
and distinguished as this-one in appearing. The notion of the object – and as we 
encountered already, appearing in general – can be thought independent of any 
subject or perceiving consciousness, and therefore aspires to be a truly “subject-less 
object” (LW: 193). Perhaps most importantly, objects (or their components) are 
understood to localise in appearance determinate multiples, and therefore present 
the crucial link between appearance and being. And lastly, as units of appear-
ing, objects provide subjective formalisms with the material support they need 
in order to enact truth procedures in their worlds. The general line of reasoning 
continues from understanding worlds as organised by a transcendental order, 
onto which multiple-beings will now be indexed and can thus be understood to 
appear and be localised as objects in the world under consideration. The suturing 
of a being-there to its underlying ontological multiple proceeds via an analytic of 
objective appearing capable of determining the object’s components, identifying 
the minimal (atomic) form of such a component and finally establishing an inter-
section between such ‘atoms of appearing’ and ‘atoms of being’.
Starting with the differentiation between beings in a world, Badiou calls func-
tion of appearing or transcendental indexing the measuring of phenomenal identity (or 
difference) between two beings in a world. This transcendental degree of identity 
varies from absolute non-identity to maximal identity, with any possible inter-
mediate degree. The values of identity between every pair of beings in a world 
is indexed to the transcendental of this world. Considering “any being appear-
ing in a world,” Badiou writes, “we call ‘phenomenon’ of this being the complete system 
of the transcendental evaluation of its identity to all the beings that co-appear in this world” 
(LW: 201). If the function of appearing is measuring the difference of phenomenal 
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appearance of beings in a world, how is the intensity of phenomenal appearance 
evaluated in the first place? For Badiou, the intensity of appearing of a being is 
nothing else then its self-identity, which is to say a function that reflects a being’s 
self-affirmation in a given world. This is what he terms existence of a being in a 
world (LW: 208, 246). Now that we understand phenomena within appearing, 
it is time to take them apart again, this time in regard to the components Badiou 
assumes to be the worldly support of the multiples or sets supposed by ontology. 
The central question in this analytic approach (or process of de-composition) is 
whether we can discern, from within a worldly logic, the components that make 
up a phenomenon. At the same time this necessitates that there be, as in ontol-
ogy (with the empty set and the singleton), a halting point for such decomposi-
tion, that is to say something like atomic components of a phenomenon.8 Badiou 
answers in the affirmative by proposing the functions of a) phenomenal components, 
which evaluate the degree of belonging of an element to a being in the world, 
and b) atoms of appearing that designate phenomenal components which belong to 
a maximal degree, that is absolutely, to the being-there in question. Finally, the 
linkage between being and appearing takes the form of a postulate, the ‘postulate 
of materialism,’ stating that “every atom of appearing is real” (LW: 218). More tech-
nically, this means: “given an atomic function between a multiple and the tran-
scendental of a world—that is a component of the appearing of this multiple which 
comprises at most one element (in the sense of ‘absolute’ belonging)—there always 
exists a (mathematical) element of this multiple which identifies this (logical) atom 
(or atom of appearing)” (ibid.). Now, at last, we arrive at the definition of an 
object. An object of the world is, declares Badiou, “the couple formed by a multi-
ple and a transcendental indexing of this multiple, under the condition that all the 
atoms of appearing whose referent is the multiple in question are its real atoms” 
(LW: 220). 
In the remaining sections of the conceptual part of Book III, Badiou lays out 
what he terms atomic logic – which constitutes the core of the Greater Logic. Atomic 
logic proposes “the theory of the relations which are thinkable between the elements of an 
8 Allow me a polemical side-note at this point: As it is often in Logics, such questions, rather than 
being treated and somehow answered, are seemingly posed by Badiou in order to posit some 
intuition, formula or proof that pre-emptively describes the function or concept whose possi-
bility was initially the point of the question – thereby ignoring the need to justify the decision 
for affirming this possibility.
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object” (LW: 221), where object-elements denote elements of ontological multiples 
that appear in a world as real atoms or atomic object components. Crossing or 
linking the domains of mathematics of being and logics of appearing, this logic 
comes to project and inscribe transcendental organisation into multiple-being 
itself, a process Badiou calls retroaction of appearing on being (ibid.). The oper-
ations on which atomic logic is built are the localisation of atoms, compatibility 
and order of object-elements and real synthesis of objects or objective regions via 
envelopes of transcendental degrees. The connection between being and appear-
ing on which retroaction relies – or, to be precise: since retroaction is conceptually 
posited and not deduced, this conception is what establishes the operative connec-
tion in the first place – enables Badiou to conceptualise the synthesis of a multiple 
from its objective appearance, via his atomic logic. He writes that “this synthesis 
is ultimately realizable in the form of a relation, which is itself global, between the 
structure of the transcendental and the structure that is retroactively assignable 
to the multiple insofar as the latter appears in such and such a world” (LW: 226). 
This relation receives the name transcendental functor. The retroaction of appearing 
on being is probably the most significant conceptual idea in Logics, since it is not 
only what allows for the becoming of a subject in a world (LW: 222) but also and 
most importantly it is what allows us to think genuine change in a world, since ret-
roaction is thought to guarantee that such change not only and merely concerns 
appearance but also the ontological foundation of what appears:
The key point of the retroaction of appearing on being is that it is possible in 
this way to reunify the multiple composition of a being. What was counted 
for as one in being, disseminating this One in the nuances of appearing, may 
come to be unitarily recounted to the extent that its relational consistency is 
averred. (LW: 230)
Book IV: Relation
The last part of the Greater Logic is dedicated to the question of intra-worldly 
relation. Badiou states it as the rather simple problem of thinking what is between 
objects or what is their co-existence in the same world, under the same transcen-
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dental. Right from the start he establishes that relations have no being, that they 
are not a matter of ontology, a direct consequence of this is that any bond between 
objects should be understood as being regulated by those objects: “A relation is 
a connection between objective multiplicities—a function—that creates nothing in 
the register of intensities of existence, or in that of atomic localizations, which is 
not already prescribed by the regime of appearance of these multiplicities” (LW: 
301). Continuing from the two-fold determination of the object by being (exten-
sive or mathematical multiplicity) and appearing (intensive or logical multiplic-
ity), the treatment of the question of relation proceeds via an examination of the 
similar double determination of worlds. On one side is the question how many 
objects there are in a world, what the type of multiplicity of beings in a world is. 
Its treatment is an ontological, extensive one. On the other side, there is the issue 
of what a relation or the appearance of a connection in a world is; a question that 
is to be thought in logical terms. Regarding the extension of a world thought in 
its being, the answer should come as no surprise that every world is ontologically 
infinite (we remember Cantor’s theorem) and that this infinity is of an inaccessi-
ble type. “A world makes immanent the dissemination of that which composes 
it” (LW: 307) at the same time as it “makes immanent every local totalization of 
the parts of that which composes it” (LW: 308). Inaccessible infinity follows from 
the impossibility of constructing the concept or measure of this infinite from the 
interior of any world. This impossibility also guarantees that a world is closed 
without being totalisable, “every world is affected by an inaccessible closure” 
(LW: 310). Turning to the question of the relation between objects, Badiou reiter-
ates his claim that within appearing, a relation “is necessarily subordinated to the 
transcendental intensity of the apparents that it binds together. Being-there—and 
not relation—makes the being of appearing” (ibid.). Relation, according to Badiou, 
leaves no mark on what it relates, it has no power to alter the objects it connects, 
but operates under the condition that it preserve existences and maintains iden-
tities. The idea is that for two related objects, there exists a function connecting 
elements of one object with elements of the other, conserving “the atomic logic of 
these objects, and in particular the real synthesis which affects their being on the 
basis of their appearing” (LW: 312). 
Continuing the thought of the ontological closure of a world, Badiou proposes 
its logical equivalent: logical completeness of a world. This would suggest that 
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it is indeed impossible to transcend or ‘leave’ a world (from within that world). 
The argument unfolds around proving the universal exposition of every relation, 
which means that every relation within a world is ‘visible’ within that world. 
Understanding the universal exposition of a relation as index of the dimension of 
the world, allows Badiou to demonstrate a connection between the dimension of a 
world and its logical completeness. More precisely it is because of the inaccessible 
infinity of objects in a world (ontological closure) that every relation is univer-
sally exposed within that world (logical completeness). He terms this insight the 
‘second fundamental thesis of materialism’ and therewith bolstering – after the 
first fundamental thesis of materialism that every atom is real – the support for 
his hypothesis that appearing is subordinated to being: “Since we can establish 
that this logic is complete—in the sense of the universal exposition of every rela-
tion—simply due to the inaccessible infinity of a world, we can affirm here too the 
subordination of the main properties of appearing to the deepest determinations 
of multiple-being” (LW: 320).
In the final section of book IV Badiou provides an important, however short, 
addendum to his theory of the constitution of the object. He declares that every 
object possesses an element that inexists in the world in which this object appears: 
“we will call ‘proper inexistent of an object’ an element of the underlying multiple whose value of 
existence is minimal …, [that] inexists in the world” (LW: 322). Every relation between 
objects is said to also conserve its objects’ inexistents. Since the inexistent desig-
nates the abstract possibility that a world’s underlying multiple composition could 
appear in other ways (as different worlds), the inexistent is thought to express 
within appearing the contingency of being-there.
Summary of the Greater Logic
Badiou’s exposition of the Greater Logic ends herewith; let us revisit the major 
points of the argument. The main rationale for its conception is to give a “theory 
of the world, [an] elucidation of the most abstract laws of that which constitutes a 
world qua general form of appearing” (LW: 299). Badiou starts with the assump-
tion that there is a somewhat primordial realm that comes to appear in a world 
and this appearance is what needs to be explained. From Being and Event, we 
remember that this is the realm of set theory ontology and what is thought to 
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appear as worlds are situations, understood as multiplicities of abstract multiples 
with no other properties than their pure multiplicity. The appearing of a situation 
as world is governed by the transcendental, the organising principle of the inten-
sive degrees of appearance that is immanent to the world whose logical order 
it presents. The indexing of the intensity of appearance of a multiple onto the 
transcendental determines this multiple as object in the world. The object itself is 
decomposable into atoms of appearing and since Badiou posits that every atom is 
real (‘first postulate of materialism’), they present the points by which appearing 
is sutured to being. Having established this connection on an atomic basis, he 
proposes a retroaction of appearing onto being, which is to say that the way a mul-
tiple comes to appear as object in a world has an effect back on its being, allowing 
for an alteration of the multiple-constitution itself. This retroaction is meant to 
explain the possibility of both, the becoming of a subject in a world as well as 
genuine change that radically reorganises the ontological situation and worldly 
appearance. Relations for Badiou are simply connections between objects that are 
determined by the objects themselves (as prescribed by the transcendental regime 
of appearance). Ultimately, he writes “a world is … a system of objects and rela-
tions which makes an infinite collection of pure multiples appear, and prescribes 
for them an atomic composition which relations leave invariant” (LW: 339). 
After the complete exegesis of Logics, we will return to some problematic points 
of the Greater Logic or the assumptions upon which it is built. These will be: 
the origin of a world’s structuring (or transcendental) principle, the simplistic 
conception of relation and the retroactive effect of appearing on being as the most 
obscure consequence of thinking being as primary to being-there.
Book V: The Four Forms of Change
After laying out his formal theory of worlds, Badiou comes back to the central 
question of change. The Greater Logic as such “leaves the question of change 
untouched” (LW: 357) and there is nothing in the account of being or in being-
there that would allow for the identification of change. Badiou sets out to describe 
different intensities of change, starting from the self-modifications of objects that, 
instead of constituting a break with its being or appearing, is understood as the 
proper operation of attaining its self-identity and as consequence its degree of 
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appearing in a world. He calls modification “the rule-governed appearing of intensive 
variations which a transcendental authorizes in the world of which it is the transcendental” 
(LW: 359), therefore something that is rather constitutive of the appearing of a 
world rather than disruptive ground for its transfiguration – in short he states: 
“modification = objectivation” (LW: 391). Real change, as was established in 
Being and Event, takes its cue from the exception that occurs under the name of the 
event and stems from an evental site. The refinement into four forms of change 
starts with the evental site, and involves a reworking of its ontological conception 
as well as a logical, intensive account of this birthplace of the event. The intuition 
behind the site, as worldly appearance, is that its supporting multiple “count[s] itself 
in the referential field of its own indexing“ (LW: 363) – which means that a site exposes, 
besides the objects it contains, also itself. Ontologically speaking, the multiple 
that comes to appear as worldly site within appearance is a self-reflexive set. Since 
the axiom of foundation forbids such self-belonging, the site is necessarily of 
short-lived nature, it must fade into disappearance as soon as it has been noticed. 
This ‘noticing’ is precisely the instant of the event, in which the site “carries out a 
transitory cancellation of the gap between being and being-there,” constituting the 
“instantaneous revelation of the void that haunts multiplicities” (LW: 369). If the 
site only appears to disappear, what allows us to gauge the effectiveness of change 
are the consequences that arise from it. Still, as the origin of such consequences, 
a site must exist to a maximal intensity for an event proper to result from it. It is 
then called a singularity, whereas a site whose intensity of existence is non-max-
imal is said to constitute a fact, a local disturbance or novelty without further 
consequences. The force of a singularity lies in its consequences that can, again, 
be split into maximal intensity and non-maximal intensity. The first, strong sin-
gularity comprises an event, whilst the second is called weak singularity, a novelty 
that shines bright but short, as it were, the force of its consequences being not 
strong enough to sustain genuine change. The strongest consequence in a world 
is to make appear something that hitherto inexisted in that world. In Being and 
Event, it was still very vaguely the void of a given situation that irrupted in the 
wake of an event. In Logics, what comes to exist in the world as consequence of a 
maximal singularity (an event) is the inexistent of the object that has been the site. 
This presents us with a far more specific sense of the immediate consequences 
of an event in a world, although it cannot say anything about the orientation of 
the transfiguration of the world or its transcendental that only begins with this 
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“sublation of the inexistent” (LW: 394). In the course of evental consequences, 
a new transcendental or logical base is given to a world that can then be called 
‘genuinely new’.
Book VI: Theory of Points
From this very generalised thinking of evental consequences in a world, the 
obvious question arises about how such consequences materialise within appear-
ing. This is what Badiou elaborates in Book VI, entitled ‘Theory of Points’. Points 
present those obstacles or challenges that cannot but be treated and decided by 
a faithful subject-body, since we have to understand a truth procedure as the 
infinite operation that proceeds point by point (we encountered this already in the 
discussion of the subjective formalisms). Thought like this, “a point is the tran-
scendental testing ground for the appearing of a truth” (LW: 399). The mode of 
this testing or treatment that a point commands is that of a decision, specifically 
that of a binary decision, a question of yes or no. A point therefore presents “the 
crystallization of the infinite in the figure … of the ‘either/or’, what can also be 
called a choice or a decision” (LW: 400), where the infinite denotes the infinitely 
differentiated configuration of the world, or more precisely of its transcendental 
structure. The basic idea (or desire) on Badiou’s side seems to be that of merging 
a clear-cut and therefore binary decision (‘this, and everything else not’) with a 
consideration that involves the world plain and simple. A decision, in order to 
arrive at a yes or no, requires the compression of a world’s appearance, or “exis-
tential densification” (LW: 404), into a point that is then evaluated on the binary 
level of yes or no. In other words it is “to ‘filter’ the complex transcendental 
through a binary device and reduce the nuances of evaluation to the simplicity 
that characterizes every ultimate choice: either 1 (for yes) or 0 (for no)” (LW: 
403). If we understand a point to be a local test of the world’s transcendental 
organisation vis-à-vis a truth, then a point also localises the action or body of that 
truth. Assuming a plurality of points in a world (or on a world’s transcendental 
index), this plurality is said to compose a topological space. Badiou attributes to 
such a congregation of points a power of localisation that results “rather naturally 
[in] something like the topological summary of the transcendental” (LW: 416). 
More precisely and interestingly, such topological summary can be thought to 
67
extract from a transcendental organisation the tensions and contradictions that 
co-organise or co-form this transcendental. If we now conceive a truth procedure 
as successive decisions of points, where these points (as topology) localise what 
is conflicting in the ‘beneath’ of the transcendental of this world, then what in 
Being and Event was rather mystically posited as ‘truth of the situation’ becomes 
more localisable or gains conceptual substance. In short, from the thought that 
the points of a world designate a topological space, Badiou infers that the essence 
of appearing is “a topos: appearing, considered as the support of a truth tested by 
the world, is the taking-place of being” (LW: 419). Understood this way, it is rather 
evident that not every world has the same capacity to lend being a place, that a 
world whose transcendental is devoid of points is a world in which no change can 
take place. The crux here is a sort of evaluation of a world’s capacity for change 
or power of localisation, which for Badiou is in direct correlation to the number 
of points in a given world. He terms atonic any world that is devoid of points, 
nothing can change in such a world because a potential subject-body finds, in a 
sense, nothing to act on. The opposite configuration would be a tensed world, in 
which points exist in abundance and thereby allow subjects to carry out a truth 
procedure, decision by decision. Most worlds though are located between those 
poles of absence of and saturation with points.
Book VII: What is a Body?
Turning to the last book of Logics, we come back to the initial question, the effi-
cacy of a subject in a world, or, in short: ‘What is a body?’ What Badiou assumed 
to be in place whilst elaborating the different subjective formalisms, the laws of 
appearing and change, is now at hand. The conceptual strategy took the path, 
starting with the formalisms of the subject, via the Greater Logic (transcenden-
tal, object, relation) and the forms of change and theory of points. Asking what 
a body is happens under the condition that its core features are already estab-
lished: “a body is this very singular type of object suited to serve as a support 
for a subjective formalism, and therefore to constitute, in a world, the agent of a 
possible truth” (LW: 451). In addition, since the question is about the appearance 
of a subjective formalism in a world, Badiou supposes that there also exists an 
evental site in the world that might give rise to the body. That is to say that the 
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whole analytic framework of his Greater Logic and the forms of change act as 
the now completed foundation for the discussion of the body. Under this orien-
tation, Badiou is now ready to ask what a body is, or “what marks out a body 
among the objects that constitute the appearing of a world” (LW: 454). Under 
the attribution that a body be the material bearer of a subjective formalism, how 
does a body come to be, or how does an object of a world become or assume 
the task of a subject-body? How is a body born? Since it is the worldly support 
for a subject, its birth must coincide, on an existential plane, with the birth of a 
subject, thought ontologically. That moment is, as has been established previ-
ously, the event, or more precisely what in Being and Event was referred to as the 
act of affirming the event – the instant when fidelity commences. Within a world, 
this is the moment when the inexistent of a site comes to appear maximally, that 
is to say when an evental trace is established in the world. Therefore, the evental 
trace is a general condition for a body (LW: 488) that makes a body, in abstract 
terms, “the set of elements of a site … which entertain with the resurrection of 
the inexistent … a relation of maximal proximity” (LW: 466). Or slightly clearer, 
although even less specific: “a body is the set of everything that the trace of the 
event mobilizes” (LW: 467). This capacity of the body to mobilise or incorporate 
evental consequences into a new material present is founded in its ability to make 
determinate choices or decisions in the world, point by point. “It is a matter of 
formalizing what it means for a body to treat a point. This basically comes down 
to formalizing the efficacy of a ‘decision’ for a determinate subject.” (LW: 487) 
As we recall from the first book, an efficacious body is supposed to be in posses-
sion of a variety of organs that are apt to deal with the local specificities of some 
points, to decide them and in that way unfold the consequences of a post-evental 
truth. These regional specialisations of the body in the form of organs are locally 
and immanently synthesised by the faithful body vis-à-vis the points of the old, 
declining world. This organic synthesis necessitates to “stratify the body, defining 
within it a completely new link between previously separate, or even ill-defined … 
structures” (LW: 472), which is to say that to establish a new organ is to envelop 
the efficacious part of the body in new concepts (LW: 474). 
Badiou reiterates these last points rather than adding clarity or specificity to the 
concept of the body. This results, in a sense, in nothing more than the formal 
theory of the subject that has been outlined in the first book, which boils down to 
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positing that a body is the material support in a world for a subjective formalism, 
and that its efficacy depends on being able to synthesise the appropriate organs 
for the treatment of the points it comes to face. Additionally, in order for a body 
to arise in a world, the following five conditions need to be fulfilled: There must 
be some points in the world, an event has to occur and be consequential enough 
to constitute a coherent body, this body must contain an efficacious part which is 
organised according to new concepts, resulting in organs capable of treating the 
points the body encounters in the world (LW: 474, 491). Badiou argues that 
this sequence of conditions presents a generic form of the coming-into-existence 
of truths. Accordingly, “this authorizes the materialist dialectic to contend that 
beyond bodies and languages, there is the real life of some subjects” (LW: 475).
Conclusion: What is it to Live?
Under the heading ‘What is it to Live?’ Badiou concludes Logics of Worlds by 
revisiting the stakes of the book outlined in the preface, namely the merits of his 
material dialectic over democratic materialism. He takes up the question what it 
is to live ‘as an Immortal’ (LW: 40, 507), which meant to wrest the notion of life 
from democratic materialism’s equivocation of life with mere existence. The pos-
sibility of a living that reaches beyond contemporary ideologies of finitude cannot 
be found in what is given in a world, in what appears. It is rather the trace of a 
vanished event that bears the potential of life, by demonstrating the exceptional 
possibility for some inexistent to come to exist. For those who are in search of the 
true life, Badiou advises: “You can only put your hope in what inappears” (LW: 
507). Of course, hope is never enough, the point of identifying an evental trace 
is to enact “what the trace authorizes in terms of consequences” (LW: 508) into 
a new present. Where the body presents the material support for the continuous 
creation of, or its incorporation into, this new present. In order to enact the conse-
quences of a trace, we recall that the world needs to contain some points, in which 
the infinite is filtered through the Two in form of a subjective choice and deci-
sion. Also, for a body to truly live requires it to be in disposition of a subjective 
formalism, and more precisely, since neither conservation (reactive subject) nor 
mortification (obscure subject) count for such true life – as both work against the 
coming into existence of a post-evental truth – such a body has to incorporate a 
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faithful subjective formalism. Badiou goes on to link his description of the faithful 
subject as creating “the present as the being-there of eternity” (LW: 510) with the 
notion of the Idea as the exceptional experience that authorises, and in a vague 
way guides, the creation of this present by a subject-body. Therefore, he writes, 
“for the materialist dialectic, ‘to live’ and ‘to live for an Idea’ are one and the same 
thing” (ibid.). Or again, more specifically phrased towards finite human existence:
Several times in its brief existence, every human animal is granted the chance 
to incorporate itself into the subjective present of a truth. The grace of living 
for an Idea, that is of living as such, is accorded to everyone and for several 
types of procedure. … To live is possible. Therefore, to (re)commence to live 
is the only thing that matters. (LW: 514)
* * * * *
Discussion of Logics of Worlds
Let us return to what Badiou, in the preface to Logics, presents as the broader 
objective of his book, which consists in establishing what he term a materialist 
dialectic. The central intent is to validate the exceptional existence of truths and 
to prove that the appearance of truths (as new presents and worlds) is possible and 
furthermore compatible with his set theory ontology. After having gone through 
the arguments of the book, we are now in the position to examine Logics of Worlds, 
in respect of our interest in supplementing the edifice of Being and Event with link-
ages towards enactments of creation in situated worlds. There is no question that 
Badiou succeeds in delivering a scintillating theory of appearance inspired and 
supported by contemporary mathematics (logic, category theory and topology) 
and that his model of subjective embodiment of ideas into radically new presents 
and worlds misses neither rigour nor compatibility with his formalisms in Being 
and Event. Then again, we still need to assess if Badiou does in fact succeed in 
providing a soundly founded theory of the process of creation of radical novelty. 
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Let us get more precise on the criteria for this discussion. The objective for discuss-
ing the book in the first place was to probe it for capacities to found and advance 
a proposition on the act of creation. Whilst this proposition still has to take form, 
the reasons for turning to Logics in the process can be summarised as follows. By 
taking up Badiou’s central notions from Being and Event in the previous chapter 
– the distinction of consistent and inconsistent multiplicity, the void, exceptional 
event, subject, truth procedure – the question became how a concept of crea-
tion that is based on these ontological notions and formalisms can be brought to 
matter or work in actual worlds, where acts of creation ultimately take place. As 
such, the problem became how enactments of the ontological conception of creation 
(post-evental truth procedure) can be thought to work in existence. Since Logics of 
Worlds states an intention to venture into exactly this question of the appearance of 
novelties, its choice seemed obvious, at least in the beginning. The trouble we will 
be facing now originates from collapsing the question of the worldly enactment 
of creation with the problem of the appearance of novelty in general, which was 
performed at the outset of this chapter. Now though, these two questions need to 
be separated again in order to gain the initial criteria to gauge Logics: first Badiou’s 
own attempt to conceptualise the appearance of novelty, then my focus on the 
worldly enactment of the procedure of creation. The following short examination 
starts from the tensions the two questions evoke in relation to the discussion of 
Logics (and to a lesser degree of Being and Event). The principal tension derives 
from the obvious difference in what is asked: Badiou is interested in a theory of 
being-there (as generic appearance) in the form of an objective phenomenology 
that can be subsumed under his ontology in order to account for the appearance 
of novelties and the subject-bodies that give rise to them. Whereas my interest lies 
in a minimal linkage of the ontological foundation of the formalisms of creation 
with a capacity in existence for creation in order to affirm creation’s generic possi-
bility and tighten its most crucial concepts to worldly subjective capacities. To put 
it bluntly, Badiou thinks it necessary to give a complete model of how being can 
be thought to appear as being-there, and how the very discourses that make this 
thinking possible (set theory, mathematised logic) can be understood to be related 
with each other (category theory, dominance of mathematics over logic). Until 
now we went with Badiou on this view but it becomes clear that to think what 
makes genuine change does not, in fact, require a complete model of being and 
existence. What is required is a concise, rudimentary theory of ontic-ontological 
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connections that allow, for any kind of situation, a subjective worldly enactment 
of the conceptual operations of creation. In fact, it is precisely this which will be 
developed and discussed in the Chapter 4. The task for now is to present and 
get into the intricate knot of problems in Logics, their symptoms, covers and pos-
sible ways out. The following outline of a critique presents an attempt to foster 
an understanding why Badiou’s system as it stands is unnecessarily complex for 
thinking the act of creation and presents some fundamental problems in how it 
conceptualises the relation between being and existence (not least because of its 
complexity). But as we will come to see, it can nonetheless provide the central 
inspiration and some crucial corner stones for a new, more materialist concept of 
creation.9
In the conceptual presentation of Logics of Worlds, the pivotal point regarding the 
operative relation between being and existence is the mechanism of retroaction of 
appearing on being – which is meant to ensure that changes in worlds are conse-
quential or reflected in their ontological multiple-composition, thereby founding 
the possibility of real change by demonstrating the effectiveness of subject-bodies 
on the ontological composition of their world. On closer inspection though, it 
appears as a rather dubious conception, since the discussion of retroaction marks 
Badiou’s first notable attempt to actually formalise a functional correlation directed 
from appearing to being, in a system that until then knew only the opposite direc-
tion - from being to appearing. It is somehow telling that the parts of Logics that 
try to found, conceptualise and formalise retroaction (based on the postulate of 
materialism and atomic logic), are the most complicated and opaque of the whole 
book (hence, in part, the need for my somewhat technical and detailed exegesis), 
and this seems suggestive of the apparent difficulties of implementing this first 
trait of materialism in such a (still) utterly subtractive model of worlds and their 
logics. Although retroaction presents possibly the most crucial nexus of Logics 
9 The precise understanding of Badiou’s materialism is not straightforward or simple, as Brass-
ier and Toscano attest: “In a sense, the classical question of materialism is rescinded by Badiou 
to the extent that he does not permit of any operative distinction between the (material-) real 
and the ideal, displacing that traditional trope into the distinction between the real of the event 
and the knowledge, language or representation of the situation. … Badiou’s is ultimately an 
anti-naturalist materialism. It rests on the provocative proposition that nature, far from being 
the arena of savage becomings, is a domain of perfectly adjusted representation, of seamless 
normality, and that the event-history is the only site of the upsurge of inconsistent imma-
nence.” (Brassier and Toscano, 2004: 273)
73
(and, in this sense, might be a prime target for further and more detailed study 
and discussion), my point here is that retroaction and its complicated conceptual 
and formal construction present a symptom of a more fundamental problem in 
Badiou’s system. It will be argued that this fundamental problem revolves around 
the aforementioned assumption of a primacy of being over being-there,10 which 
is expressed in unidirectional prescriptions of what appears by what is – with 
the exception of retroaction.11 What a situation in being can prescribe for the 
world in existence whose being it presents is of course solely the multiple com-
position (structure) of otherwise non-descript multiples. Nonetheless, what this 
prescription establishes is an empty – in the sense of quality and substance – but 
fundamentally real structural framework of belonging of everything that comes 
to appear of an ontological situation.
To clarify how the mechanism of retroaction presents a symptom of ontolog-
ical primacy, let us first briefly consider how situations not only change but can 
be understood to come to be in the first place. We know that an ontological sit-
uation (consistent multiplicity) acquires structure from inconsistent multiplicity 
by the operation of the count. How are we to think the operation of ontological 
counting to be carried out, or in other words, since it requires execution, what 
or who enacts this operation? In Badiou’s framework, it is exclusively the subject 
that is endowed with such efficacy, the subject and its embodiment are the only 
formalisms he grants the capacity to create and modify situations and worlds, as 
Hallward points out: “At the operational foundations of Badiou’s ontology we 
10 See Hallward’s question in his introduction to Think Again: “In what sense is there being and 
then also (if not afterwards) appearing? What sort of separation – temporal, causal, phenom-
enal – is implied in this ‘then’ or ‘also’? This remains a little obscure since, though Badiou 
generally insists that the pure being of a being puts no constraints on its being- there, on how 
it appears in the situation, nevertheless both at what he calls the ‘atomic’ level of an object 
(the level that includes the irreducibly characteristic elements of an object) and within the cir-
cumstances of a ‘site’ (defined now as an element which itself comes to determine the way it 
appears in the situation), a being does prescribe the immediate nature of its being-there. So does 
the logic of appearing have anything more than a derivative force? Is this force really strong 
enough to account for the issue that, by Badiou’s own admission, was left more or less unex-
plained in Being and Event, namely the way in which a situation is structured (since the concept 
of set is itself more or less structure-free)?” (Hallward, 2004: 19)
11 There are plenty of illustrations for this in Logics, for example in the introduction to Book III, 
concerning the conception of the object: “we are obliged to establish that an object is indeed 
the being-there of an ontologically determinate being; or that the logic of appearing does not 
exhaustively constitute the intelligibility of objects.” (LW: 195)
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find neither revealed word nor reconstituted thing but the subject in its purest 
form” (BST: 76). How are we then to answer the question of constitution or 
genesis of ontological situations if the subject is the only formalised performer in 
Badiou’s ontology? With this model, we run into the problem that his subjective 
formalisms can only arise from and work on already established situations and 
their appearing as worlds – since an event, as that which constitutes the subject, 
requires an established situation to compose its paradoxical multiple from. Con-
sequentially, the subject cannot create ontological situations since a situation is its 
condition of possibility in the first place. Since this would have presented the only 
viable account of situational genesis within Badiou’s system, his system proves to 
have no account for such genesis and consequentially his model seems to lack this 
central foundation.12 
Putting the question of genesis aside for now, if we try again to think through 
the creation of new situations (starting, this time, from already existing ones) 
combined with the idea of ontological primacy, we run into another foundational 
problem. It has been established by Badiou that every ontological situation is to 
appear, that it be-there. It assumes that everything that exists is the appearance 
of ontological multiplicity, meaning that for something to exist (to be-there), this 
something has to already have a consistent being (be counted-as-one in being). 
Therefore everything that appears is prescribed in its existence by its ‘underlying’ 
multiple-composition, which is to say that what appears is ontologically deter-
mined (although not how it is to appear, since this is the work of transcendental 
evaluation). Because of the imperative of being to appear as being-there, Badiou 
needs to come up with a concept that allows a situation’s multiple-composition 
(in being) to be altered by genuine changes in its localised appearance as world 
(being-there). The mechanism of retroaction of appearing on being is supposed 
to ensure such ontological reflections of worldly changes. Confusion now arises 
if we understand both, ontological prescription and retroaction as constitutive of 
12 Both Ray Brassier and Sam Gillespie point to the open question of what creates consistency: 
“It is precisely the failure to clarify the connection between ontological inconsistency and 
ontical consistency that obliges Badiou to resort to hollow tautologies such as ‘consistency 
must be consistent’. If unity is only ever the result of an inexistent operation, then what non-tautological 
instance accounts for the necessary ubiquity of consistency?” (Brassier, 2006: 72, my emphasis) And: 
“What is missing is thus an account, on the one hand, of the process through which possible 
situations or possible worlds are formed, as well as the various categories that are transitive to 
both ontology and the situation itself, on the other.” (Gillespie, 2008: 99-100)
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each other’s realms, that an ontological situation prescribes (as anonymous struc-
ture of the situation’s multiple-composition) what appears as world but that at the 
same time changes in this same world re-constitute its ontological multiple-com-
position. This way, retroaction ultimately suggests, thanks to its evental anchor-
age, that ontological structure is the effect of worldly structuring or change, which 
destabilises the grounds for Badiou’s assumption of ontological primacy since, 
in this case it no longer holds that “being has the last word” (LW: 302). Out of 
the necessity to account for true change arising from the embodiment of a truth 
procedure within appearing, Badiou undermines with the concept of retroaction 
his own presumptions of ontological primacy and thereby also, in a way, the 
viability of his subtractive approach in conceptualising genuine change. Or more 
precisely is it the necessity to conceptualise appearing as prescribed by being that 
is suddenly problematised, which means that Badiou’s objective phenomenology, 
and especially its Greater Logic, looses its initial urgency to be formulated in the 
first place.
The above reasoning is sensible only if we assume the idea of retroaction to 
be valid and crucial enough to confront the rest of Badiou’s system with the 
confusions it provokes. In our reading, retroaction presents the most materialist 
idea of Logics in that it presumes that true change in worlds is real. In this sense, 
to paraphrase Hallward’s polemic that “the retroactive effect … might best be 
described not merely as immaterial but as simply esoteric” (Hallward, 2008: 120), 
retroaction rather appears to be the only ‘sober’ concept against the backdrop of 
Badiou’s far more ‘esoteric’ assumption of the primacy of being over being-there. 
Considering his focus on genuine, material change, it is strange that this very 
material process and all the concepts it involves or employs (subject, event, site, 
truth procedure, etc.) are not only thought possible exclusively via ontological 
subtraction from all specificity and materiality but are also prescribed by it. A 
truly materialist theory of change would need to have a much stronger founda-
tion within worlds, however much it abstracts from them. 
In a way, Logics of Worlds appears as an immensely rigorous yet ultimately uncon-
vincing attempt to console Badiou’s own fundamental Platonism with his desire 
to think the real possibility of materially effective, genuine change. In holding on 
to a conception of being and its relation to being-there that can easily be read like 
that of a primary Idea and the ever incomplete appearance of its existential instan-
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tiations, it is difficult to understand why one would even set out for an endeavour 
on such conflicting foundations. Then again, it is precisely through this relentless 
work of a convinced Platonist, yet believing materialist, in developing his idea to 
its clear consequences, that its ultimate inconsistency comes to appear – exactly 
by trying to make it a consistent system.
Apart from this brief discussion of Badiou’s ontological primacy and the result-
ing questioning of the necessity of his Greater Logic, Logics of Worlds nevertheless 
proposes a host of valid and fundamental concepts, like the revisions of the sub-
jective formalisms and forms of change, transcendental organisation of appearing 
and logics of worlds, points and their treatment by subject-bodies. We will revisit 
– and, indeed utilise – some of these concepts in the following chapters. 
Since the above critique concerns Badiou’s assumptions of both foundation and 
necessity of most of Logics and tries to point to some of their problems, any specific 
critique of the concepts and mechanisms of the Greater Logic would not really 
change the more fundamental issues with it. What we will try to do in Chapter 4 
though is to sketch out a rudimentary model for thinking change that is based on 
fundamental ideas and parts of Badiou’s system. It stems from my conviction that 
an explicitly materialist approach is necessary for an effective model of radical 
change and creation, where the capacity of transformation is founded in the world 
in which it unfolds whilst the very idea of the new world to come (its truth) is 
still founded in an extra-worldly event (the being of which can only be thought 
but not encountered in existence). In this conception, the capacity for materially 
effective change aims to be co-extensive with the subtractive thought that enables 
the dedication (fidelity) to it, which otherwise would be conceived impossible.13 
We will unfold this thought after the following excursus.
13 Gillespie outlined this task, for his own, unfinished project as follows: “The goal, for a philoso-
phy of novelty, is to determine the void beyond its empty designation as a mere name, and for 
this, something other than ontology is required. The movement beyond a ‘pure’ ontology will 
consist of making that indetermination of being determinant in and through the production of 
a truth … It is at this point that a shift must be made from ontology as a foundation for Badi-
ou’s system to a theory of the event and truth as the possible arenas in which a determination 
of the limits of any given system occurs. That is, the move beyond ontology will consist of 
various efforts to redetermine knowledge precisely at those sites where it encounters its own 
failures: that is, around the void of any given situation. And these redeterminations will not be 
the exclusive project of philosophy, but rather will occur in specific situations, in which knowl-
edge and truth operate: politics, science, art and love.” (Gillespie, 2008: 61)
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3
Excursus: Foucault’s Problematisation of the Present
This chapter takes the form of an excursus from the main part of the thesis. It sets 
out to further clarify the notion of radical novelty and its creation by looking at a 
different inflection on the latter in the late work of Michel Foucault, and specifically 
his concern with experimental productions of subjectivity. Indeed, like Badiou the 
question of the subject is crucial to Foucault’s account of change. We will come 
to understand that Foucault’s notion of an experimental, counter-normative sub-
jectivity is not straightforwardly connected to the notion of radical change that 
this thesis is concerned with, but that it shares the same impulse of transgressing 
established configurations of power and subjectivity. This shared focus on the 
subject as agent of change, and the practices it employs vis-à-vis a given worldly 
structure, will help us sharpen these notions – power structure, subject, agency, 
practices of freedom and change – and their interrelations in regard of the project 
at hand. It will be argued that Foucault’s notion of the experimental work on 
one’s self (on one’s subjectivity) presents a crucial way of understanding the pro-
duction of difference from within the worldly situation it is carried out. On the 
other hand, Foucault’s work does not provide any clues for a conceptual founda-
tion of an outside – or a proper ontological approach, allowing for a higher level 
of abstraction – and therefore precludes a notion of radical change going beyond 
mere modification of what already exists. In the end though, and with the con-
sideration of Badiou’s onto-logical system in the previous chapters in mind, we 
will come to understand that although (or perhaps precisely because) Foucault 
did not engage in arcane abstraction, his notions of experimenting, attentive and 
 
78
self-determining subjects are ultimately what will help us to bring some of Badi-
ou’s abstraction back to the material, embodied realm of praxis.1
Power and the subject
When approaching the question of change and radical novelty, it might be instruc-
tive to situate and scrutinise this operation in the field into which it intervenes: 
an always historically situated present, within history in general. Considering 
worldly situations as embedded in history – as historical – entails that every situ-
ation is to be seen as the dynamic result of historical processes. This simply means 
two things, first that there is no ‘natural’ or neutral situation, that what seems 
to be given as world is rather to be understood as produced. And second, that 
by analysing the movements and struggles that produce changes and differences 
throughout history, we might come to understand not only some of the forces 
of history and their agents that give form to a specific era but also some of the 
mechanisms and tendencies that are functional or are made use of across different 
times in history. In short, it is less the specific indexes of historical times that are 
of interest here but rather the shifts in how these times themselves were thought, 
made sense of and acted upon.
1 It is important to acknowledge why the work of Gilles Deleuze is absent from the discussion in 
this thesis, as it is more often than not his writing that is engaged with when it comes to notions 
of creation, actualisation of difference and the virtual.
First and foremost, my specific interest is to investigate the creation of radical novelty, which 
entails rupture and is dependent on an equally radical outside (or void). We can find in Deleuze, 
in this regard, a philosophy of immanent becoming – which does not at all rule out ways of 
thinking creation of novelty but does present us with a fundamentally different way of thinking 
about the creation of radical novelty. 
Second, the choice to stage an encounter between Foucault and Badiou (however timidly) rather 
than between Deleuze and Badiou comes from the intuition that Foucault could, by way of this 
excursus, be a more explicit interlocutor for Badiou. For both Badiou and Foucault, but not for 
Deleuze, the subject takes up a pivotal position in their respective work, and it is the contrast 
in belabouring this central concern – philosophical conceptualisation contra theorisation via 
genealogical analysis – that makes them a more interesting pairing. Specifically, in Foucault’s 
elaborations on technologies and care of the self can we find a resonance but also explicit dif-
ferences with Badiou’s truth procedure – especially when we look at what the subject actually 
carries out. It is really Foucault who can challenge Badiou on his contestable idea of putting 
forward a materialist thought, not least because Foucault, perhaps more so even then Guattari, 
was a non-philosopher. This challenge will not, however, take the form of a direct encounter – or 
engagement with Foucault’s writings beyond this excursus – but rather will inform my attitude 
towards Badiou. Badiou’s system will be probed in the spirit of Foucault, as it were. This will 
become especially apparent in the following two chapters.
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The work of Foucault is of seminal importance in this respect, insofar as it can be 
understood to trace – in different historical periods and with shifts in methodolog-
ical approaches and subject matters – the ways in which historical configurations 
acquired the appearance of internal coherence and consistency. For Foucault, 
what opened history to this kind of analysis was the notion of problematisation, 
the concern with “why a problem and why such a kind of problem, why a certain 
way of problematizing appears at a given point in time” (Foucault, 1989a: 414). 
He states that the “development of a given into a question, this transformation of 
a group of obstacles and difficulties into problems to which the diverse solutions 
will attempt to produce a response, this is what constitutes the point of problem-
atisation” (Foucault, 1989b: 421). The implication of this genealogy of problems 
is that it can make visible some of the forces that constitute a historical situation. 
It can do so by tracing backwards from manifest, diverse and often contested 
propositions of an era to their general form of problematisation, and from there to 
the practices or constitutive fields of action that tried to deal with the specific dif-
ficulties and uncertainties of their time. A problematisation then opens an indirect 
access to the understanding of the construction of a given situation by exploring 
the practices that try to intervene in and modify the ways this situation has been 
and is being produced, thus exposing these constitutive operations. For Foucault, 
such an historical analysis of problematisations is at once specific to the era under 
consideration and generalisable on the level of what acquired this or that histor-
ically unique form, that is to say in regard to the configuration of knowledge, 
power and ethics. Such diverse inquiries, he writes, “have their theoretical coher-
ence in the definition of the historically unique forms in which the generalities of 
our relations to things, to others, to ourselves, have been problematized” (Fou-
cault, 1997: 118-9).2
Now, on the basis of this genealogy of problematisation, Foucault describes the 
objective of his work – at least in retrospect – as “to create a history of the different 
modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects,” and hence that 
“it is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme of my research” (Fou-
cault, 1982: 208-9). The main fields of practices that he investigated all present 
2 This is how Foucault situates his genealogy of problematisation within a wider philosophical 
ethos, which he sees introduced by the Enlightenment; see “What is Enlightenment?” (Foucault, 
1997).
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different ways of turning the subject into their object: the sciences (regimes of 
knowledge), “dividing practices” (normative discourses) and the ways one turns 
oneself into a subject (technologies of the self) (ibid.). Foucault’s analyses of how 
human beings – in different discursive practices and at various historical moments 
– have been objectified brought to the fore the respective and specific mechanisms 
of how these discourses exerted their force on (and thereby produced) the subjects 
they tried to grasp. In bringing to bear determining forces on the subject, such 
practices and discourses raise the question of power since they come to define and 
enforce what a subject can reasonably be, how it is to be understood, how it is to 
be governed and how it is to think of itself. Yet, the form power assumes vis-à-vis 
the subject is not some one-directional oppressive force but rather a formative 
process of relations of power that permeate and constitute the social body:3
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which catego-
rizes the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his 
own identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize and 
which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes 
individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word subject: subject 
to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a 
conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which 
subjugates and makes subject to. (Foucault, 1982: 212)
With his approach of analysing power through the diverse forms of resistance 
against it and the antagonisms of strategies that find expressions in a situation, 
Foucault aimed to shift the focus from the manifestations of a given power struc-
ture towards the ways in which power is exercised. Asking how and by what 
means power is exercised brings into play the relations between individuals since 
we can speak of power only as that which structures or produces a modification 
in the field of possible actions. “In itself the exercise of power”, Foucault writes, 
3 This understanding of power as a complex and productive discursive operation rather than 
oppressive force pure and simple is of course what Foucault is most well known for. For an 
exemplary elaboration, see his refutation in The Will to Knowledge of what he called, in regard 
to (post-)Victorian sexuality, the “repressive hypothesis” (Foucault, 1978: 10-3, 47-9).
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is not violence; nor is it a consent which, implicitly, is renewable. It is a 
total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it 
induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it con-
strains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon 
an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable 
of action. (Foucault, 1982: 220)
Understood in this way, power relations are based on and require acting sub-
jects in order to come to exist and exert their effects on the social network in 
which they find their material foundation: “Power exists only when it is put into 
action” (Foucault, 1982: 219). So, instead of conceiving of power as something 
that governs ‘from above’, Foucault urges us to understand power relations to 
be “rooted deep in the social nexus” (Foucault, 1982: 222), being based on the 
possibility to interact with, interfere in and modify the actions of others, “which is 
co-extensive with every social relationship” (Foucault, 1982: 224). 
Power relations need therefore be understood as relations not between power 
and subjects but as relations between subjects where the form of these relations 
is both conditioned by the contemporary configuration of power and reproduces 
this arrangement of power in a more or less faithful/close manner. To produce 
such relations is what subjects do, and, indeed, what they are constituted by in 
that power subjects a human being by conditioning its possible fields of action 
– i.e. prescribing, to a certain degree, the possible ways for subjects to form and 
maintain these relations. Hence not only is power productive of the subject – the 
subject constituting “one of its prime effects” (Foucault, 1980: 98) – but it is also 
the subject which actualises and reproduces forms of power. Subjects “are always 
in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are 
not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its 
articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points 
of application” (ibid.). This last point – that individuals are vehicle, rather than 
points of application of power – is worth keeping in mind as it will form the kernel 
of the operation that re/produces the logics of a world in the model of creation 
developed in the following two chapters.
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Agency
Foucault’s analysis of power relations presents us, as one of its aspects, with a 
possible model of how power assumes structure, how a manifold of power rela-
tions are produced and upheld in the form of a historically specific configuration 
of power. In his conception of the subject we can identify something like an agent 
of history since only subjects actively articulate relations of power, embody them 
and thereby grant them material reality. So far however, this articulation has been 
framed only in direct relation (be that affirmative or negating) to existing power 
structures, to the configuration of power relations that have been productive of 
the subject by making it re-articulate the former. How are we then, within this con-
ception, to think agency, the possibility of an act that is not exclusively (or even 
not at all) prescribed by dominant power structures and hegemonic discourses? 
That is to say a possibility of subjects being not merely “vehicles of power” but 
agents of something not already determined by a given power structure or estab-
lished field of possibilities? It should be remarked at this point that the question 
of agency does not yet involve the notion of free will or self-determination, but 
simply concerns the general possibility of acts that are not entirely prescribed by 
the situation they are carried out from. Such an account of agency would allow 
for an understanding of how the production of power relations can become the 
locus of a mutual, interdependent development of power and subject, instead of 
a uni-directional determination of the subject by power. I would like to briefly 
discuss two related approaches to this question of a general possibility of agency 
before turning to Foucault’s own trajectory that in some senses struggles with, but 
also anticipates and lays the ground for, aspects of both those approaches.
In the work of both Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler, we can find notions of 
agency that derive from a critical reworking of J. L. Austin’s concept of perform-
ative speech acts, that is acts that do what they say, that allow us to do something 
by means of language. The following, brief outline of Derrida’s notions of iter-
ability and iterative citation does not directly connect to Foucault’s work as it is 
discussed here but provides an important ‘background’ for understanding Judith 
Butler’s own reworking (which follows after the brief discussion of Derrida) of 
Foucault’s politico-ethical project.
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In his essay “Signature Event Context”, Derrida formulates a critique of Austin’s 
speech act theory by problematising the latter’s central assumption that every per-
formative utterance is to be issued within an ordinary, shared context. He iden-
tifies Austin’s trouble to account for unsuccessful utterances (“infelicities”) in the 
attempt to reduce, contain and exclude such infelicities as non-serious, parasitic 
uses of language. Derrida proposes that in order to grasp this general possibility 
for every speech act to fail, we have to understand this possibility of failure – of a 
signifier breaking with its context – as the very condition for language to operate, 
instead of detecting therein a problem of im/proper use of language:
Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written (in the usual sense 
of this opposition), as a small or large unity, can be cited, put between quo-
tation marks; thereby it can break with every given context, and engender 
infinitely new contexts in an absolutely nonsaturable fashion. This does not 
suppose that the mark is valid outside its context, but on the contrary that 
there are only contexts without any center of absolute origin. This citation-
ality, duplication, or duplicity, this iterability of the mark is not an accident 
or an anomaly, but is that (normal/abnormal) without which a mark could 
no longer even have a so-called “normal” functioning. What would a mark 
be that one could not cite? And whose origin could not be lost on the way? 
(Derrida, 1982: 320-1)
Now if we understand such different contexts as embedded within a wider dis-
cursive framework, governed by a particular configuration of power, one could 
counter, or relativise, that although contexts are being broken all the time, these 
shifts are still operating within discourse and therefore according to its imma-
nent power structure. So whilst the sense of an utterance changes when it crosses 
contexts, the different meanings of this utterance still make and produce sense 
according to the structure of discourse and power in order to remain legible – 
otherwise they would be, precisely, non-sense.
But when we move from difference constituted by shifts across contexts to 
difference within the originating, ‘proper’ context, Derrida points to a more fun-
damental erring of signifying form from both its referent and its intention. With 
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what he terms “iterability”, Derrida describes the inherent possibility of every 
utterance to never fully succeed in the citation (repetition) of a mark:
This iterability (iter, once again, comes from itara, other in Sanskrit, and 
everything that follows may be read as the exploitation of the logic which 
links repetition to alterity), structures the mark of writing itself, and does 
so moreover for no matter what type of writing (pictographic, hieroglyphic, 
ideographic, phonetic, alphabetic, to use the old categories).” (Derrida, 
1982: 315)
Even if we assume that an act of reproducing power is determined by power, and 
that such an act would be intended to fully affirm the current power structure, 
Derrida’s iterability points to the necessary possibility inherent in language (and 
indeed in every form of act and experience)4 for such citational ‘reproductions’ of 
power to stray from and miss their intention. Iterability thus conceived could be 
read as a weak form of agency in that this fundamental feature of language and 
discourse – its iterability – prevents power from being reproduced self-identically.
Then again, from the perspective of subjective agency, this inherent erring from 
prescription and intention does not present much of a possibility for directed 
differing (or strong agency), since the erring of the citational act is completely 
independent of its specific context and intention. Although it requires a context 
to operate, the differing operation entertains no functional connection with both 
global situation and subjective situation or intention because it is the citational 
exercise of language itself that intervenes in – and with complete indifference to 
– a given context and intention. This missing interface to the differing operation 
precludes any navigational employment of such operation by a subject. This is 
to say that with iterability, because it is intrinsic to the citational practice of lan-
guage, speaking subjects introduce modifications into discourse without having 
any influence on the direction or orientation of those modifications.
4 “I will extend this law [of the structural possibility of every mark to be severed from its referent 
and intention] even to all “experience” in general, if it is granted that there is no experience of 
pure presence, but only chains of differential marks.” (Derrida, 1982: 318; my addition)
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In short, Derrida’s conception of every mark and utterance being able to break 
with its originating context, as well as the inherent impossibility of any such utter-
ance to identically repeat or cite its referent, allows us to account for the evident 
modifications that any configuration of power undergoes without those modifica-
tions being determined by the power structure they ‘cite’ from. But in respect of 
agency, iterability contributes little to an understanding of the possibility, founda-
tion or mechanism of acts that are not completely determined by a given config-
uration of power, since iterability operates indifferently to any given context and 
thereby forecloses any way of employability– the erring in the iteration happens 
by itself and independent of any intention and context.
In her work on gender performativity, Judith Butler picks up Derrida’s notions 
of iterability and iterative citation and brings them to bear on Foucault’s concep-
tions of power and discourse. Butler’s concern is to show that gender is not a 
natural, neutral and unproblematic category, that there is no such thing as gen-
dered essence. Instead, she argues, we need to understand gender as discursive 
effect of the ritualised repetition of norms, which is to say that only through such 
repetition do we gain a sense of gender identity. This conception is very close to 
Foucault’s understanding of power being productive of the subjects it regulates, 
but further specifies it in regard of Derrida’s iterative citation in that power struc-
tures must be understood to be upheld only through their compulsive repetition 
– perpetuating their normative presence in the form of dominant citational chains. 
Butler terms this discursive operation performativity, which “must be understood 
not as a singular or deliberate ‘act,’ but, rather, as the reiterative and citational 
practice by which discourse produces the effects that it names (…) not as the 
act by which a subject brings into being what she/he names, but, rather, as that 
reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and 
constrains” (Butler, 1993: xii). 
If performativity is not an act that originates from a subject but denotes instead 
the reiterative power of discourse which produces and enables the subject, what 
does this mean for the subject’s capacity to act? How are we to think agency 
within this framework of performativity? Butler argues that it would be a mistake 
to construe the subject’s constitution by discourse as its complete determination 
by the latter, which would result in the foreclosure of agency tout court (Butler, 
1999: 182). Rather, she writes:
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... when the subject is said to be constituted, that means simply that the 
subject is a consequence of certain rule-governed discourses that govern the 
intelligible invocation of identity. The subject is not determined by the 
rules through which it is generated because signification is not a founding 
act, but rather a regulated process of repetition that both conceals 
itself and enforces its rules precisely through the production of substantial-
izing effects. In a sense, all signification takes place within the orbit of the 
compulsion to repeat; “agency,” then, is to be located within the possibility of 
a variation on that repetition. (Butler, 1999: 185)
Subjectivation thus understood does not to happen through – and is therefore not 
determined by – a singular founding act (once and for all, as it were) but rather 
in the iterative process of signification which a subject cannot but enact and so 
gains recognisability and intelligibility as a subject. It is for this reason that we 
can speak of the subject as an effect of its performative enactments of the norms 
of a given configuration of power/discourse. According to Butler, agency has to 
be located within this reiterative process of signification and is by consequence 
entirely “immanent to power, and not a relation of external opposition to power” 
(Butler, 1993: xxiii). Agency would then be the volitional interference in, or play 
with, the citational process whereby repetition is made to coincide with alteration 
and resignification: “The critical task is, rather, to locate strategies of subversive 
repetition enabled by those constructions, to affirm the local possibilities of inter-
vention through participating in precisely those practices of repetition that consti-
tute identity and, therefore, present the immanent possibility of contesting them” 
(Butler, 1999: 188; my emphasis). Subversive repetition would aim at displacing 
the very norms that enable subjectivation under a given discursive configuration, 
thereby opening the possibility for these contested norms to be negotiated and 
transformed.
Now, as a conception of agency that is situated within iterability and is entirely 
immanent to power/discourse, what can be considered as its scope? How much 
acting and doing, especially doing differently, can it allow? Does this immanence 
to power not inherently determine the subject in its capacity to act, despite Butler’s 
arguing to the contrary? Whilst she makes a convincing case for the subject not 
being directly determined by norms but rather enabled by the iterative processes 
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that nonetheless form and frame the subject in relation to those norms, Butler 
arguably focuses too exclusively on normative terms and categories (in regard of 
their resignification) and pays less attention to the broader discursive prescription 
understood as the field of intelligible possibilities. Normative terms and categories 
can be understood as local or specific determinations within the broader, global 
field of discourse. It is then this localisation of norms within the general regime of 
intelligibility that poses a constraint on the efficacy or scope of Butler’s subversive 
repetition, since the latter works on locally specific expressions of a global way of 
making and enforcing sense – however incomplete this regime of intelligibility is, 
or can be, expressed as a whole.
Whereas such a regime of intelligibility surely allows agency to unfold accord-
ing to Butler’s conception, it must also be understood as that anonymous force of 
power/discourse that compels any resignification of terms to settle tightly within 
and, most importantly, according to, the general intelligibility of a given power 
structure. Any given configuration of power, conceived as a (more or less) total, 
multidimensional space of intelligibility, delimits a space of possibility in which 
terms can be resignified locally without necessarily propagating difference beyond 
such local realms, where global tendencies stay undisturbed or get even enforced 
by discursive resolutions (be they emancipative or oppressive) of embattled terms 
and categories.
Agency conceived within the process of performativity can then be consid-
ered to have subversive effects only insofar as it lays bare the normative force of 
hegemonic discursive terms and the inherent constructed-ness of every signifying 
category or index within discourse. Although it can thereby provoke the negotia-
tion and local resignification of normative terms and categories, there is no further 
conception (and, as we will come to understand, no conceptual foundation) for 
the production and incorporation of difference beyond those challenged terms, 
beyond their local scope. 
Subversive resignification merely employs established – however marginalised 
– categories against their normative function within their context and in that 
sense can be understood to be more of a ‘troubling non-compliance’ on a local 
level than producing difference beyond this limited scope. Performativity affirms 
the efficacy of subjective agency in regard of normative terms within the general 
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configuration of power and discourse but it is not clear where difference – as that 
which introduces change into the incessant reproduction of discourse and power 
– could come from or be founded in. 
In this sense then, Butler’s conception of agency as subversive resignification 
faces two critical problems or restrictions: First, it considers only the local scope 
of normative terms without accounting for a broader notion of change; broader 
in the sense of not merely concerning the former’s potential resignification within 
a given historical situation that can easily accommodate such local modifications, 
but one that intrinsically effectuates change on that global level of a situation (at 
the level of what I have called general intelligibility). Second, subversive resignifi-
cation (which is really the opening or provocation to renegotiate the signification 
of a given term) misses a foundation for the difference that would be instantiated 
by such a process. Butler does not clearly elaborate how or from where this differ-
ence is supposed to emerge but seems rather to entrust performativity an always 
positively productive capacity to propagate and effectuate revaluations of norms 
on the level of power/discourse in general. A more expressed foundation of differ-
ence is necessary for a model of agency, on one hand, since a model is expected 
to give a complete (however hypothetical or speculative) account of what it sets 
out to model. On the other hand such a foundation – in either sense of material 
for or operation or methodology of construction – would be helpful to gauge the 
scope of change this model of agency allows for.
The intention of this brief digression (from Foucault) into Derrida and Butler 
has been to lay out a different but related approach to the question of agency at 
a point in our discussion of Foucault’s conception of power relations where the 
latter appeared to come up against a problem, namely of how to account for the 
possibility to act without being completely determined by a given power structure. 
Foucault himself proposed that the key for non-determinacy is freedom, without 
which power would not be possible – this notion will be explored in the follow-
ing section. Within his extensive work on power though, the notion of freedom 
appears rather sparsely and late, and is built, as we will come to see, on a vague 
conceptual foundation. This might explain why Butler (besides others) chooses 
a different route to tackle the question of agency, namely her own reformulation 
of Foucault with the help of Derrida. As has been shown above, Butler’s concep-
tion of agency comes with its own problems or restrictions, which concern the 
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scope of resignification as well as its foundation, more precisely the foundation of 
difference that subversive resignification claims to produce. These shortcomings 
effectively reduce agency to an operation of troubling non-compliance, of merely 
provoking a renegotiation of a normative term instead of conjuring a real capacity 
for change within the iterative operation that produces subject and power.5
Freedom
Returning to Foucault, how does he then negotiate the question of a subject being 
wholly determined by a given power structure? As mentioned above, it is the 
notion of freedom that ensures that the subject is never completely determined by 
a given configuration of power. In fact, for Foucault, freedom is the condition for 
power, for it to be exercised, and a precondition for power to be an operational 
category in the first place:
Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. 
By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field 
of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and 
diverse comportments may be realized. ... there is no face to face confronta-
tion of power and freedom which is mutually exclusive (freedom disappears 
everywhere power is exercised), but a much more complicated interplay. 
In this game freedom may well appear as the condition for the exercise of 
power (at the same time its precondition, since freedom must exist for power 
to be exerted, and also its permanent support, since without the possibility 
of recalcitrance, power would be equivalent to a physical determination). 
(Foucault, 1982: 221)
Freedom here is the condition for a meaningful differentiation between “physical 
determination”, or slavery, and power as a more dynamic interplay between the 
subjects it produces and their reproduction of it. Subjective agency – the subject’s 
5 Notwithstanding this critique of Butler’s conception of agency, her work did provide an impor-
tant intuition for my conception of a world (in Chapter 3 and 4) through the understanding of 
power as a complex network of relations of power that derives its material, worldly reality from 
the compulsive, iterative reproduction of a given (normative) power structure.
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capacity to act not entirely determined by a given power structure –  can then be 
understood to be enabled by this freedom, and enacted in form of a conduct, as 
Foucault terms it. To conduct involves both a mechanism of coercion (the norma-
tive side of power) and of acting according to a field of possibilities at a distance 
to this normative force (freedom as capacity for free action).
Before discussing this exercise of freedom though, the notion of freedom itself 
needs to be unpacked a little further. Foucault gives us almost no clues beyond 
the sentences cited above, which makes this task more of an interpretation than 
a close reading.6 If freedom presents or opens “a field of possibilities in which 
several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be 
realized” (ibid.), this field of possibilities is to be understood as an outside to a 
given power structure, which is why it can enable various conducts and modes 
of behaviour that are not determined by this power structure, that manifest a 
recalcitrance without which “power would be equivalent to a physical determi-
nation” (ibid.). This field of possibilities is also located, qua possibilities, within 
the wider field of discourse, since a possibility is necessarily something that can 
be comprehended, or simply, uttered, in order to be taken as a task and realised. 
Therefore freedom, like power itself, is situated within discourse. Whilst power 
continually weaves discursive entities and formations into a network of normative 
power relations, freedom is the space containing those discursive formations not 
yet included in the power structure. Freedom, then, can be understood as that 
space within discourse which is not yet stratified by power, rather than a trans-
gressive force or a radical outside to its discursive, worldly situation. This is to say 
that the discursive situation presents the horizon of possibility for this freedom, 
or for every act that embodies or exercises this freedom. Although this notion of 
freedom successfully establishes a space outside of power whilst being situated on 
the same plane as the latter (providing a strong foundation for agency), we can 
see therein a certain delimitation of freedom by discourse, since the space and 
horizon of possibility is established by discourse, regimes of knowledge, ways of 
understanding and approaching the world and oneself. 
6 In The Use of Pleasure, for example, Foucault devotes a chapter (Foucault, 1985: 78-93) to the 
discussion of freedom in classical Greek thought and we can find in this historical analysis some 
inspirations for his own conception. These elaborations should nonetheless be considered pri-
marily within the analysis they are carried out in, since they do neither present a part nor readily 
fit into Foucault’s own, slightly more abstracted conceptual edifice around power and the subject.
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For Foucault, this idea of delimitation of freedom by discourse would probably 
make no sense, rather discourse should be understood as enabling freedom in 
relation to power in the first place. The demarcation of the space of freedom by 
discourse becomes intelligible as a problem only once we shift and expand the 
object of transformation – that which is acted upon and transformed through 
subjects’ capacity to act – from power relations within a power structure to the 
world as such, of which discourse presents, in Foucault’s edifice, the broadest 
expanse of intelligibility. This shift is required if we want to think the creation of 
radical novelty, its foundations and operations of instantiation, once we under-
stand radical novelty as that which is precisely unintelligible before its instanti-
ation. Now even though his account of freedom (and the concept of agency we 
can derive from it) falls short in regard of this more global scope, it would not do 
justice to Foucault to close the case on him just yet, since the transfiguration of 
the given field of possibilities (“the present”) is what his late work around ethics 
and technologies of the self is focused on – practices he considers as exercises of 
freedom.
Experimentation
Freedom is the ontological condition of ethics. But ethics is the considered 
form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection. (Foucault, 
2000b: 284) 
Freedom, again, is not only the condition for power to be exerted but also for the 
subject’s capacity to act in difference to a given power structure. The actualisation 
of this capacity to act freely, Foucault says in regard of Greek antiquity, is itself 
“an ethical problem ... ethical in the sense in which the Greeks understood it: ethos 
was a way of being and of behavior” (Foucault, 2000b: 286). To problematise 
freedom through ethics means to engage in the quest for a way of living that takes 
its rules not from any given power structure but instead from an experimental 
practice that aims at establishing such rules through its own problematisation of 
the present. To give form to freedom then requires work on one’s self, one is to 
 
92
analyse, reflect and change one’s ethos – one’s relation to the world and oneself 
expressed as a way of living. It is not merely a matter of self-awareness but of:
self-formation as an “ethical subject,” a process in which the individual 
delimits that part of himself that will form the object of his moral practice, 
defines his position relative to the precept he will follow, and decides on a 
certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal. And this requires 
him to act upon himself, to monitor, test, improve, and transform himself. 
(Foucault, 1985: 28)
This work on the self can be understood as a limit-attitude that consists in the 
analysis and reflection upon the limits of ourselves, and a practical critique of a 
possible crossing-over, an experimentation of going beyond those limits of what 
we are today. Such a practical critique “has to be considered not, certainly, as a 
theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumu-
lating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which 
the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of 
the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going 
beyond them” (Foucault, 1997: 118).
In face of the subject’s determination by power, ethics presents precisely not a 
‘way out’ of determination altogether but a practice that constructs the terms (or 
determinations) for the subject by that subject’s situated problematisation of the 
present. Instead of simply accepting and enacting dominant norms, the subject 
decreases its determination by power through the experimental construction 
of rules that increase its self-determination. In that sense, “ethics can be a very 
strong structure of existence, without any relation with the juridical per se, with 
an authoritarian system, with a disciplinary structure” (Foucault, 2000a: 260). It 
is in this trajectory that we can understand Foucault’s subtle shift from freedom 
as “field of possibilities” to freedom as practice or exercise, where the ground 
of one’s actions is neither dictated by power nor given by freedom in the sense 
of a field of possibilities untouched by power (but still somehow prescribed, by 
discourse). Instead, the basis of one’s actions is constructed by the subject from 
within, but with a reflected distancing to, established discourse and power. This 
reflected distancing is an exercise of freedom in that a subject takes determina-
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tions by power and transforms them into its own rules of conduct (self-determi-
nations) through the act of critical reflection – a mode of reflection that distances 
its subject from immediate immersion within power relations, thereby enabling 
perspective, reflection, and modification of these relations. The enactments of the 
subject’s rules of conduct then result in difference and liberty expressed in form 
of a way of living.
How then are we to think such exercises of freedom? In what way does the 
problematisation of the present feed into the experimental task of going beyond 
the limits this present imposes on us? And how can this experimental practice be 
understood to construct the rules for the way of living it gives form to? The oper-
ational core of this experimental practice is constituted, in Foucault’s terms, by 
technologies of the self. These technologies “permit individuals to effect by their 
own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their 
own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform 
themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfec-
tion, or immortality” (Foucault, 1988: 18). Technologies of the self are themselves 
situated within a broader ethical practice of the cultivation and care for the self, 
since it is only through taking care of oneself that one obtains and comes to 
employ these technologies.7 Care of the self implies labour, focussed concern and 
attention, and generally entails a host of directed occupations, the common goal 
of which “can be characterized by the entirely general principle of conversion to 
self” (Foucault, 1986: 64). Such rejoining, reverting to or reviewing oneself means 
to break free from dependencies and enslavement (or, subjection) by acquiring 
mastery over oneself, a relation to the world and one’s self that enables defining – 
and is dialectically developed on – one’s own rules of conduct. 
7 For the most part in his late work, Foucault concentrated on ethical practices in Hellenistic 
and Roman culture and investigated specifically the shifts those practices underwent in relation 
to shifts of the major aspects of ethical concern – ethical substance, mode of subjectivation, 
self-formation and telos (Foucault, 1985: 26-8; Foucault, 2000a: 263-5). This voluminous work 
is beyond the scope of this brief overview to be considered in its detail and will only be selec-
tively referenced for the sake of a more focussed and brief discussion of the technologies of 
the self, since the latter can be considered as the central practices and exercises that establish 
the basis for free action. For an in-depth genealogical account of the cultural and philosophical 
settings of the technologies of the self, see The History of Sexuality, Volumes 2 and 3 and Fou-
cault’s lectures at the Collège de France from 1981 onwards (particularly The Hermeneutics of 
the Subject), as well as Pierre Hadot’s Philosophy as a Way of Life.
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In his analysis of the Stoic technologies of the self, Foucault points out three 
main aspects: disclosure of self, examination of self and conscience, and askesis. In 
writing about one’s self – in the form of notes, letters, treatises, by keeping a note-
book and so forth – one describes and relates the experience of oneself, disclosing 
one’s self to oneself. Examination of conscience can be seen as an administration 
of one’s deeds, often at the end of a day, where one considers how what one was 
going to do corresponds with what one did, both in order make adjustments to 
and reactivate one’s rules of conduct. Ascesis is the self-forming activity by which 
one becomes an ethical subject; it “means not renunciation but the progressive 
consideration of self, or mastery over oneself, obtained not through the renunci-
ation of reality but through the acquisition and assimilation of truth” (Foucault, 
1988: 35). For such assimilation of truth to contribute to self-formation, it has to 
become part of oneself, be transformed into one’s principles of action. But how 
is truth acquired and transformed into rules of conduct? Foucault puts together 
a range of activities in relation to true discourses (logoi), which are attitudes and 
exercises that aim at being attentive and conscious about oneself in connection to 
the world, to have ready the fundamental rules of life and the intellectual exercise 
of appropriating truth,8 through listening, writing and self-reflection. He remarks 
though that:
it is not a matter of discovering a truth in the subject or of making the soul 
the place where truth dwells through an essential kinship or original law; 
nor is it a matter of making the soul the object of a true discourse. ... On the 
contrary, it is a question of arming the subject with a truth that he did not 
know and that did not dwell within him; it involves turning this learned 
and memorized truth that is progressively put into practice into a quasi-sub-
ject that reigns supreme within us. (Foucault, 2005: 501)
Through the exercises of meditation (melete) and training (gymnasia), one then 
enacts and puts to test – and is in return able to revise – the truth one acquired, 
memorised and transformed into one’s rules of conduct. Whereas in meditation 
8 Truth here refers to the essences of a master’s teachings in the philosophical schools. As is briefly 
elaborated below, truth is not simply a category of knowledge but is to provide the foundation for 
one’s actions.
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we find the reactions to imaginary events to train thought, gymnasia concerns train-
ing in real situations which is “to establish and test the independence of the indi-
vidual with regard to the external world” (Foucault, 1988: 37). In what Foucault 
calls the control of representations, one is to pay attention to if and why one is 
affected by things represented, with the aim of finding “in these representations, 
as they appear, the opportunity for recalling a number of true principles concern-
ing death, illness, suffering, political life, etcetera. By means of this reminder we 
can see if we are capable of reacting in accordance with such principles” (Foucault, 
2005: 504). When truth is acquired and transformed into the guiding principles 
of one’s conduct by these exercises, what does such truth consist of, and where is 
it acquired from? According to the Stoics, truth is not to be found in the self but 
is “in the logoi, the teaching of the teachers” (Foucault, 1988: 35). These logoi are 
to be understood not merely as true propositions or axioms but to have material 
existence, in the sense that they bring about actions, and not only conviction. In 
this sense, logoi “must actualize the soundness of action rather than the perfection 
of knowledge” (Frédéric Gros in Foucault, 2005: 528). Ascetic exercises are then 
the practical, material work through which one is to assimilate and inscribe logoi 
in the self as the rules of one’s conduct.
We can begin to see how the problematisation of the present, in the form of 
technologies of the self, can contribute to a possible crossing-over of the limits pre-
sented by that present. A problematisation makes the conditions we are situated 
in – which, in more or less direct ways, exert normative power on our subjectiv-
ities – and particularly our relation to them, into the object of heightened atten-
tion, reflection, experimentation and transformation. The capacity to go beyond 
the limits of the present resides in the independent and self-devised construction, 
enactment and revision of one’s rules of conduct through a set of practices that 
are nonetheless situated within but exercised in reflected distance to the condi-
tions of the present. In this diverse and interrelated nexus of practices, we can find 
a foundation for agency that is more attuned to the complexities of its present, 
which presents a more effective and reliable conceptual basis for self-determined 
action. In a more abstract way (fashioned to the generic language of the preceding 
chapters), technologies of the self can provide a foundation of subjective agency 
that is immanent to concrete situations yet not determined by the latter’s specifics, 
since conduct itself is a result of, or founded in a mode of problematisation, reflected 
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difference and transformational experimentation that is working on, rather than being 
determined by a specific power structure.
Radical change
In what way is this discussion of Foucault’s conception of the subject and power, 
and his genealogical analysis of technologies of the self, illuminating for the ques-
tion of radical novelty and its creation? As has been argued above, Foucault’s late 
work can be understood to lay a sound foundation for agency, for an acting not 
determined by a given power structure or an existing discursive situation alto-
gether. This provides us with a conceptual basis for mechanisms of enacting and 
producing difference, difference in regard to the present in which such practices, 
as well as its subjects, are situated in. What then is the relation between difference 
thus produced and radical novelty? Whilst Foucault, with his subtle shift from 
freedom as field of possibility to freedom as exercise, can indeed claim to have 
found a set of practices that produce difference from within power/discourse that 
possibly go beyond the limits of this same discursive world, the discussion of 
what such difference manifests, ‘how much’ of a difference it constitutes and what 
this difference is founded on is left open. In short, we get no clear guidance from 
Foucault whether independent, different ways of living constitute real novelties 
– instead of, for example, merely different subjective perspectives on an other-
wise unchanged world and thereby still abiding by its general structure of power/
discourse – and where such novelty (if that’s what this difference constitutes) is 
founded in or derived from,9 since Foucault only discusses the ‘how’ of their pro-
duction.10
9 A critique that is brought forward by Oliver Feltham and Justin Clemens in a less balanced way 
(see Feltham and Clemens, 2005: 4).
10 Foucault never really posed or engaged with these questions of scope, degree or radicality of dif-
ference, nor with the question novelty. We cannot really extract from his oeuvre if and how one’s 
independent ethos, attitude or way of living affects, transfigures or changes the broader worldly 
setting of power and discourse. It feels necessary to remark though that in the last lectures at the 
Collège de France before his death, he started to discuss the Cynics’ understanding of the care 
of the self as something that not only changes the conduct of individuals but also changes the 
general configuration of the world – which could have marked another shift in his investigation, 
in the direction of the effects of independent conduct on the world. In his manuscript he writes: 
“... the most important historical core of Cynicism is clearly expressed: namely, that the true life 
will be the life of truth, which manifests the truth, which practices the truth in the relation to self 
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The approach of Foucault is of course very different from the present investi-
gation into creation. Namely in that he sets out from archaeological and genea-
logical analyses of shifts in the mechanisms that make individuals subjects, and 
from there how subjects can exercise freedom in constructing their own rules of 
conduct independent of those former mechanisms of coercion. The approach in 
this thesis is to start with positing that radical novelty can indeed come to exist 
and that it has its foundation necessarily outside of the situation – which means 
also the discursive – it started out from. The task then is to formulate both the 
ontological model that allows for the act of creation’s foundation and the mecha-
nisms or procedures that can bring about, through that act, radical novelty. The 
aim here is to think, in a generic conception, the most ‘radical’ or ‘pure’ form 
of creation – that which brings radical novelty into existence ex nihilo – in order 
to provide thought with a kind of generic anchor against which we can gauge 
practices that intend to instantiate radical change or genuine creation. That the 
conception of creation be generic means that it must be thought – constructed – 
without recourse to history, case studies, or any specifically situated account but 
that it also be formulated so that it might be ‘applicable’ (albeit in the form of an 
abstract concept) in whatever specific worldly setting, present or future. 
There is a slightly seductive simplicity inherent in historical analysis or situated 
accounts of change in that we, today, already inhabit the outcome, or its rem-
nants, of past revolutions or historical ruptures, and are therefore in the position 
to easily manufacture pseudo-linear/causal explanations about how change came 
about in retrospect. From the perspective of a rupture yet to come, or whose 
process of rupturing has not started yet, it is much more difficult (if not outright 
impossible by definition) to foresee how such a break might even be possible, be 
imagined, approached and carried out. This is one of the reasons why we need a 
generic conception of radical change and novelty, since the apparent continuity of 
history (however constructed and only retrospectively available) cannot, by defi-
nition, help us in approaching and carrying out the task of radical change, that is, 
creation in the strongest sense. In the end, a generic conception of creation that is 
based on the notion of the outside is completely devoid of established narrations 
and others. So that the objective of this life of veridiction is the transformation of humankind 
and of the world” (Foucault, 2011: 315). Unfortunately, Foucault could not return to or engage 
further in this investigation.
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and connectors for affective identification. In its proof though, that change is not 
only possible out of any situation but that this change is radical in the sense that 
it has the power to establish a genuinely different world, we can find a strong rea-
sonable basis for the belief and hope that is needed to take on the task of creation.
How are we then to think difference as radical novelty? What does genuine 
difference manifest itself as, what is its scope (‘how much’ difference does it con-
stitute) and what is this difference founded on (what is its ‘origin’ or generative 
procedure, as it were)? These questions have been discussed in the framework 
of Badiou’s onto-logical system and for now, we have to postpone the complete 
argument to Chapter 4 and 5, where we will come to see that the instantiation 
of radical novelty is equivalent to the creation of a new world altogether.11 This 
means that genuine difference manifests itself as radically different logic of a 
world, and therefore as a new world tout court – it does not really make sense to 
speak of radical novelty as object, a set of specific relations, subjective perspec-
tive, orientation or set of rules, and so on. Therefore, its scope is always a world 
– the global set of relations, or more precisely the logic that organises the latter, 
rather than local modifications thereof – since for it to be instantiated, a genuine 
novelty demands the logic of the given world to be transfigured beyond its inher-
ent possibilities. The foundation of radical novelty, as has been argued in the 
introduction, needs to be located outside the given world and its logic, outside the 
given configuration of power/discourse. Novelty thus understood is not thinkable 
within the ethico-politcs of Foucault, since he does not include the thought of an 
outside in his oeuvre. On the other hand, we can understand his coupling, in the 
technologies of the self, of problematisation (of the present) and ethical practice 
(of constructing one’s rules of conduct) to produce possible trajectories towards 
the outside. By establishing self-determination as the ground of one’s actions, one 
attains (at least potentially) a capacity of unfolding new spaces of intelligibility 
11 This can be grasped intuitively when trying to think if and how one would be able to apprehend 
a radical novelty within the world that pre-dates it, from which its creation started out from. It 
would be impossible to understand this thing as either new – instead merely indexing it to an 
appearance that comes closest within the established system of understanding, or logic, of this 
world – or as a thing at all – when the logic of the world can neither accommodate this thing nor 
‘fake it’ into something similarly and already established in appearance. A genuine novelty can 
only exist in a world whose logic allows it to be accommodated, a world in which such novelty 
has a proper, sensible place. Therefore, this world’s logic, in order to shelter a genuine novelty, 
needs itself to be radically different from the one its creation started from.
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not conceivable in advance – not conceivable in the sense of both intelligibility 
and possibility. It is the self-devised rules and a recalcitrance towards the given 
and established configurations of power that allows such routes to the outside to 
acquire orientation and substance – routes that then venture beyond the present 
situation and draw out new spaces of intelligibility manifest in new forms of life 
that reconstitute their discursive foundations. 
Regardless then of Foucault’s missing foundation for radical difference and 
novelty, or an account of the outside, he does provide this immensely useful 
framework for a practice that is both abstract and immanent enough to princi-
pally work towards an outside – regardless of the latter not being embraced by 
Foucault himself. In this respect – of the centrality of practices a subject comes 
to employ to effectuate change (in regard of itself, its immediate context or the 
world at large) – we can see a close similarity to Badiou’s project, where we find 
the subject at the heart of the post-evental truth procedure – even though the 
latter’s subject is a much more abstract and generic conception. To bring these 
two (hardly compatible) strands into a closer relation is the undercurrent of the 




So far, in the first two chapters of this thesis, we discussed Badiou’s onto-logical 
system in Being and Event and Logics of Worlds so we can now gauge its aptness 
as explanatory framework for the procedure of creation of genuine novelty. It 
became clear that Badiou’s work is of primary importance due to its conception 
of radical change founded on the irruption of the ontological void into existence 
and carried out by subjects born from such an event. What is also evident is that 
the issues raised in the discussion of Badiou’s system now complicate the under-
taking of employing the latter as foundation for a model of creation. To sum-
marise, these issues unfold in the following way. In his ontological framework, 
Badiou does not give any account of how a specific situation comes to be, how it 
acquires its structure, which is more precisely the omission of the question what 
exactly does the counting that produces consistent multiplicity from inconsistent 
multiplicity. The only specified formalism that has traction on the formation of 
situational structure is that of the subject but the obvious problem here is that the 
subject requires a situation that pre-exists it. This is both because the event that 
brings forth the subject can only break into an existing situation (it necessitates 
a site) and in turn, the subject can only unfold its fidelity, in form of a generic 
procedure, on the basis of this already existing situation (since there needs to be 
some structured multiplicity to evaluate and ultimately force the resulting generic 
subset into). When shifting to Badiou’s supplementation of his ontology with the 
logics of appearance, the unresolved issue of what produces ontological structure 
extends to the veritable impasse that worlds and their transcendental organisa-
tion loose their sound foundation in ontological situations – since it is the latter 
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that appears as world, or is indexed on a world’s transcendental. His postulate of 
materialism – “every atom of appearing is real” (LW: 218), meaning that every 
atom of appearing is the appearance of an element of a multiple in being – is 
insufficiently founded, if not invalidated, because the multiple composition that 
is to appear misses itself the functional operator that would allow it to come to be 
in the first place. Since this postulate is the central and exclusive point of connec-
tion between being and appearing – or more precisely, this connection takes the 
form of a prescriptive relation from being to appearing (ontological primacy) – we 
end up with the two spheres of being and appearing completely detached, even 
though conceptualised in a highly analogical fashion. A further problem raised 
by the operation of retroaction (which posits that true change in a world effects 
the ontological multiple composition of what is changed in appearing) is that in 
absence of a functional operator of count in being, retroaction presents the only 
viable or explicitly formulated operation of construction of ontological structure. 
This though violates Badiou’s fundamental assumption that always “being has 
the last word” (LW: 302), that there be a primacy of ontology over logics of 
appearance, since in this way, ontological structure would be sculpted from oper-
ations in appearing. 
Polemically speaking, the process of formation of both situations and worlds is 
addressed by Badiou either in a completely subtracted manner (although equally 
simple and concise), as in Being and Event, where it is founded on a functionally 
inexistent operator and misses any elaboration regarding its presumably more 
complex enactment in existing worlds. Or it is elaborately discussed (yet still 
completely abstract), as in Logics of Worlds, where it is exclusively founded in and 
ultimately incongruently linked with the ontological model of the earlier book 
– as has been argued in Chapter 2. In a way, Badiou’s work can be seen as polar-
ising between being either simple, concise but ultimately unfounded and sub-
tractive beyond any chance of material effectiveness, or being allegedly material-
ist, overtly complicated and again inconsistent in its foundation (since being and 
appearing ‘lose touch’), whilst still being incapable of accounting for the actual 
complexities of both how worlds come to appear and what allows for things to 
happen in those worlds.
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Finally, as has been touched on above, the central notions for the procedure of 
evental change – the event itself and by consequence the subject too – are without 
actual foundation in Badiou’s system as it stands. That he does not provide an 
explanation how an ontological situation actually comes to be, what exactly per-
forms the operation of counting that lends structure to the presentation of being, 
leaves us with three options in regard of his system’s viability. First, the complete 
system as such must be considered unfounded and therefore be suspended until 
such foundation is provided. Second, the fact that the subject is the only formal-
ism that Badiou explicitly conceptualises to possess efficacy on both ontological 
multiple composition and transcendental organisation should be taken to its last 
consequence, meaning that the subject is ultimately at the heart of how a world is 
established – and potentially, via retroaction, the latter’s situation in being. (This 
goes obviously against Badiou’s fundamental decision of being having primacy 
over appearing, as well as it renders the concept of being-as-being itself somewhat 
redundant, at least to some degree.) Third, that there be some active force in the 
realm of being that generates ontological situations by way of forging consistent 
multiplicity out of nothing, out of inconsistent multiplicity. (A proposition that is 
incompatible with Badiou’s notion of ontology and his materialist commitment, if 
not outright absurd in itself – by implying a necessary, God-like entity.) 
Faced with these options, how are we now to conceptualise, in a generic yet mate-
rially effective way, the general possibility of genuine novelty and a framework and 
embedded formalism of the procedure that brings such novelty about – with still 
some support from Badiou’s central concepts? The argument of the remaining 
chapters will take the path of the second option, namely that the subject must be 
understood as the active force in the process of both the constitution and radical 
transformation of worlds, but will also reconsider the notion and scope of being as 
such by negotiating aspects of the third option. The main issues to be addressed in 
the development of a conception of creation are then the following. First, staying 
true to the commitment of thinking creation as instantiation of radical novelty, an 
account has to be given as how the outside of any given world can be thought – 
since the process of creation is necessarily constituted at least in parts by what is 
not of its world (the outside or void), as has been discussed in the previous chap-
ters. Second, we require a conceptual framework of the generic space in which the 
procedure of creation takes place, understood as both, worlds creation intervenes 
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in (starts from) and worlds that it creates. Third, the procedure of creation itself 
has to be outlined – a procedure that is understood, in some aspects close to Badi-
ou’s intuition, as subjective formalism. And last, we need to secure the material 
efficacy of the subjective formalism in regard of the world it is enacted in.
Let us consider the role of Badiou’s onto-logical system for the following argu-
ment, or more precisely which concepts of it will be sustained. On one hand, we 
want to uphold the basic structure of Badiou’s procedure of change: that from 
the irruption of an event, the outside (void) of a situation is exposed, which then 
determines the constitutive moment of the faithful subject and the post-evental 
‘truth’ the latter labours to unfold through an infinite procedure (enquiries, generic 
subset, forcing) thus creating a new situation. What allows for radical novelty 
in Badiou’s system is the rupturing of a situation’s consistency by the event’s 
exposition of the situation’s foundational void. If we now want to maintain the 
basic idea of this procedure of creation – the subjective formalism of the faithful 
subject and its immediate conditions of possibility – whilst transposing it onto a 
materialist foundation, then the evental exposition of the void (or inconsistency) 
needs to be accounted for on an existential level. Therefore it is the inexistent of 
a world that needs ‘material’ foundation and its evental exposition that needs to 
be explained. 
On the other hand, if we abandon the idea of ontological primacy, what does 
this entail for the concept and scope of being-qua-being? What is arguably lost is 
the directed and necessary correlation from being to being-there.1 For if we grant 
that material reality is not in any way prescribed by being, then every effort of 
thought to make statements about being on the basis of what exists – arguably by 
way of abstraction or subtraction – is again enforcing the very idea that there is a 
being of a thing or world. This resurrects the idea of a superiority of being beyond 
what-is-there and therefore – by way of implicitly pointing to the incompleteness 
of the material existence of a thing or world – re-establishes an essential relation 
from the (complete but inaccessible) being of a world to that world’s (incomplete 
or partial) material existence. The problem lies in this very attempt to think a 
determining being-of of any entity or world, instead of thinking being as such, 
1 The problem of ontological primacy in Badiou’s work is elaborated in the discussion of Logics 
of Worlds at the end of Chapter 2.
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being-qua-being. The idea of ontological primacy is inextricably bound up with 
the thought of a being-of. Hence we can infer that it makes little sense to think the 
being-of of a world or entity but only to think being-qua-being, without prescrip-
tive correlation in the direction of being-there or existence. The scope of being-
qua-being is then rather to be concerned with the existential possibility of any 
being-there in general and not with thinking some being-of of whatever instanti-
ation resulting from such possibility. In short, faced with the impasse in Badiou’s 
system to think being as the prescriptive foundation of existence (since there is no 
actual operator that would be able to instantiate a situation in, or presentation 
of being), the decision taken here is to think being as that which opens the very 
possibility of material existence as such, without any prescriptive relation.
Materialist abstraction
In the following part of this chapter, we will attempt a reformulation of the notion 
of being and its relation to existence on the basis of Quentin Meillassoux’s work 
in After Finitude. With a minimalist conception of being and a materialist founda-
tion of the inexistent, the aim is to formulate a rudimentary model for the pro-
cedure of creation under the banner of what could be called materialist abstraction. 
The idea here is to start, on one side, from actual, material worlds from which 
the generic possibility of change and radical novelty can be thought by way of 
abstraction, and on the other side from a more radical, minimalist notion of being 
that aims to simply guarantee (materialist) objectivity. Materialist abstraction then 
designates, in the first instance, the movement that allows the inexistent of a world 
to be thought on the basis of abstracting from this world – which is to say on the 
basis of a generic thought of worlds.2
Returning to the idea of thinking genuine change in a generic yet materially effec-
tive way, we have to clarify two points to begin with. First, how we are to think the 
generic possibility of radical novelty with the foundation of Badiou’s system suspended? 
In which realm of thought is the foundation of novelty and creation to be situated? 
Second, how can this generic foundation be ensured to be materially effective? 
2 This generic conception of worlds, as we will come to understand, finds its foundations in 
immanent material practices that re/produce a given world – materialist abstraction is therefore 
considered materialist because it abstracts from these immanent practices.
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The first point is an open question again, given the ramifications of Badiou’s omis-
sion to provide an operational foundation for the presentation of being (‘what 
does the counting?’), namely the loss of foundation for both, the event and the 
subject, and the constitutions of worlds. Instead of trying to somehow fix Badiou’s 
system and maintain his idea that the foundation for change and creation is to be 
found in the realm of being (that it should just be conceptualised some different 
way), we shall try to base this foundation in the realm of being-there, in the sphere 
of material existence. Now, to perform for a moment a rhetorical shift from an 
utterly subtracted to a completely immersed approach, a situated foundation in a 
specific, actual world would of course assure that whatever is enacted under the 
idea of change has immediately to do with the world within which it is immersed 
in. The problem here is, unsurprisingly, that we not only loose the generic aspect 
that would allow us to speak of a model in the first place (that is, a thought appli-
cable to many situations) but also that we are without criteria as to what radical 
change hinges on or what the novelty it creates is drawn from, as it were. 
This would also run against our initial reasoning, which stated that radical 
change or the creation of genuine novelty is dependent on an outside of the 
worldly situation that is transfigured by such a radical transformation. Therefore, 
if the foundation of genuine novelty is to be based in being-there, the only way 
to conceptualise it generically is to perform an abstraction from and across the 
worlds in which it is to operate. This approach we will call materialist abstraction.
The second point, to ensure the material efficacy of a concept of genuine novelty 
founded on materialist abstraction, requires two assertions: First, that this sort of 
abstraction is indeed generic, meaning that it breaks away enough from its mate-
rial specifics in order to be transferable to other, different situations whilst still 
allowing connections ‘back’ to specific points of any world so to be relevant and 
effective for the enactment of the generic concept. Second, since we posited that 
the criterion for genuine novelty is that it derives from something that hitherto did 
not exist, materialist abstraction is required to provide a legitimate conception of 
the inexistent of a world. Which is to say that we have to be able to explain, on 
the basis of and abstraction from what exists, that which does not exist, and how 
it can come to exist.
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On the basis of an objectively existing universe – provided by a minimalist con-
ception of being – it is through our discussion of Foucault’s late work (in the pre-
vious chapter) that worlds will be understood to be re/produced by subjects, and 
further, that this process of re/production can be geared towards the production 
of an event that founds the creation of a new world. The experimental practices 
that Foucault investigated, by which subjects attain (partial) self-determination 
vis-à-vis otherwise determining power structures, combined with the thought of 
the outside in the form of the inexistent (derived from Badiou), will provide the 
underlying intuition for the development of a rudimentary model of the proce-
dure of creation. Before launching into this development though, we will turn to 
a last primary text that will allow us to drastically simplify the notion and scope 
of being.
Meillassoux’s minimalist conception of being
The reasons for invoking Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude3 here (to outline 
them quickly in advance), are to gather support for a radically minimalized con-
ception of being, to purge the idea of ontological primacy (of what we called 
being-of) from such a conception and to found in being thus conceived the objec-
tivity of (material) universes. It is important to note though that Meillassoux’s 
own project is not (primarily) concerned with these issues – his is the question of 
how to reintroduce the thought of the absolute into contemporary philosophy – 
but, as will be argued below, we can employ some of his arguments to our own 
ends.
The task Meillassoux sets out with is the rehabilitation of Locke’s theory of 
primary and secondary qualities, which quickly turns into the particular problem 
for contemporary, post-Kantian thought to think the in-itself and, indeed, of the 
nature of thought’s relation to the absolute in general. The problem unfolds 
around the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, where secondary 
qualities arise from my relation to the thing and primary qualities are supposed 
to be inseparable from or residing in the thing itself. For post-critical thought, 
3 The following summary of After Finitude has been compiled with the help of the transcripts 
of Meillassoux’s lecture “Time without Becoming” (Meillassoux, 2008b) and the Speculative 
Realism conference (Brassier et al., 2007), specifically the latter’s Q&A session. 
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the latter presents an absurd and “indefensible thesis because thought cannot get 
outside itself in order to compare the world as it is ‘in itself’ to the world as it is ‘for 
us’, and thereby distinguish what is a function of our relation to the world from 
what belongs to the world alone” (AF: 3-4). Meillassoux terms this orientation 
correlationism, which expresses and deems insurmountable the idea that ”we only 
ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to 
either term considered apart from the other” (AF: 5). What is thereby lost to cor-
relationist thinkers is “the great outdoors, the absolute outside of pre-critical thinkers: 
that outside which was not relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to its 
own givenness to be what it is … that outside which thought could explore with 
the legitimate feeling of being on foreign territory – of being entirely elsewhere” 
(AF: 7). 
The argument against correlationism and the subsequent demonstration of 
thought’s ability to again think the in-itself and the absolute begins with the for-
mulation of a paradox for correlationism. It consists in the fact that science is 
able to make statements about the universe before the emergence of human con-
sciousness, even anterior to any form of life on earth, or the accretion of earth 
itself. Meillassoux terms this reality anterior to human thought ancestral and the 
material that indicates the existence of such ancestral reality an arche-fossil (AF: 
10). That an ancestral statement of modern science presents a paradox, or indeed 
non-sense, to correlationism is because the referent of such a statement cannot 
possibly have been correlated to thought, since the referent pre-dates the emer-
gence of human consciousness and is therefore anterior to givenness. The only 
way correlationism can interpret such ancestral statements is in admitting that the 
latter “is true, insofar as it has its basis in an experience which is by right repro-
ducible by everyone (universality of the statement), without believing naïvely that 
its truth derives from its adequation to the effective reality of its referent (a world 
without a givenness of the world)” (AF: 16). If we want to uphold the ancestral 
statement’s strong realist sense, that it be taken literally, the question shifts to “the 
conditions under which an ancestral statement remains meaningful … the condi-
tion that legitimates science’s ancestral statements” (AF: 26-7). What is at stake 
here, and what presents the urgency of Meillassoux’s argument for this thesis, is 
to grasp the possibility, or indeed the capacity, of thought “to access an absolute, i.e. 
a being whose severance (the original meaning of absolutus) and whose separateness 
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from thought is such that it presents itself to us as non-relative to us, and hence as 
capable of existing whether we exist or not” (AF: 28). 
Meillassoux’s route for thought to access its outside, or an absolute, proceeds 
by way of embracing the ultimate consequences of an argument which correla-
tionism itself employs against thinking the in-itself: the notion of facticity. Facticity 
concerns the invariants that determine the world’s logicality and representation, 
and that govern its existence. These invariants constitute a fact and not an abso-
lute, since we can only describe them but cannot found either their necessity or 
their contingency. Meillassoux writes that:
What I experience with facticity is not an objective reality, but rather the 
unsurpassable limit of objectivity confronted with the fact that there is a 
world; a world that is describable and perceptible, and structured by deter-
minate invariants. … what is operative in facticity is not knowledge of the 
actual possibility of the wholly other, but rather our inability to establish its 
impossibility. … Facticity is the ‘un-reason’ (the absence of reason) of the 
given as well as of its invariants. (AF: 40-1)
Now, instead of concurring with correlationism in that facticity would present 
thought with its intrinsic limitation in the quest for ultimate reason, Meillassoux 
proceeds by employing facticity as the key for thought to gain access to an abso-
lute. His move is to absolutise facticity, to “convert facticity into the real property 
whereby everything and every world is without reason, and is thereby capable 
of actually becoming otherwise without reason’ (AF: 53). By ascribing unreason to the 
things and world themselves, facticity becomes thought’s proper knowledge of the 
absolute. The absolutisation of facticity results in the absolute impossibility of a 
necessary being or entity, and of a necessary reason for things to be the way they 
are. This allows Meillassoux to demonstrate the absolute necessity of everything’s 
non-necessity, or what he terms contingency, as the only necessity alone. He calls 
the absolute that is rescued by this demonstration ‘hyper-Chaos’, an extreme form 
of chaos “for which nothing is or would seem to be impossible, not even the 
unthinkable” (AF: 64). 
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But how are we to assert, on the basis of such a hyper-chaotic absolute, the legiti-
macy of ancestral statements and of the in-itself? What we know about this abso-
lute is that contingency is necessary, and that contingency alone is absolutely 
necessary. But in order for a thing to be contingent, Meillassoux maintains that it 
cannot be anything whatsoever, which means that we have to establish “the con-
straints to which an entity must submit in order to exercise its capacity-not-to-be 
and its capacity-to-be-other” (AF: 66). He goes on to demonstrate that any entity 
must be non-contradictory (otherwise it would be both what it is and what it is 
not, thus defying contingency), and that it is necessary that something exist – 
and that this existence takes place in the realm of the in-itself, rather than in the 
correlational realm of the ‘for-us’. As Meillassoux writes: “Since contingency is 
thinkable (as an absolute), but unthinkable without the persistence of the two 
realms of existence and inexistence, we have to say that it is necessary that there 
always be this or that existent capable of not existing, and this or that inexistent 
capable of existing” (AF: 76). In seeking a positive determination of the realm 
of the in-itself (vis-à-vis absolute hyper-Chaos), the argument proceeds from the 
necessity of contingency to what Meillassoux terms the ‘principle of factiality’, 
meaning that facticity itself cannot be thought as fact, that “only the contingency 
of what is, is not itself contingent” (AF: 80). This part of the argument secured 
the conceivability of the thing-in-itself, but what is still to be achieved is the val-
idation of mathematics as the appropriate means to make statements about this 
in-itself. Meillassoux devotes one chapter to refute the objection that if not only 
things but also physical laws are contingent, then the laws that govern our world 
could change at any moment and that we would already have noticed this – or, 
rather than having noticed it, to have been eradicated by such a cosmological 
event. Contingency seems to be contradicted by our experience of the stability 
of the laws of nature. Meillassoux approaches the problem via a reformulation of 
Hume’s problem (the problem of demonstrating that the same effects will always 
follow from the same causes): “how we are to explain the manifest stability of physical 
laws given that we take these to be contingent” (AF: 91-2). He goes on to refute what he 
labels the ‘frequentialist implication’, an objection which states that if the laws of 
nature were contingent, then they would change frequently for no reason. What 
is identified as the problem with this implication is that it builds on probabilistic 
reasoning, and therefore can be disproved by showing that probability needs a 
numerical totality from which a possibility can be selected. Such a totality can 
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only be found within the universe (in what can be experienced) but cannot be 
extended or applied to the universe itself (what can be thought) – a reasoning that 
follows from the detotalisation of number that Cantor introduced under the name 
of the transfinite.4 What this means for the question of the stability of our world 
and its physical laws in the face of contingency is that by detotalising the possible 
we are “able to think the stability of laws without having to redouble them with an 
enigmatic physical necessity” (AF: 107). This removes another obstacle for think-
ing the principle of factiality, by way of demonstrating that from the contingency 
of the laws of nature (or the universe) does not follow any necessary instability of 
those laws (or the universe). 
The more fundamental movement in the argument though is the incorporation 
of the mathematical, which Meillassoux brings to bear fully in the last chapter 
of After Finitude. There he returns to the question of the conditions of meaning 
for dia-chronic statements (designating not only ancestral statements but also 
including events “ulterior to every terrestrial-relation-to-the-world”; see AF: 112) 
and more precisely to the capacity of scientific discourse to give meaning to this 
possibility of the dia-chronic. It is the development of modern science, i.e. the 
mathematisation of nature after Galileo and the decentring of thought in rela-
tion to the world after Copernicus with which science acquired “the possibility 
of transforming every datum of our experience into a dia-chronic object” (AF: 
116). According to Meillassoux, the historical paradox of science’s revelation that 
“what is mathematizable cannot be reduced to a correlate of thought” (AF: 117) 
is that what after Kant became known as ‘the Copernican revolution’ designates 
the exact opposite, thereby undermining the Galilean-Copernican revolution and 
foreclosing the import of its speculative character into philosophy. He traces this 
catastrophe back to what he terms the ‘de-absolutizing implication’: the idea, after 
Kant, “that there is an irrefutable inference from the end of metaphysics to the end of absolutes. 
Since science has convinced us that all metaphysics is illusory, and since every 
absolute is metaphysical, then it follows that, in order to think science, we must 
renounce every form of absolute” (AF: 125). 
4 We encountered and briefly discussed Cantor’s implication for Badiou’s thought in our chapter 
on Being and Event, and Meillassoux designates a section to discuss his own take of Badiou’s 
discussion; see AF: 103-8.
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Meillassoux then outlines the task of contemporary philosophy to finally return 
to and embrace (in opposition to correlationism) the Galilean-Copernican revo-
lution, which consists in re-absolutising the scope of mathematics, without falling 
back on any sort of metaphysical necessity. This absolutisation of mathematics 
brings together two threads of Meillassoux’s argument: The first deriving from 
the principle of factiality, stating that what is mathematically conceivable is not 
necessarily true but absolutely possible. The second point derives from the dis-
cussion of Hume’s problem and concerns the necessity to establish the stability 
of the laws of nature as absolute in order for empirical science to be actually pos-
sible. This is thus “a question of establishing that the laws of nature derive their 
factual stability from a property of temporality that is itself absolute, which is to 
say, from a property of time that is indifferent to our existence, viz., that of the 
non-totalizability of its possibilities” (AF: 127; my emphasis). We are confronted with 
a two-fold absolutisation of mathematics, of ontical and ontological scope. The 
ontical absolutisation concerns the contingent yet absolute possibility of every entity 
to exist once it is mathematically describable. The ontological scope addresses “the 
structure of the possible as such, rather than … this or that possible reality” (ibid.), 
asserting the necessary un-totalisability of the possible as such, via the absolutisa-
tion of the Cantorian non-All. Meillassoux concludes this outlook by stating that:
 What must be demonstrated at this juncture is that only those theories that 
ratify the non-All harbour an ontological scope, while those others, which 
allow for some sort of conceivability of the All, would be merely ontical in 
scope, since the totality which they invoke, or the non-totality which they 
refuse to ratify, betray the fact that they are describing a totalizable entity, or 
a totalizable world, as opposed to the un-totalizable being of worlds. (AF: 
127-8)
After Finitude sparked a veritable discussion after its publication and although Meil-
lassoux’s most rigorous readers were quick to pinpoint the book’s most difficult 
and problematic arguments, many of the efforts to severe one of its fundamental 
assumptions or methods often seem themselves to be based on specific projections 
brought to the reading of Meillassoux’s argument than are manifest in the latter 
itself. These concern, amongst others, the exact scope of Meillassoux’s concep-
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tion of being and ontology,5 the supposed mismatch of spheres of problematisa-
tion and explanation,6 his alleged confusion of pure and applied mathematics and 
the general disqualification of his materialism or realism.7 Some of these points 
have been addressed subsequently by Meillassoux or are still under discussion.8
5 Adrian Johnston ostensibly reads too close a similarity into the “teacher-student duo” (John-
ston, 2011: 103) of Badiou and Meillassoux in that he applies Badiou’s ontological system (via 
some shared foundations in set theory) to Meillassoux’s entity- and law-less notion of being. 
The issue here is that Meillassoux has a non-prescriptive conception of the relation between 
being and existence (he does not think any being-of, as we termed it earlier), or as Brassier 
notes in an earlier discussion: “unlike Badiou, [Meillassoux] does not characterize ontology as 
a situation within which the presentation of being is subtractively inscribed in such a way as to 
obviate any straightforwardly metaphysical or phenomenological correlation between thought 
and being” (Brassier, 2007: 45-6). Thereby Johnston’s argument that contingency applies to 
the entities or laws within a universe and therefore subverts the possibility of scientific state-
ments (Johnston, 2011: 102-4) does not hold – since absolute contingency (or un-reason) oper-
ates on the level of universes themselves and not within them (see AF: 105-6 and Meillassoux, 
2007: 64-5).
6 Alberto Toscano’s critique of Meillassoux’s argument for the absolute necessity of contingency 
hinges on an apparent misreading of its use of Cantor’s detotalisation of infinity. When writing 
that “Meillassoux poses the ontological presuppositions of correlationist epistemology, but 
resolves it by logical means” (Toscano, 2011: 91), Toscano seems to miss the point that the 
logical means employed (the possibility of probabilistic reasoning) are themselves conditioned 
(and ultimately refuted) on the mathematical foundation of Cantor’s transfinite set theory.
7 Peter Hallward states that “if Meillassoux can be described as a ‘realist’, then, the reality that 
concerns him does not involve the way things are so much as the possibility that they might 
always be otherwise” (Hallward, 2011: 131). Whilst Meillassoux’s absolutisation of contin-
gency surely insists on the possibility that any universe – which also Hallward seems to not 
demarcate enough from realities within such a universe – might be otherwise (see e.g. Meil-
lassoux, 2010: 463), the crucial and indeed radical materialist claim of his argument is that 
material reality does exist in-itself, regardless how we try to think (or doubt) it. At the same 
time, Meillassoux’s intentions in After Finitude is not (rather obviously, in my view) to give an 
account of why the reality of our present world is the way it appears to us or to provide some 
anchorage for changing a specific ‘contingent’ situation like our world today. Against the latter 
accusation by Hallward, Nathan Brown points out that: “The obvious fact that After Finitude 
does not address possible ways of changing social and political situations does not imply 
that Meillassoux’s philosophy impedes or compromises our capacity to do so. A speculative 
demonstration that whatever-situation is contingent rather than necessary (despite its manifest 
stability) does not undermine the political urgency of working toward the contingent stability 
of another situation—toward just and equitable ways of structuring or distributing relations 
among the given” (Brown, 2011: 156). On a side note though, Brown himself seems to blur 
absolute contingency (which concerns universes) with more relative forms of contingency 
(which concern situations within universes) that have no absolute necessity but might be better 
understood in terms of general causal reasons like historical development or intended con-
struction or struggle.
8 See for example his “Iteration, Reiteration, Repetition: A Speculative Analysis of the Meaning-
less Sign” (Meillassoux, 2012).
113
The points of After Finitude that are of central import for our following engage-
ment are not amongst the fiercely discussed ones – the latter usually circling 
around the notion of contingency as the destructive rupturing and becoming of 
a radically different universe for no reason, or as the (misunderstood) possibility 
of laws or entities changing within a given universe for no reason. What is most 
useful for us in Meillassoux’s work is that it allows, via facticity and the principle 
of factiality, to think the universe and our world to have an objective material 
reality. Nathan Brown summarises this as follows: “It is this generic principle of 
materialism—the existence of matter ‘beyond the consciousness and sensation of 
man’—that the principle of factiality seeks to buttress by novel means, through a 
counter-intuitive argumentative strategy responsive to the effects of null traces 
whose displacements are refractory to common sense” (Brown, 2011: 161). The 
conception of being that ‘is behind’ this reality is so minimal that it is completely 
non-prescriptive – it constitutes, for no reason, a universe that is otherwise utterly 
severed or relieved from any doubling in form of a prescriptive ontological struc-
ture. The reason that objectivity of material reality (and a minimalist, non-pre-
scriptive conception of being) is important for the development at hands is that it 
can provide the basis on which to think the inexistent – a basis that seems at first 
unimpressive, asserting that material existence in itself is a non-negotiable fact, 
but as it became apparent during the engagement with After Finitude does indeed 
require an exceptional argumentative effort. 
Rudimentary model of a framework and procedure of creation
In what follows, we will lay out a conceptual sketch of a rudimentary model 
for the foundations and operations of the procedure of creation. This model is 
inspired by and draws from our discussions of the systems of Badiou and Meillas-
soux and the late work of Foucault – although we will not always engage in the 
exact demarcations of the respective intellectual territories. The intention here is 
to outline a working hypothesis for the foundational framework and operations 
of creation in form of a coherent model that may come to find a stand on its own 
(once expanded with a more thorough argumentation).9 This sketch tries to clear 
9 We will not be able to go beyond a preliminary outline of this model, as it would take a 
separate thesis that sets out with this task at its very beginning. The reason this thesis is not 
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and circumvent some of the problems raised by the impasses we encountered in 
the discussion of Badiou’s system, particularly by taking a materialist approach 
(a foundation in what actually exists) and a minimalist notion of being, largely 
disconnected from the realm of existence (only connected by exceptions). It will 
do so by building on the previous discussions of the works of Badiou, Foucault 
and Meillassoux in the way that the latter are understood as depository of con-
cepts and vocabulary, which will now be employed as either referential shortcuts 
(however specified or modified) or to span a conceptual space by composing these 
terms and concepts in specific ways. This also means that the format of this sketch 
explicitly requires to be read with the previous discussions in mind (and, indeed, 
it is for this reason that the rather technical exegeses – especially of Badiou – have 
been laid out in the detail they have). We will start with the conception of being 
and the ontico-ontological relation, continue to being-there and worlds within 
it, where the latter will be understood as depending on the reiterative efforts of 
subjects to sustain them and turn finally to the discussion of the inexistent (its 
possibility within the proposed materialist framework), its evental occurrence and 
the subjective involvement in the latter’s unfolding.
Minimalist conception of being and the ontico-ontological relation
The fundamental issue with Badiou’s system as it stands is that it thinks situations 
in being to prescribe, in a structural sense, worldly appearance without accounting 
how these ontological situations de facto acquire their structure – this is the unan-
swered question of what is doing the count that produces consistent multiplicity 
from inconsistency. As a consequence, any form of change becomes unfounded 
as well, since neither that which changes can be established from within Badiou’s 
model, nor the active operator of change itself (the subject), since the latter is born 
exclusively from the event, which in turn requires (a site in) a situation in order 
to erupt (out of nothing) into being. But since we want to uphold, with Badiou, 
that project is that the necessity for such a novel model can only be grasped after the kind of 
conceptual exegesis (and ground clearing exercise) that this thesis attempts. Indeed, the model 
itself could only have arisen out of the impasses we have encountered in the close examination 
of Badiou’s work. The necessary challenge of a more thorough development of this model I 
leave for another time – for now this sketch shall suffice for giving a ground for thinking the 
procedure of creation of radical novelty.
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that genuine change is necessarily founded in nothing within a world (the latter’s 
outside or inexistent) and that the subject is the active operator of such change, 
we need to account for the outside without invoking a conception of being that 
prescribes what appears as world. 
We inferred from this that being needs to be thought as that which only pro-
vides the possibility for being-there to exist, without entertaining any further, pre-
scriptive relation to this existence. The ontico-ontological relation envisioned here 
could be described as exceptional (not without allusion to Badiou’s denotation 
of the event) in that being is thought to exclusively account for the genesis (and 
possibly the destruction) of existence.
In After Finitude, Meillassoux develops the argument that allows for such a 
minimal conception of being, as well as a bare and exceptional ontico-ontological 
relation, by way of establishing that what exists (as a universe) as contingent, 
and that this contingency is the only absolute necessity. The principle of unrea-
son ensures for a minimal conception of being precisely by securing the ultimate 
ground of material existence in unreason rather than via an elaborate model that 
seeks to give the former’s reason in a structural doubling (founded on nothing 
but also never instantiated) that is said to found and structurally prescribe what 
exists, as in Badiou’s model. In Meillassoux, being takes the form of hyper-Chaos 
that, in a sense, can be thought to cause or instantiate (for no reason) existence as 
the definite, material existence we encounter – where the term universe delimits 
the totality given to our experience. There is no further correspondence between 
being and the existence it brought forth, other than the possibility (in its absolute, 
non-probabilistic sense) of being to destroy existence for no reason (from tiny 
alterations on a universal level – which nonetheless destroys the conditions of 
possible experience within it – to outright annihilation). In a sense, Meillassoux’s 
minimalist conception of being liberates what exists not only from us in that it 
reinstates the in-itself and an independence of existence vis-à-vis our experience of 
it (against correlationism), but also liberates what exists from prescriptive ontol-
ogy (like Badiou’s) and from any ultimate reason for its existence and particular 
form. 
We will designate as universe the totality of material existence that exists in-itself, 
which is given to us in experience and is validated, or in the process of validation, 
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by science as a systemic totality that is endowed with (some underlying) consist-
ency and laws. The necessity that what appears in (and as) a universe to exist 
independent of us thinking it – that is to say objectively – is what Meillassoux 
establishes from the absolute necessity of contingency, since the latter can only be 
thought if there exist things that could also not exist, and inexistent things that 
could exist (AF: 76). That the universe’s existence is indifferent to us thinking it 
means first of all that our access to it is no longer a problem of the correlationist 
‘for-us’ – the dilemma that we can never step outside our thinking of the universe 
and things, resulting in our inability to say anything about the things in-them-
selves, separate from us. A universe therefore provides the foundation for any 
materialist orientation in thought, if we understand materialist thought as starting 
from actual, material existence. 
In short, our access to the universe and the things-in-themselves can now be 
thought in what Meillassoux called the spirit of the Galilean-Copernican rev-
olution, meaning that this access is no longer dictated by either short-circuited 
thought (correlationism) or inaccessible, prescriptive and ultimately inexplicable 
being (as with Badiou’s ontology), and that making statements about the things-
in-themselves is possible in the form of speculative advancements. The impor-
tance of proving the necessary existence of the objective reality in-itself lies in the 
implication that it is indeed the material universe – and not human consciousness, 
absolute being, or language, discourse, etc. – that provides the ultimate founda-
tion of everything within it – including human consciousness and agency. It shifts 
the ground for thinking radical change within the universe to the generic concep-
tion of worlds within the universe.10
Worlds and logic
With the notion of the universe we designated the singular totality of material 
existence – vis-à-vis the non-totalisable hyper-Chaos of being. Within the uni-
verse an abundant multiplicity of worlds can be thought, where the latter are 
understood as local logical augmentations of the universe. A world delimits and 
10 That radical change within the universe requires the generic conception of worlds and not 
of universes themselves is because alterations on the universal level arguably change (and 
thereby destroy) the very conditions of possibility for our life and experience.
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endows this augmentation with an immanent logic, similar to Badiou’s conceptual 
idea of worlds introduced in Logics of Worlds.11 We can speak of augmentation 
here since a world adds a logical dimension to the material, objectively existing 
universe. A world organises itself around such a dynamic, multifaceted logic and 
can be seen as expressions of it, in the sense of Badiou’s transcendental order. 
But contrary to the latter’s conception, a world is ‘onto-logical’ only in the sense 
that it has an objective, material foundation in the universe (that derives from 
its contingency vis-à-vis being and not from a prescriptive being as in Badiou) 
and a self-generated and therefore immanent organisation or logic that makes a 
world appear consistent. The logic of a world makes sensible what exists and is 
organised as a world from within that world. That worlds are governed by an 
immanent logic means that they cannot be apprehended in a completely ‘objec-
tive’ way – in a sense they are conglomerates of entities endowed with primary 
and secondary qualities (in-itself and logical augmentation), to ventriloquise Meil-
lassoux’s invocation of Locke. 
Worldly logic does not concern the same scope as universal laws since it is an 
augmentation of the latter’s local supposition. In short, a world’s logic acts as 
complex ordering principle according to which a world can be apprehended as 
consistent. 
To assume the possibility of a multiplicity of worlds within the universe – 
and not only one single world – is a consequence of thinking a world as local 
augmentation of the universe. Rather than a container in which worlds can be 
accommodated, the universe is the material basis on which worlds can proliferate. 
Contrary to the universe, a world is capable of changing radically whilst leaving 
the material existence of the universe untouched – since the radical change of a 
world concerns its logical organisation, that which gives it form as world, within 
the material universe. Which is to say that a world can radically change without 
implying the destruction of the universe that provides the material foundation of 
any world (and with it the conditions of possibility of life and experience).
11 According to our earlier discussion of and issues with Badiou’s model, it is necessary to dispose 
of his conceptual linkages between worlds and situations in being, that is to say to strip this 
conception of worlds from any connection to being that so problematically prescribe them 
whilst retaining their logical dimension and transcendental organisation.
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Objects
What is ordered or situated by such logic are the objects of a world – which is pre-
cisely what Badiou argues in Logics of Worlds. In difference to Badiou though, we 
will understand an object to be ‘onto-logical’ (in a similar way to a world) in that it 
presents the conjunction of an objective entity of the universe and its logical locali-
sation in a world. This conception of an object is very broad and generic, it simply 
consists of the conceptual pair of objective referent (universal) and its logical localisa-
tion (local, of a specific world). An object is therefore a worldly situated objective 
entity. An object can by extension also be thought to designate a composite of 
multiple objects that are internally related or localised (exposing an object-logic). 
Relations
We asserted, with Badiou, that an object is localised or situated by the logic of its 
world. To be more precise though, the logic of a world should be understood as 
the complex, manifold network of the localisations of its world’s objects. A logic 
not only situates but also expresses and presents itself as principle of consistency 
‘behind’ its world’s localisations. What then situates objects in a world in the first 
place? What puts a world’s objects into place and thereby creates the logic of that 
world? To localise something is to put it into relation to other distinct entities – dif-
ferent or identical in this or that sense and degree – and can therefore be thought 
as a ‘differentiating operation’. In difference to Badiou though, this difference is 
not understood to be founded in the objects themselves (their specific intensity of 
appearing that is simply evaluated) but actively produced by an operation of locali-
sation. In that sense, relations can be said to be constitutive of a world’s logic, in 
that they make up a differential network with and across the objects they relate. 
Nevertheless, relations not only constitute a world’s logic, they are in turn also 
framed in their localising possibilities by what we can call their world’s logical 
principle, as well as by the universe itself. Since worlds are located within the uni-
verse, it is the material existence and the ‘inherited’ (locally supposed) laws of the 
latter that frame the localising operations and thereby make up the foundation of 
any world’s logic in form of universal laws. A world’s logic could be understood 
to evolve from the continuous interplay between the universally given – though 
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locally supposed and augmented – logical disposition and the incessant differenti-
ations of objects effectuated through operations of localisation, of relating. 
Types of localising operations: from modification to radical change
If we understand the operation of localisation (of relating objects) as on-going 
and inherent aspect of what makes a world, how are we to conceptually distin-
guish such vital differentiations – that affirm and uphold the world in which 
they operate12 – from radical change, which transfigures or destroys a world by 
transforming its logical principle? This question implies that we understand the 
operation that localises objects in and as a world as being comparable to, if not 
the same operation that gives form to or creates a new world – by relating objects 
under a newly evolving logic. Since a new world – qua world – requires a logic, 
a relational network of localisation (indeed a topology) we can nominate locali-
sation as the effective operation of creation and radical change. But if the act of 
relating is the basis for both, upholding the logical principle of a world and its 
destruction and transfiguration, where do we draw the line or define a tipping 
point between these two poles or intensities of localisation (between mere modifi-
cation and radical novelty)? 
Badiou himself addressed this question in the book ‘The Four Forms of Change’ 
in Logics of Worlds, where he basically proposes a range of intensities of change 
having minimal to maximal consequences for a world. We recall that a modification 
designates a change of minimal intensity, which is to say a local reconfiguration 
without effects for its world’s global logic. Facts and weak singularities have stronger 
effects in their occurrences but still affirm, by and large, their world’s logic. In 
Badiou’s vocabulary, only a strong singularity amounts to the disruptive force of 
an event. Adapted to our model, modifications (and every other form of change 
weaker than an event) alter the relational network of their world in accordance 
with the latter’s logical principle, which is to say that modifications operate within 
the framework of possibility dictated by their world’s logic. On the other side, 
radical change or genuine creation alters the logical principle of a world itself, that 
12 This upholding of a world is to be understood in the sense derived from Foucault, as has been 
developed in Chapter 3. We will shortly clarify how it is subjects that incessantly perform this 
operation of localisation and thereby reproduce a world’s logic.
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is to say they change the very way a world is made to appear or be understood 
as coherent, making sense, etc. This form of change renders the world it arose 
from as incoherent, untenable, but only in the process of creating a new relational 
network of this world’s entities, building a new understanding and sense of what 
is there as new world. Creation therefore concerns operations that effect a world’s 
logic on a global scope – or indeed exceeding what the latter demarcates as its 
global scope – in contrast to the local scope of modifications. This is to say that 
the new, coming logical principle resides outside the thinkable as it is delimited 
by the logic of the pre-evental world. To speak in Badiou’s terms, radical change 
transforms the criteria of transcendental evaluation, it creates a new set of criteria 
that re-evaluate its former world into a genuinely new and different world.13 
The event and the inexistent
Radical change, as we saw above, not only modifies local relations but changes 
the way and principle according to which a whole world is configured or related, 
that is, how it makes sense or appears as coherent world. Since it transgresses the 
possibilities of a world delimited by the latter’s logic, the creative power of (that 
which starts a procedure of) radical change cannot derive from the logic of the 
world it disrupts but only from its outside, from what inexists within its world. 
This notion of the event which exposes the inexistent of a worldly situation is 
clearly Badiou’s, only that now, after our issues with his model, we are to obtain 
the foundation of the inexistent from the conception of worlds themselves, rather 
than from the foundational void of prescriptive being. We recall that Badiou gives 
two not entirely compatible definitions of this ‘source’ of evental novelty. First, 
in Being and Event, it was the indiscernible, an uncountable part of a situation, that 
errupts from this situation’s evental site, from its specific void. The notion of the 
indiscernible gives an ontological account of that which only the extra-ontolog-
ical intervention of an event can bring into being. Then, in Logics of Worlds, the 
inexistent is understood as the minimally existing part of an object-multiple (again 
constituting an evental site), which is to say that part of the object’s multiple-being 
13 However, since the operation of transcendental evaluation is again ultimately based on the 
assumption that ontological multiples appear (ontological prescription), this reference to Badi-
ou’s notions might be of restricted use here.
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that does not appear in the world, since its degree of appearing is minimal. The 
inexistent in Badiou is therefore an onto-logical concept, in that it is based on 
and prescribed by the ontological multiple-composition of the worldly objects it 
concerns. In short, both, Badiou’s indiscernible and inexistent, rest on the prob-
lematised assumption that there be a primary ontological situation that only then 
appears as a world. With our departure from any ‘being-of’ of what exists, both 
Badiou’s linkages to the outside (of either situation or world) have been rendered 
dysfunctional, which forces us to establish the inexistent through our own con-
ception of worlds. 
We asserted that a universe possibly hosts a multiplicity of worlds that could 
be understood as local augmentations of the universe. The immediate, although 
incomplete, consequence of this conception is that if a world is a local augmen-
tation of the universe, then there might always be something of the universe still 
outside such a world – or something that inexists within that world. This state-
ment though ignores the more interesting case of the outside or inexistent not 
merely being some entities of the universe hitherto undiscovered – and henceforth 
to be included in a new, possibly simply expanded world – but of the inexistent, 
in the sense of logically incompatible objects, ‘existing’ amongst the objects of this 
world. The idea here is to say that the inexistent concerns an objective referent14 
of an object that is part of the world under consideration but inexists in it because 
it cannot be localised according to that world’s logic, it demands another logic for it to 
have a proper place in a (new, different) world. It is the incompatibility of different 
logics, the already operating one, and the one to come, that makes an inexistent 
object not find a place in the world it nonetheless shares its objective referent with 
– through an existing but discordantly localised object.15 The intuition behind this 
idea of the inexistent being somehow partly included in a world, or rather think- 
 
 
14 We discussed the objective referent of an object briefly above. It designates an entity of the 
universe without or subtracted from any worldly localisation, in a sense it can be understood 
as the raw matter of an object, the matter an object localises in its world.
15 In a way, this approach to the inexistent is inspired by both of Badiou’s notions just discussed, 
in that it borrows from the indiscernible the idea that it irrupts as the specific void of a situa-
tion’s site (otherworldly logic), and from the inexistent that there is something ‘in’ an already 
existing object itself that can come to appear as disruptive force to its world (as of yet incom-
prehensible, otherworldly localisation of a known objective referent).
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able within it, comes from the idea of a universal entity being shared or referred 
to by more than one world – entangled objects, as it were.16 
Simply put, for every object in a world it is possible that its objective referent, its 
raw, universal matter, could be localised as a different object in another world, 
according to another logic. This ‘other-worldly’ localisation of the objective refer-
ent of any object can be thought in two variants. Either two or more worlds that 
exist concurrently in the universe share some of their objects’ objective referents. 
Or these worlds can be thought to exist in succession to each other, in which case 
the sharing of an objective referent is exercised over time rather than in time. For a 
physical object, this would mean that the same material entity could be the objec-
tive referent for many objects because every world that includes that entity locates 
it differently in the relational network that makes each world’s logic. This is to 
say that every world makes sense of that entity in its own and genuinely different 
way, since each world is governed by (and generative of) its specific logic. 
Our foundation of the inexistent is then made possible by two steps: First, with 
the notion of the object as the conceptual pair of objective referent and logical 
localisation – where logical localisation attests to the contingency of any object’s 
localising logical principle and world. Second, with the foundation of the material 
universe (via Meillassoux) that is referenced, or localised, in the form of objects 
in possibly multiple worlds. On this basis, we can think the inexistent as possible 
linkage to the outside of a world.
16  This idea of some worlds sharing one objective referent could be termed entanglement, which 
must be thought as a plausible property of worlds – a property that is not necessary but specu-
lative. The crucial point of entanglement lies in its extension to the entangled site, an evental site 
of one world that is (at least partially) entangled with parts of at least one other world – either 
in or over time. It is important to note that the entanglement of two or more worlds through 
a site still upholds the strong meaning of the inexistent as concerning the radical outside of the logic 
of its concerned world. That some objects of one’s world share their objective referents with 
different objects in different (present or future) worlds still means that the latter, ‘other-worldly’ 
objects are inaccessible, indiscernible and therefore properly inexistent from within our world 
of reference. In that sense, the thought of entanglement is both speculative (since it is founded 
on the speculative assumption of many worlds within one universe) and abstract or generic, 
which means that even though we can think entanglement, we can only ever make sense of 
that part which is part of our own world, according to its immanent logic. With this concep-
tion of an inter-worldly shared objective referent, derived from the idea of entanglement, it 




When an event happens, the inexistent of a world is exposed to this world at 
a specific location, the evental site. In Logics of Worlds, Badiou has presented the 
inexistent as a non-appearing part of an object’s multiple composition, which is, as 
such, ‘hidden’ in the world by that object – constituting the evental site. In what 
ways do the localisations of the inexistent’s irruption – Badiou’s (logical) evental 
site, our notion of entangled objects – condition the inexistent? Strictly speaking, 
they cannot impose anything on the inexistent itself, since the inexistent is by defi-
nition thought to be properly outside the frame of reference or sense, outside of 
the logic that makes the world it inexists in intelligible. Instead, what the thought 
of the evental site localises and defines is simply the worldly place and context of 
the evental exposition of the inexistent. Therefore, the inexistent attains some spec-
ificity only retroactively by having been exposed by an event at a certain place in 
the world, by having irrupted from what only afterwards can be nominated as its 
evental site. What then is this specificity that the absolute nondescript generates 
when being exposed by an event, at a site? In Badiou’s terms it is the truth of its 
situation, importantly though the exposition of this truth does not take the form 
of a direct and conclusive presentation but rather the form of subjective incorpo-
ration into its infinite generic procedure, or truth procedure. That an event erupts 
from a site more generally means that the object that the site presents (within the 
relational topology of its world) in some way conditions or orients the following 
radical transformation of its world. The post-evental site, in this sense, contributes 
to an orientation in the procedure of creation that follows its evental inception. 
The evental trace: foundational indetermination
What founds and upholds a generic procedure, in Badiou’s system, is its connec-
tion to the evental trace, the trace an event leaves in the world after having vanished. 
How can we think the evental trace on the basis of the concept of entanglement 
developed above? We have seen that when the inexistent breaks into existence 
via an event, it does so at a site in the world. Since the inexistent concerns an 
otherworldly localisation of an objective referent of its site-object – that is, a radi-
cally different localisation in regard to the logic of the existing world – and since 
the site-object and its world are yet to be transfigured, the only thing we can state 
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in general about the effect of the appearance of the inexistent on its site-object 
is that the latter becomes topologically undermined, unhinged from its secured 
localisation in the existing world, as it were. The exposition of the inexistent at 
its evental site demonstrates, to the subjects capable of recognising it as such, the 
non-necessity (or contingency) of the worldly logic that cannot accommodate the 
now exposed inexistent in its topology. We can therefore understand the evental 
trace as the topological indetermination or opening, which an event inflicts on the 
localisation of its site-object. This topological indetermination of the site is apparent 
only for a subject that has registered the event, either directly or through its trace. 
Whereas the world, would it become aware of the unhinged site, would merely 
need to reinforce its logic onto the site in order to secure the status quo, the task 
of the subject is more demanding. In stark opposition to the reactive reincorpora-
tion of the site into the existing world’s logic, the subject sets out to create a new 
world – that is, a new logical organisation – from the now indeterminate ground 
of the site, a world whose logic allows a proper place for the inexistent.17 In Badi-
ou’s terms, the evental trace cannot itself ignite such a truth procedure, the latter 
only commences with a subject’s recognition of the event and its fidelity to the 
evental trace. In order for the event to bear consequences for its world, a subject 
has to enact what – under the condition of the subject’s fidelity – the uncertainty 
about the site-object’s placing, and consequently its world’s logic, imposes upon 
the subject through the evental trace. The subject recognises an inconsistency, 
that something of the world became unhinged, and acts accordingly.
Enactment of a procedure of creation: redefinition of the subject
When it comes to the enactment of – or incorporation into – a procedure of 
change, Badiou’s stance is that the procedure advances by the treatment of what 
he calls points in the world. We recall that a point presents “the crystallization of 
the infinite in the figure … of the ‘either/or’, what can also be called a choice or a 
17 Badiou remarks on the necessity of a new worldly logic (or transcendental regime) in the 
aftermath of an inexistent’s exposition: “If an element finds itself absolutely modified in its 
transcendental degree of existence, then slowly but surely the transcendental regime in its 
entirety will no longer be able to maintain its rules. Everything will change: the comparisons 
of intensity in appearance, the existences involved, the possibilities of relations, etc. There will 
be a rearrangement of the transcendental regime, and therefore, strictly speaking, a change of 
world.” (Badiou, 2003b: 131)
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decision” (LW: 400). Although such binary decisions certainly present, as it were, 
the most recognisable milestones of a procedure of genuine change, they argua-
bly do so mostly retroactively. Which is to say that the fact that a point has been 
treated, that a grand decision has been taken, might in many cases be a construal 
driven by the desire for historical indexes and might not very well reflect the more 
complex and local struggles that, only after a while, seem to constitute such a sin-
gular decision. How then are we to think such local and perhaps more complex 
struggles within a procedure of change? 
The principal idea here is that the procedure of genuine change – which we will 
term procedure of creation – relies on the same operations that establish and uphold 
the logic of a world, which we touched upon above and in our discussion of Fou-
cault’s notion or power relations in Chapter 3. What establishes or make a world? 
To recapitulate: that a world exists is the effect of a part of the universe’s augmen-
tation with a specific logical organisation. A world’s logic is generated by acts of 
localising objects in relation to each other, by the act of relating. The manifold and 
complex network of relations that evolves from those constitutive acts of relating 
is what we called the logic of a world, whereas we named logical principle of the 
world what guides or delimits the operations of relating. To relate is immanent 
and vital to a world, it presents the active and infinite process that ensures its exist-
ence – put bluntly, if this process stops, the world it affirms will loose coherence 
and come to an end too. In this sense, crucially, a world can only exist if there are 
agents that uphold it by continually reproducing the world’s logic, by keeping it 
alive, as it were. Against Badiou,18 who reserves the term subject exclusively for 
those agents in a world that are born out of an event (faithful, reactive, obscure), 
this leads us to redefine the notion of the subject as the agent that incessantly relates, localises, 
that puts things into place so to make the world logically coherent. We could call this basic 
kind of subject an indifferent subject. The indifferent subject is a subject insofar as it 
relentlessly reproduces (with only slight modification, if at all) the world through 
repetition of its existing logic, according to the world’s established logical princi-
ple. It is indifferent precisely because of this consenting stance in the reproduction 
18 We recall his insistence on the exclusive post-evental existence of the subject in Being and Event: 
“The ‘there is’ of the subject is the coming-to-being of the event via the ideal occurrence of 
a truth, in its finite modalities. By consequence, what must always be grasped is that there is 
no subject, that there are no longer some subjects. What Lacan still owed to Descartes, a debt 
whose account must be closed, was the idea that there were always some subjects” (BE: 434).
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of relations, since the indifferent subject generates or modifies relations not in 
difference to but in accordance with the world’s logical principle. A faithful subject 
is then (in loose and partial analogy to Badiou) a subject that generates relations 
in radical difference to the logic of its pre-evental world, by creating relations hith-
erto thought impossible. It thereby engages in the infinite procedure (in the sense 
of never being fully completed) of creating a new logic and with it a new world. 
The creation of a new world is indeed an infinite procedure, the faithful subject 
incorporates itself, as Badiou terms it, into a new present by partaking in such an 
infinite procedure.
Let us repeat the necessary steps in the operation of the faithful subject. A faithful 
subject is born out of the affirmation of an event and upheld by the faithful connec-
tion to the evental trace. In the world, the evental site gives an event its topo-logical 
context and in that way delineates what the event concerns – or simply ‘is about’ 
– by what a site shares with the inexistent: its objective referent. Through the site an 
event is endowed with some specificity, since it exposes the inexistent’s objective 
referent it concerns, whilst at the same time inducing uncertainty about the site’s 
world, since this world cannot any longer give the site-object a secured, unequiv-
ocal place. We linked this topological indetermination – the thorn in the side of 
any given world - with the notion of the evental trace. A subject can be recognised 
as faithful only if it embodies this evental trace, wherefore the point of origin of a 
procedure of creation is precisely this emergence of a faithful subject from the evental 
site, induced by the event and upheld by the evental trace. In other words, a faith-
ful subject can be considered to partake in a process of creation only as long as 
it affirms the mark of the evental trace (the having become indeterminate of the 
world’s logic from the standpoint of the inexistent and its evental site). In being 
faithful to an event, a faithful subject affirms first of all the non-necessity of the 
world the event irrupted from to be structured and organised the way it currently 
is, which is to say the non-necessity of its logical principle. The very principle 
of the world trembles. The faithful subject continues to enact the operation that 
makes it a subject in the first place, which is to relate, to generate logic. Just that 
now, being marked by an evental trace, these acts of relating or localising are not 
anymore performed in accordance with the logical principle of the pre-evental 
world but in genuine difference to it (introduced by the evental trace), which con-
sequently creates a new logical principle and world.
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How though are we to think this genuine difference to the existing logical princi-
ple that informs the creation of a new world? It is clear that this difference cannot 
be deduced from either the old world’s principle (since there is no difference then) 
or the new logical principle, since the latter is precisely not yet in place – but is 
evolving with the infinite procedure of creation. Instead, we can understand the 
orientation that is inscribed in the procedure by the evental trace as that which 
produces in every act of relating the difference to an existing world’s logic. The 
affirmation of an event and the marking of the faithful subject by the evental 
trace establish this orientation by spanning a vector away from the site-object 
– by negating the necessity of the latter’s localisation and the logical principle 
that places it this way – and endowing it with a direction that results from the 
suspension of the site’s secured location in the world by the indetermination the 
inexistent enforced on it.19
Although this conception is sound, it does little to clarify how exactly genuine 
difference expresses itself in the operation of relating, how this difference comes 
to be apprehended by the faithful subject who performs a re-relation according 
to it. To think this orientation as being established in a procedure of creation by 
the evental trace is therefore not enough, since it only tells us what we already 
assumed, namely that the inexistent instructs a procedure of creation to proceed 
‘anywhere but here,’ according to some logic that is as of yet unthinkable. This 
leading ‘not anywhere’ should not be understood as an impasse (for thought as 
for practice), rather is it precisely how we can think this orientation, since it neces-
sarily points to the proper outside of our world, an uncharted territory for which 
a different mode of navigation is required. Creative localisation happens for no 
necessary reason (to paraphrase Meillassoux) but still with the intention to create 
a new coherent world. We can infer from this that the enactment of a procedure 
of creation that is guided by ‘anywhere but here’ can only be experimental, since it 
lacks, as of yet, a (complete) system of reference as well as a logical principle for 
its localisations – this principle, in a way, materialises in the process from its own 
future. It can only decide on the ground, within its momentary situation and for 
every act of relating, how to proceed. Creative localisation proceeds through the 
affirmative power of specific negation: not like this and not according to the logic 
19 This as of yet vague notion of orientation will be given more discussion in the following chapter.
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that only allows this and nothing genuinely different. As part of a procedure of 
creation, the forging of a new relation is the expression of an experimentation of 
what – if ‘not this’ – this relation can be, and by consequence, step by step, how a 
logical principle concerning these relations would need to function.
But perhaps we are thinking the procedure of creation too rigid. We require the 
world that such a procedure creates to be genuinely new, to express a genuinely 
different logical principle from its pre-evental world, and that this transfiguration 
be connected to the evental trace (to what the event concerns, what orients the pro-
cedure of creation). Let us consider some restrictions we can apply regarding the 
different levels of novelty of a new world. An event concerns the transfiguration 
of the set of relations that its site holds with the world, how the site-object makes 
sense, is topologically embedded in the world. The disruption of and uncertainty 
about this set of relations drives from the event and informs the procedure of 
creation. A new world that arises from a procedure of creation is necessarily new 
because it requires a genuinely different global logic, since it concerns the relations 
a world entertains with the now indeterminate site-object. This does not entail 
the destruction of every local logic that constitute the pre-evental world’s com-
posite objects or regions. Creation, in this sense, does not demand the complete 
destruction of a world’s local relations, but the transfiguration of its global logic 
that takes its origin from outside its logical principle, from its post-evental future, as 
it were. We can then restrict, and therefore specify, the procedure of creation by 
maintaining that it establishes a genuinely new world and logical principle, and 
that because the procedure is concerned with a global re-relation that there exists 
no necessity for the destruction or transfiguration of every local relation that does 
not concern the site-object’s global relation (either directly or indirectly). This 
restriction effectively retains local relations unconcerned with the site-object, or 
at most demands only their modification according to the evolving new logical 
principle.20 Radical transformation is indeed total (global), but this does not mean 
that it impacts on every local relation – or, at least, not in the same way. 
20 Regarding the set of relations that do concern the site-object, we also can – following Badi-
ou’s conception of the generic procedure in Being and Event – posit a restriction in form of the 
requirement that at least one global relation (concerning the site-object) generated by the proce-
dure of creation must not fall under the logical principle of the pre-evental world (see Chapter 
2 and BE: 337). To qualify as genuinely new and different logical principle, it therefore suffices 
that the site-object is related in at least in one respect in absolute difference to its pre-evental 
logical principle.
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This restriction in a way limits the amount of relations that a procedure of cre-
ation requires to transfigure. But how are we to decide from within a procedure 
of creation which of all relations that concern a site-object – and which relations 
are, in the first place, concerned with the site-object, directly and indirectly – are 
to be genuinely changed, which of those relations are to express the foundation 
of the new logical principle? To again appropriate a notion from Being and Event, 
we can derive the principle for this decision from the operator of faithful connec-
tion which “designates another mode of discernment: one which, outside knowledge 
but within the effect of an interventional nomination, explores connections to 
the supernumerary name of the event” (BE: 329). For every act of relating, of 
localising an object within the new world, it is necessary to discern if this object’s 
existing localisation is in accordance with what the procedure is faithful to: the 
evental trace and the orientation the latter imprints in the procedure. If the given 
relation affirms or is compatible with the evental trace it can be retained or modi-
fied but does not need to be truly transfigured. If the relation under consideration 
is incompatible with the evental trace then it needs to be re-established on the 
uncertain ground the evental trace inscribes in the procedure. For those relations 
that require transfiguration, the most of a generic guidance we can venture to 
derive from our preliminary model would be the need to answer positive to the 
question: “Can the principle that this new relation materialises measure up to its 
exceptional cause – to the event and its trace to which I am faithful?”
We are encountering a limit here of the aptness of generic thought. That is to 
say the limit of what can generically be said about a situated procedure of creation, 
in particular the operations of the latter that are so specific to its worldly setting, 
its specific struggle – how precisely the exposition of an inexistent orients the 
procedure, how such an orientation suggests decisions regarding the re-evaluation 
of relations, and so on. In the following, last chapter, we will try to give a more 
situated account of the generic thought of the procedure of creation developed 
above, and to revisit and clarify some of its underdeveloped conceptual terms.
* * * * *
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Recapitulation
The aim of this chapter was to develop a rudimentary model of the foundations 
and operation of the procedure of creation – based on and departing from Badi-
ou’s system, and with the additional support of Meillassoux’s conceptual innova-
tions and Foucault’s work on the subject and power relations.
Materialist abstraction
How did the notion of materialist abstraction inform our model of the procedure 
of creation? Through abstraction from what materially exists, we came to under-
stand that what exists has no necessity to exist the way it does. This abstraction 
can be illustrated by the distinction between inhabiting and thinking a world. 
Inhabiting a world is the rather unproblematic experience and reproduction of the 
delimitation of that world – it falls together with what we ascribed to the indiffer-
ent subject. Thinking a world, on the contrary, is the movement that exposes and 
investigates these delimitations of its world, and, crucially, the acts that reproduce 
this consistency. Thinking a world therefore requires a stepping back, an abstrac-
tion from what exists, in order to think the generic conditions of any world’s exist-
ence. So, for example, if we experience in the world a true problem or dilemma, 
one that cannot be resolved by local reconfiguration or modification, we came to 
understand that it can only be resolved by transfiguring the logical principle of 
the world which causes this dilemma to persist in the first place. This knowledge 
is what forces us to decide to engage in a procedure of change, or to engage in 
producing or to resurrect an event that then serves as that procedure’s genesis.21
Foundation of the inexistent
How did we found the inexistent in line with the idea of materialist abstraction? 
We showed that the inexistent can be thought, via the notion of entanglement, 
based on the speculative assumption of the possible existence of multiple worlds 
within the one universe. The universe these worlds are thought to be part of (and 
21 Whilst we developed some foundations to think the possible invocation of an event, this pos-
sibility will only be explored in the next chapter.
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its minimalist ontological foundation) has been conceptually appropriated from 
Meillassoux’s After Finitude, namely through his demonstration that what exists is 
absolutely contingent but that this absolute necessity of contingency requires that 
something does indeed exist in itself.
Redefinition of the subject
In the course of the argument, we also came to redefine the notion of the subject. 
For us and in opposition to Badiou, there are always and necessarily some sub-
jects, since a subject, qua subject, localises or relates objects and thereby estab-
lishes and upholds a world through the reproduction of its logic. Without this 
operation of relating carried out incessantly, a world would cease to exist. The 
distinction from the kind of subject that upholds its world by reproducing its logic 
– what we termed the indifferent subject – to the faithful subject that radically 
transforms it is still necessary to map out. The difference between an indifferent 
and a faithful subject is though more subtle than Badiou would have it between a 
mere individual and his notion of a subject. This difference lies in what the basic 
operation of the subject – the operation of relating – is carried out under, i.e. the 
logical principle that informs the formation of worldly relations. Whereas for the 
indifferent subject it is the existing logical principle that is reproduced (or mod-
ified), the faithful subject forms relations according to the radically new logical 
principle inaugurated by the event. As we will discuss in the following chapter, 
this new logical principle is itself to evolve concurrently with the world under 
creation. It is in process – the experimental product, ultimately, of the acts and 
decisions of faithful subjects. However, the evental exposition of the inexistent 
does provide an initial orientation, or prototypical relation, as we will term it.
Invocation of an event
What in our conception of the procedure of creation will allow us to outline the 
possibility for invoking an event? In some ways similar to Badiou’s notion of the 
evental site, the entangled site retroactively locates the irruption of the inexistent. 
The idea of entanglement states that the inexistent shares an objective referent 
with the site-object and in that sense concerns the radically different localisation 
132
of this objective referent of the site-object. This localisation is radically different 
in that it demands not merely a different localisation in the world but a genu-
inely new logical principle of the world in order to be localisable at all. For our 
general aim to think the possibility of an invocation of an event and a procedure 
of creation, this means that some (probably highly contested) composite object in 
the world can be seen as a ‘crystallisation point’ for an event, or be understood, 
precisely, as a future site. Shifting away a little from a strongly generic thinking, it 
makes sense to understand a site as having materialised from a region of struggle 
or a dilemma within its world. Such a struggle is perhaps most intensely perceived 
on an affective level, where it is felt and experienced as constriction, impasse or 
hindrance – for a subjective, communal or social life – that proves unsolvable 
within its world, within the logic of that world. Strictly speaking, every object 
could potentially be a future site. The difference allowing us to narrow down this 
‘everything’ hinges on some sort of (rational or sensible) precognition of the pos-
sibility of what only retroactively can be understood to have been the inexistent 
of an object, caused by an event, constituting a site. This still cryptic proposition 
prepares the intuition that we will explore in the following chapter. Namely that it 
is in being affected by a genuine impasse (one that cannot be resolved within the 
existing world’s logic) that the sensibility for a pre-evental site and its potential 





In the previous chapter, a rudimentary model has been developed for thinking the 
procedure of creation based on the generic conception of worlds that is founded 
on the objectively existing universe and the material practices within it – an 
attempt we carried out under the name of materialist abstraction. The aim of this 
undertaking was to provide a generic yet materially effective concept of the pro-
cedure of creation. Whilst the generic concept has been sketched out, its material, 
worldly effectiveness still needs to be demonstrated. That a concept is materially 
effective means, in the first instance, that it can be carried out, be enacted or 
‘materialised’ in a world. In the following, we will revisit the relevant components 
of the proposed model and link them with situated, immanent subjective capaci-
ties that aim to ensure this material effectiveness in a world.
Subjective capacity, social abstraction
To begin with, a subjective capacity is understood to designate the ability of a 
situated subject to act in its world, to effect something within it. In order to get a 
clearer notion of this capacity, let us consider what it concerns, what it entails and 
how it emerges. The subjective capacity for creation is to be specified (vis-à-vis 
the wide field of capacities a subject might have at its hands) according to our defi-
nition of creation, since this situated capacity is to actualise in a world what the 
concept of creation outlines in generic terms. The generic terms we established as 
being central to the procedure of creation are the occurrence of an event and the 
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procedure of creation itself that is carried out by a faithful subject in the wake of 
such an event. In our aim to think the event as not an absolutely aleatory matter 
but to be possibly evoked (under the name of evental production), this possibility 
to bring about an event as well as the procedure of creation it initiates define what 
the subjective capacity for creation is a capacity for. We therefore need to outline 
the operations that enable the subjective capacity for creation to cause or produce 
an event and to unfold or enact its consequences.
In requiring the subjective capacity for creation to involve an event – and its 
possible causation – it is clear that such capacity cannot be thought to be somehow 
readily available in a world, since the only capacity that is generally at hand for a 
subject in a world is its ability to relate and modify its world (in accordance with 
the latter’s logic) in order to uphold it. What we called the indifferent subject 
enacts this basic capacity by reproducing its world’s logic and thereby ensures the 
latter’s continuous, coherent existence. How can we then think the emergence of 
a subjective capacity that breaks with this reproduction of its world’s logic? Again 
the problem here is how to break with what is constitutive of the immanent realm 
of possibility, logical consistency and sense – the realm that renders such an idea 
of the outside impossible, inconsistent and nonsensical. Since there exists no pos-
sibility for radical difference within a world’s logic, the question is how – from 
within a world – a capacity can emerge that is capable of creating such radical 
difference, that is capable of grasping the impossibility of stepping outside as a 
sudden real possibility, as it were. 
The intuition behind the following argument is that we can perform such a 
stepping back and establish a prehension of radical difference as real possibility. 
It is the gesture of abstraction that, once enacted by a situated subject, opens the 
outside as possibility and allows the subjective capacity for creation to emerge. 
Since we are looking for what enables a worldly situated subjective capacity for 
creation and not its generic thought in the form of a concept, the mode of abstrac-
tion that allows for this capacity to emerge will not be conceptual, or more pre-
cisely not theoretical, at least not in the way we employed for developing the 
concept of creation in the previous chapter. Although both attempts seek to derive 
their respective principal matter – concept and situated subjective capacity – from 
material practices and the objective universe by abstracting from it, the mode of 
materialist abstraction employed towards a situated subjective capacity for crea-
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tion is to be thought as primarily non-theoretical, social.1 Abstraction thus per-
ceived is the movement away from an immersed position, the inhabitation of 
which one is not aware of since there is no perspective possible onto this position 
as long as there is no partition between oneself and that position. A social mode of 
abstraction could be thought to operate as dissociation from and critical reflection 
of one’s ‘identity’ – as particularly related, located position – in a world and to 
open a sensible awareness that neither this position one occupies nor the world 
that assigns positions like that have any essence or necessity to be (and stay) the 
way they are.2 Non-theoretical, social abstraction would not merely make sensible 
or felt the results of conceptual abstraction (presenting something that theoretical 
reasoning evokes in situated experience) but would also arrive at those sensible 
understandings without the necessary invocation of theoretical reason.
Social abstraction is thought to enable the subjective capacity for creation to 
evolve from the situated experience and understanding that the given space of 
possibility (an existing world and its logical principle) cannot, and must not, be 
all there is. Subjective capacity is born upon the not exclusively theoretical realisation that 
the delimitation of the possible is an immanent but nonetheless absolutely contingent quality of 
every world vis-à-vis the universe. Such a realisation prepares an expansion of the realm of the 
possible in that it unsettles the totality of a world, it founds something of a proleptic awareness 
of the real possibility for a radically different basis of what will be possible. The proleptic 
awareness of radical difference as real possibility functions as a preliminary and 
as of yet unfounded supplementation to the existing totality of the world – which 
allows this totality to found radical difference, once the expansion is actualised.3 
This is how social abstraction can provide an immanent and functional anchor 
in the world that can be informed by concepts but is not exclusively prescribed 
by the latter. Social abstraction can be understood as a foundational operation 
1 This distinction of two modes of materialist abstraction (conceptual versus social) is polarised 
for now in order to allow for more clarity in the line of reasoning. When employing abstrac-
tion, these modes are arguably unlikely to operate in mutually exclusive ways but rather to 
blend into and inform each other.
2 We can compare this critical, distancing reflection in relation to one’s world to what we dis-
cussed under the care of the self in Chapter 3 as not only self-awareness but indeed as one 
condition for exercising freedom.
3 Such awareness is proleptic in that it anticipates the disruptive force of the event, which is, as 
Badiou puts it: the “opening of an epoch, [the] transformation of the relations between the 
possible and the impossible” (Badiou, 2003a: 45).
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of the future faithful subject before an event has taken place, by giving rise to a 
subjective capacity by way of a situated awareness that genuine change and cre-
ation will be possible – a possibility glimpsed but yet still logically unfounded in 
its pre-evental world.
For this awareness to allow a subjective capacity for creation to operate, it is not 
necessary to have a concept of its possibility – for example in form of a theory or 
model, as has been proposed in the last chapter. Nonetheless, the same general 
movement of abstraction that the concept of creation is obtained by is also instru-
mental, within an actual world, for generating the situated subjective capacities 
that will allow for radically changing that world – capacities that can actualise 
what has been formulated conceptually, without this concept being a precondi-
tion for such actualisations. The notion of materialist abstraction can therefore 
be understood as a two-fold intuition that generates on one side the conceptual 
thought of creation, its procedure and the subjective capacity for creation, and on 
the other, non-theoretical, social side such a capacity immanent to the world itself. 
The actual subjective capacity for creation in a world can enact and link up with 
the generic operations from the concept of creation but does not depend on the 
availability or existence of such a concept. 
That the actual subjective capacity for creation is not dependent on the avail-
ability of its conceptual capture means that we have to modify the statement 
made earlier, that our model of the procedure of creation be not only a generic 
conception but that this conception be also materially effective. It is not any sort 
of direct implementation of the concept that ensures the operations it delineates to 
be effective in an actual worldly situation. The concept of creation is neither prescriptive 
in regard of its specific actualisation nor at all necessary for the enactment of the generic opera-
tions it outlines. What links concept and enactment within the present undertaking 
is the movement from which we are capable to derive both of them: the two-fold 
gesture of materialist abstraction that founds concept and immanent capacity ulti-
mately on the same material practices that re/produce a world. In the setting of 
this thesis, the subjective capacity for creation and its enactment are still thought 
to be informed by the conceptual insights that have been developed in the pre-
vious chapters, even though the concepts have no necessary prescriptive power 
over what they eventually find as counterparts in the world. The aim here is to 
demonstrate that effectiveness in a world is not a matter of pure imposition of a 
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concept onto the world and a subject by way of a merely posited capacity, but 
that such a capacity can actually arise and exist independently of its conceptualis-
ation. Securing our concept’s possibility to be effective in a world is then a matter 
of establishing working connections between concept and situated capacity – the 
task begun above.
Exposition of the inexistent
The crucial measure for the worldly effectiveness of the conceptual model of 
creation lies in showing the possibility and mechanisms of invoking or working 
towards an event within an actual world. In order to lay out this demonstration, 
we have to turn once again to the notion of the event itself, reconsidering first of 
all what necessarily constitutes it. Regarding the model of creation put forward 
in the previous chapter, the focus had been predominantly on the foundation of 
the inexistent, whereas the event – the momentary breaking into existence of the 
inexistent – has not been discussed much so far. It has been asserted that the event 
is the unique operation that exposes the inexistent of its world, thereby following 
the general conceptual idea Badiou formulated in Being and Event and modified 
in Logics of Worlds. The problem with adopting Badiou’s notion of the event is, 
however, that it is based on his ontological edifice that we have already prob-
lematised.4 It is thus required to transpose the event onto the same foundation 
as our overall concept of creation. More precisely though, since Badiou’s event 
ultimately relies exclusively on the set-theoretical illegality of self-belonging, the 
task is to propose a new concept of the event based on our foundation.
The idea of the event denotes the coming into existence of the inexistent erupt-
ing from a site. That an event, according to Badiou, constitutes an aleatory and 
momentary irruption is because it violates a fundamental axiom of set theory, the 
axiom of foundation. Since it is only in violation of the foundation of being that 
an event can be thought, the event is not and cannot be. The only way then for 
an event to be conceivable is to think it as instantly vanishing chance occurrence 
4 We recall that the evental multiple (in Being and Event, see BE: 190) or the site (in Logics of 
Worlds, see LW: 368) are self-reflexive multiples, they belong to themselves, which is in viola-
tion of the axiom of foundation and therefore constitutes an illegal operation within set theory 
ontology: the event.
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– it cannot be, it cannot subsist, it can have no reason or cause. Since we deprived 
ourselves from Badiou’s purely set-theoretical foundation of the event, the neces-
sity of the latter’s instantaneous nature and of its absolute chance character has 
also become inessential. 
That the event is no longer necessarily aleatory, illegal and vanishing the instant 
it takes place allows us to think it in more nuanced terms in regard to its cause 
and duration. The event still remains a logical impossibility (or non-sense) within 
the world it occurs, since the inexistent it exposes is per definition exactly this: 
illogical non-sense, impossible to be situated within the world’s logical edifice. 
The basic idea, in our conception of the inexistent is to understand the latter as a 
paradoxical object – a pairing of an objective referent and its localisation within 
a world’s logic – whose localisation is not of this world, whose localisation is not 
compatible with the given world’s logic. So what exists of the inexistent in the 
given world is its objective referent, although as part of a conventional object, 
which is to say that this objective referent is simply the objective referent of an 
existing object localised within the logic of that world. That an object inexists in a 
world is then the result of this object being localised by a radically different, out-
er-worldly logical principle – simply put, its incompatibility is the effect from not 
being of the world it inexists in. This otherworldly existence has been thought to 
take place in a different, entangled world in or over time, a world that either exists 
concurrently with or successively to the considered world. Since, to repeat, in an 
object, a localisation is paired with an objective, universal referent – the part of an 
object which, in a world, is subject to localisation but which exists in the universe 
in-itself, independently of any such worldly localisation – we can infer that every 
existing object, qua object, harbours the potential to inexist, precisely because 
it could possibly be localised according to a radically different logical principle. 
What characterises the inexistent in any given world is that although it certainly 
exists in abundance on one level (as objective referent), it has no localised exist-
ence in that given world (it is not localisable with the given logic).
When an event exposes an inexistent, what does it expose to the given world? 
On one side we have the circumscription of the inexistent by the evental site, 
which, ultimately, points to the worldly object that shares its universal referent 
with the inexistent. On the other side, there is the otherworldly localisation of the 
inexistent object that now came to be exposed. This exposition does not in some 
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magical way make the logic of the inexistent’s world accessible to the evental 
world, since they are strictly incompatible. We can state, for now, that the evental 
exposition of the inexistent unhinges its entangled object within the given world, 
as it were. We will discuss this point of evental exposition of the inexistent further 
in the following section. 
The importance of this conception of the inexistent is that it maintains the abso-
lute logical difference and inaccessibility of the inexistent without imposing an ontological, 
universal impossibility for its ‘existence’, for its conditions of possibility. From this 
we can infer that the event, as the occurrence which exposes the inexistent of a 
site-object, is not absolutely, universally impossible to occur and persist but only 
impossible to be accommodated and made sense of in the world it takes place in.
Evental production
We can infer two points from the abstract possibility of the inexistent’s other-
worldly existence. First, now that an event is no longer thought to shatter the 
foundation of being and is consequently able to subsist – however unrecognised, 
‘undercover’ – in a world’s site, it allows us to think the exposition of the inexist-
ent as a situated, possibly durational operation. Contrary to Badiou’s notion of 
the event, which exposes the inexistent in an illegal, instantaneous outburst from 
the void, the exposition of the inexistent can now be modelled as something that 
takes time and requires effort, which is to say that it becomes something a pre-
evental subject might be able to work on or, even, to produce. Second, the ‘legal’ 
but abstract possibility of the inexistent and the event become both thinkable 
and non-theoretically apprehensible through materialist abstraction, which is to 
say they have been transposed onto a foundation that is independent from Badi-
ou’s ontological conception. The two-fold apprehension of the possibility of an 
event (conceptually and non-theoretically) does not yet establish the possibility of 
radical difference itself as real possibility, since a real possibility is founded on a 
totality that allows for it (a field of possibilities) – in this case a totality that has yet 
to include the inexistent as possible to exist. 
Both points, the exposition of the inexistent as situated operation and the appre-
hension of the abstract but immanent possibility of this operation, can be under-
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stood to find expression in a world respectively as sites of struggle and the subjective 
capacity for creation. A site of struggle is to denote a pre-evental site, a region of a 
world that will potentially have served as an evental site.5 The subjective capacity 
for creation has been outlined above as the awareness of the non-necessity of 
what is given as world, paired with a proleptic sense of radical difference as real 
possibility. The idea is to situate the subjective capacity within a site of struggle, so 
that the subject unfold its capacity at a site of struggle. This operation constitutes 
what we will call an evental production that has the potential to expose the inexistent 
of its site.6 We can speak of a production because the incessant relating of objects 
that every subject carries out is productive of a world. That this operation of relat-
ing is carried out within a site of struggle is to say that it is framed by this struggle. 
What does this taking place within a struggle entail for the operation of relating? 
It implies that the operation of relating is informed on one side by the conceptual/
non-theoretical awareness of the non-necessity of the present situation and on 
the other side by the local necessity of a different (global) logical principle than 
the existing one – where necessity and difference arise from the specific setting of 
their struggle. With this orientation leading away from but still situated within its 
world’s logic, the criteria for producing relations are no longer naturally drawn 
from the logical principle of the existing world, but become experimental in testing 
other forms of relating and, indeed, trying to abandon this principle.7 
The procedure of evental production can be said to have exposed the inexistent 
of its site if at least one of the experimental relations it produces gives rise to an 
apprehension or idea on what a hitherto impossible, genuinely different logical 
5 This circular definition of a site of struggle is still preliminary, we will discuss it more closely 
in the following sections.
6 Even for Badiou, in absence of any event to be faithful to, there is work to be done, locally, 
where there is struggle: “The other way is to seek a new activation in a way that is extraordi-
narily local, in extremely precise circumstances, hoping that this filter, that this localisation will 
allow us to work much more acutely within the perspective of novelty. … I truly believe that 
when we are short of events, when we are short of what the events provide us with – during 
intermediary situations such as we are experiencing nowadays – it is necessary to focus our 
thoughts and efforts on local experiences, because really, at a global level, we have only lifeless, 
obsolete ideas; we have ideas that are not sufficiently activated.” (Badiou, 2006: 182)
7 In his lecture “The Subject of Art” Badiou gives us a vague sense of such sort of experimenta-
tion in the world of art, in terms of an “experimentation of chaotic sensibility” or the “emer-
gence of a new possibility of formalization, … an acceptance like form of something which was 
inform” that might come to “change the formula of the world”, and so on. (Badiou, 2005) 
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principle can be founded on. This we can call an event: the recognition that a 
certain experimental relation (or a set of such relations) can come to serve as 
the foundation for creating a radically different worldly principle – a genuinely 
different logical principle that guides but also evolves with the process of its new 
world being created.8 That an experimental relation succeeded in ‘winning over’ 
the inexistent of its site of struggle results from the orientated detachment from 
the existing world’s logic having, in a sense, leaped ‘far enough’, and in ‘the right 
direction’. What can be generically stated about the criteria for what makes an 
experimental relation come to expose the inexistent is merely that it only func-
tions retroactively, which is to leave the operation itself – on the ground as it 
were – without criteria. Being ‘without criteria’ is what makes evental production, 
unsurprisingly, an experimental exploration in the first place. This experimen-
tation can be generically circumscribed9 to always proceed from a context (site 
of struggle) to somewhere unknown (potentially the inexistent, mostly nowhere) 
by first constructing a still nonsensical relation (or localisation) involving the site of 
struggle, from negation of the given logical principle, and then retroactively probing 
this experimental relation for any potential to produce (new) sense after all, 
according to a possibly discovered, hitherto inexistent logic still hard to grasp.10 
The recognised inexistent – or indeed the wager on this relation constituting an 
inexistent – thereby takes the form of a prototypical relation of the new worldly 
logic that can be said to exhibit the idea of the new logical principle. In this way, a 
genuinely different logical principle for a new world has been established as real 
possibility, since what founds the range of possibilities in the existing world has 
been supplemented with the inexistent of the site of struggle.
8 To speak here about recognition of radical difference becoming a real possibility is reminiscent 
and derived from Badiou’s idea of the nomination of an event in Being and Event.
9 A more concrete discussion of the experimental practices that are referred to here only briefly 
and generically can be found in the second half of Chapter 3. There, in the larger context 
of the care of the self and the exercise of freedom, experimental ethical practices entail the 
distancing from and reflection of the world, which aim at self-determination rather than being 
determined or ruled by doxa and habit. Self-determination then takes the form of generating 
one’s own rules for one’s conduct, practicing, living them as well as regularly reflect on them 
in order to perform revisions both in thought and practice.
10 Experimentation has to proceed by incessantly taking leaps (wager first, then analyse), since, 
as Badiou remarks, “the intelligibility of the event is neither prospective nor calculative; it is 
rather retroactive … it is only intelligible afterwards, its conditions of intelligibility can never 
be anticipated.” (Badiou, 2006: 181)
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Procedure of creation
With the acquisition of this new real possibility, the procedure of evental pro-
duction transitions into the procedure of creation, the new present in which a 
faithful subject creates a new world by re-relating everything that is connected to 
the site, or that becomes necessary to be newly connected to the latter. The basic 
operation of all the discussed subjective procedures – the indifferent subject, the 
faithful subject’s evental production and creation – is the act of relating, of local-
ising objects in a world, which is constitutive of a world’s logic. The difference 
between these subjective procedures is the logical principle that informs the act 
of relating. To recall, we have defined the logic of a world to be what a world 
expresses, the framework of sense that is immanent to it. The logical principle 
informs the acts of relating, thereby operating on the production itself of a world’s 
logic. The logical principle evolves with its world, which means that the defini-
tional distinction is not at all binary – expressive logic versus productive logical 
principle. The present polarisation is intended to help us think the precise points 
where struggle and event intervene in the all-pervasive operation of relating. The 
indifferent subject reproduces relations according to the world’s existing logical 
principle, whereas an evental production is guided by an experimentation (affirm-
ative negation) that in turn originates from the attempted negation of the existing 
principle. In order to transition to the procedure of creation, the experimentation 
in an evental production is supplanted with an idea (a prototypical relation), and 
the operation of relating is based on a new, preliminary and evolving logical 
principle – whose real possibility and idea the event induced. The post-evental 
procedure of creation outlined here is very close to Badiou’s post-evental enquir-
ies, the “finite forms of a procedure of fidelity” (BE: 327). In distinction to Badiou 
though, the procedure of creation is a rather mundane operation, it is the same 
that the indifferent subject performs day in day out, the operation of relating. The 
only but crucial shift in this operation lies in what guides it, and this is the change 
from reproducing the world’s logic (indifferently) to creating a new world and 
thereby new logic (radical difference) from the idea of a new organising principle 
that derives from the experimental, now prototypical relation which exposes the 
inexistent of the former world.
Although mundane in one sense this new type of relating is destined to come 
up against the logic and logical principle of the existing world – either in a soft 
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sense (is met with incomprehension, possibly disapproval) or in a harder sense (is 
seen as illegal and sanctioned as such). In any case we might note in passing that 
the faithful subject in my schema has something in common with the production 
of the self narrated by Foucault and as laid out in my excursus in so far as both 
involve a turn away from habitual and dominant subjectivating powers – and 
towards the production of something else, warranted by self-determined rules of 
conduct (exercise of freedom). The difference is that in Foucault’s schema this 
remains on the level of the subject, whereas in mine the subject, very precisely, 
embarks upon a process of worldly transformation.
 At the beginning of this chapter, it has been outlined how the procedure of 
creation – based on the newly proposed foundational concepts and generic oper-
ations – can be thought to be materially effective in a world. It has been shown 
that the non-theoretical mode of materialist abstraction gives rise in a world to a 
subjective capacity for creation and that both, non-theoretical, social abstraction 
and subjective capacity, do operate and exist independent of their conceptualis-
ation by thought. Thereby we gained a capacity that is not only worldly situated 
and compatible with the developed model of creation but is also the result of 
the same movement – materialist abstraction – that allowed for the conceptual 
model, in its respective modes of social abstraction (lived world) and conceptual 
abstraction (generic thought). In order for the subjective capacity for creation to 
ensure the effectiveness of the procedure of creation in a world, the exposition of 
the inexistent is thought to result from an immanent evental production, which 
links the conceptual thought of entanglement (providing for the inexistent’s oth-
erworldly existence) with the worldly unfolding of the subjective capacity from 
a site of struggle. An evental production is then the experimental procedure of 
re-relating objects of a site of struggle with the world in creative negation of the 
existing world’s logical principle that would normally guide the operation of relat-
ing. That an evental production actually comes to expose the inexistent of its 
site of struggle is still only an abstract possibility, there is no guarantee for it to 
cause an event. It does though propose a generic yet worldly anchored, immanent 
procedure that is arguably considerably more enabling for thinking the quest for 
radical novelty in actual existing worlds than Badiou’s absolutely aleatory and 
subtractive conception of the event – an event that is not only out of any world 
but is out of being tout court. In discussing the consequences of a successful evental 
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production, we also came to recapitulate the post-evental worldly operations that 
anchor the effectiveness of our model of the procedure of creation.
Sites of struggle
We need to return to the discussion of one issue cut short above, the localisa-
tion of a site of struggle. The pre-evental localisation of a site of struggle poses a 
conceptual problem since its definite designation as evental site is possible only 
retroactively, after the occurrence of an event, since from within a world’s logic 
and before the occurrence of an event the site is a region of the world as any other. 
With a generic approach it is again the difficulty to get hold of the conceptual cri-
teria that would allow us, before the event, to localise such a worldly site. Situated 
within a world but again abstracting from it, the question that this problem poses 
is how one can know that one is operating or engaging in a struggle at a potential 
evental site. This shift in perspective from the generic to the situated (still abstract) 
also moves the focus from retroactive evental site to present struggle, as it were, a 
move that enables us to infer a potential evental site from the location of a worldly 
struggle. This inference is possible since an evental production is productive only 
because of the existence of a struggle, whereas the site is ‘merely’ the worldly 
region the latter will have taken place at. What then defines a struggle in a world? 
A struggle is the engagement in overcoming a specific constraint in a world. Such 
constraint can be understood to be an impasse experienced in a world, an impasse 
that expresses ultimately the irreconcilable inadequacy of a world’s (global) logic 
in regard to the struggle’s specificity. In opposition to challenging problems whose 
solution is conceivable within a world’s logic or that are a matter of mere modi-
fication (reformism), a struggle is based on the negative knowledge of an inher-
ent and essential shortcoming of the world’s global logical layout – presenting 
any solution as genuinely impossible within a world, according to the latter’s 
logic – which might start and inform an affirmative, productive negation of this 
impasse. This process of affirmative negation of an existing impasse in a world 
is what we called an evental production. If what defines a struggle as site-specific 
engagement in the world already implies the process of evental production, we are 
still required to give an account of how a struggle comes about, or how a subject 
comes to grasp and subject itself to the impasse, thus causing or contributing to 
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a struggle – so that we can follow the subject to the worldly site of an evental 
production. 
What we are looking for, in a way, is a sensibility for an impasse in a world. 
Within the argument of the present chapter, this sensibility would provide the ori-
entation for what we called non-theoretical, social abstraction (which in turn gives 
rise to the subjective capacity for creation). That an impasse becomes sensible for 
a subject is, on the most basic level, the consequence of this subject’s care for what 
makes its world, an attention towards what forces or operations place it where 
within the world – in short what conditions the field of possibility of the subject’s 
existence (we might note here, of course, the importance of Foucault once more). 
If a subject does not care for, or problematises its world and itself within that 
world, it cannot but live as indifferent subject. Therefore, the care for one’s world 
needs to be understood as subjective effort, it requires work and engagement to 
attain a sense of the world and oneself, one’s position in it.11 Only by the effort of 
caring for and problematising one’s surrounding and the world at large can one 
gain an awareness and understanding of what in the world makes for the joys of 
life, what suppresses them, in short what it is that ultimately matters to live and 
struggle for. The sensibility for an impasse in one’s world stems then from the 
awareness of a specific constraint the world enforces in regard to what matters in 
a life – a constraint that negatively defines what to struggle for.
Subject of creation
This brief outline of how and why a subject comes to place itself within a site of 
struggle lets us grasp the pre-evental localisation of and engagement with such a 
site, which is to say the location of a potential evental site. What also became clear 
from the last sections is that subjective commitment to potential radical change 
starts far ahead of the occurrence of an event (something that Badiou’s faithful 
subject cannot really account for), namely the process of evental production that 
11 This care for one’s world can be understood to be an active engagement in the world in the 
sense that has been discussed in Chapter 3 with Foucault’s notion of the problematisation of 
the present. We found that a problematisation can open an indirect access to the understand-
ing of the construction of one’s world by exploring the practices that try to intervene in and 
modify the ways this world has been and is being re/produced, thus exposing these constitu-
tive operations and the power they exert on us.
146
might lead to the occurrence of an event. Subjective commitment – if it is to 
succeed in producing an event and creating genuine difference in the form of 
a new world – begins with a very indistinct orientation but relentless care for, 
problematisation of and attention towards its world, which allows a subject to 
make sense of the world and make sensible the impasses within it. Such problem-
atisation can arguably be authorised and supported by the demonstration of the 
abstract possibility of radical novelty and change, via conceptual abstraction. The 
sensibility for impasses in the world and the awareness of their non-necessity that 
result from social abstraction enable the subject’s engagement in an evental pro-
duction. If an event has been evoked, the subject unfolds its subjective capacity in 
the procedure of creation. We will name subject of creation the subject that, starting 
with explorative attention, care for and problematisation of its world, comes to 
experimentally labour for and invoke an event, and unfold the evental consequences 
in the form of the creation of a new world.12 In this way, the subject of creation can 
be understood to supplement Badiou’s faithful subject with a pre-evental engage-
ment that comes to possibly generate an event. It is this kind of work on the 
other, preparatory side of the event, which Badiou ignores and that our model 
foregrounds with the subject of creation.
When we ascribe to the subject of creation the operations and orientations 
of its different stages as we have above, its conception seems rather inelegant, 
maybe even too deliberately constructed with its suspiciously distinct phases or 
steps. If we shift the perspective though from these stages of the subject to what 
it does or enacts, to what those ascribed stages in its evolvement mean in regard 
of the subject’s engagements, the process appears to unfold in a more seamless 
form. The basic, fundamental capacity that any subject enacts, qua subject, is the 
operation of relating. We already discussed the difference in the enactment of 
this operation between the indifferent and the post-evental, faithful subject. Since 
we have just established a subjective development from indifferent to faithful, let 
us now consider a subject’s path on this continuum. The emergence of a subject 
of creation begins rather evidently once an indifferent subject no longer simply 
and negligently reproduces the logic of its world. This emergence can happen 
12 To give a name to the subject that commits to radical change from its vague outset and all the 
way through, Badiou’s notion of the faithful subject has become too narrow for us in what it 
concerns: the merely post-evental enactment of evental consequences.
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suddenly or in a gradual shift away from the life as indifferent subject, away from 
the reaffirming enactment of the latter’s world’s logical principle.13 We attributed 
the cause of such drifting away from affirming one’s worldly logic to two causes. 
First the understanding of the abstract possibility that the world can radically 
change since we can think its radical outside, by way of conceptual abstraction. 
And second, via social abstraction, a problematisation of and care for what makes 
the world and what makes this world position its subjects in the way it does. How 
can problematisation and care be understood to influence the operation of relat-
ing? Arguably, problematisation and care bring to bear an orientation, a focus on 
some regions of the world and those regions’ specific relational configurations. 
Problematisation and care can orient a subject in that they progressively contract14 
what of the world this subject will predominantly engage in, and therefore what 
its operation of relating is primarily concerned with and enacted on. This sub-
jective contraction of a world is also what makes the sensibility for an impasse 
within this world more concrete, guiding a subject to a site of struggle within its 
world. At a site of struggle, we argued that the operation of relating is on one 
side framed by this struggle and on the other, that it proceeds experimentally, 
in what we called evental production. In an evental production, the operation of 
relating constructs relations involving the site-object of struggle in ways that do 
not conform to the logical principle of the world. Since what does not conform 
to a world’s logical principle concerns that world’s outside, we established that 
this operation of relating can only be experimental, be without criteria, resulting 
13 Such shifting away from the affirmation of the given world’s logic can be understood as break-
ing with the subordination to the state of the world. Badiou sees in this distancing from the 
state an acting “with sufficient independence from the state and what it deems to be important 
or not, who it decides should or should not be addressed. This distance protects political prac-
tices from being oriented, structured, and polarized by the state.” (Badiou, 2008b: 650)
14 This contraction of the world (by way of its problematisation) into focuses of attention or 
interest could be, in a way, compared to Badiou’s notion of points, and more precisely the 
topological space the latter are thought to compose. We remarked in our discussion of Logics of 
Worlds in Chapter 2 that the topological space composed by the points of a world (LW: 414-5) 
could be understood to localise the conflicting ‘beneath’ or not conclusively resolved struggles 
and impasses of the transcendental organisation of this world. That is to say that this topologi-
cal space delineates within a world the points or regions at which the radical transfiguration of 
that world are decided. In Logics though, these concern binary decisions and are necessitated by 
the post-evental truth. So again we cannot readily incorporate this notion from Badiou, since 
it is an exclusively post-evental concept, which makes it inapplicable for us in both senses, that 
points can be discerned and decided only after an event (whereas we are still in a pre-evental 
discussion) and that they require an event in Badiou’s ontological conception – which we 
turned away from.
148
in non-sense in respect of the world’s existing logic. (Both conceptual and social 
abstraction – the demonstration of the existence of a radical outside and prolepsis 
of radical change – can lend support to this experimental process.) This nonsensi-
cal relation is then probed for its potential of having exposed an inexistent of the 
site of struggle, which would constitute an event and inaugurate that relation as 
preliminary, prototypical expression of the new world’s logic to be created – the 
idea of a radically new organising principle. This marks then the transition to the post-
evental procedure of creation, in which the operation of relating is guided by the 
still vague idea established by the event. That such an idea is thought to be vague 
or preliminary just after its evental instantiation and yet to replace, as guiding 
principle, the ruptured world’s logical principle means that this idea evolves with 
the world it guides to create.
The subject of creation moves, we might say, on a continuum from indifferent 
to faithful subject, and this movement is reflected in the gradual changes of what 
informs the subject’s operation of relating. To summarise, this change of what 
informs the operation of relating can be understood to take the form of contraction 
– first towards a site of struggle, then in the evental production – followed by an 
expansion that testifies to the creation of a new world, arising from the singularity 
of an event. The movement of contraction concerns regions or objects of a given 
world, it makes the subject specify its location in the world by focusing on what 
of this world matters according to the subject’s explorative interest or sensibility 
of an impasse. This contraction can be thought to go all the way from the world 
at large, via a site of struggle, to the singular relation whose experimental instan-
tiation will have constituted an event. From this singularity – and the now real 
possibility of radical novelty it establishes as idea or prototypical relation of a new 
logical principle – the operation of relating comes to concern an ever growing 
scope, composed by the objects that are newly related (predominantly with the 
site object) in the procedure of creating a new world according to the new, now 
foundational idea or prototypical relation. Contraction begets expansion.
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Enactment of an idea
In returning one last time to Badiou’s system, we will consider how his notion 
of the idea can help us to understand what guides the movement of the subject 
of creation from indifferent to faithful subject. As with the notion of the subject 
itself, the problem in trying to appropriate Badiou’s notion of the idea lies in the 
latter’s definition as exclusively post-evental matter.15 By extending the notion of 
the idea into the pre-evental realm, we would gain one single pivotal term around 
which the complete journey of creating radical novelty unfolds and is guided by. 
Although this conception of an idea would present some sort of singular meta-no-
tion of the subject of creation, it also constitutes its most generic, highest abstrac-
tion – meaning that the idea, in its generic conception, is at the same time what 
is most central yet has the least specificity in the conceptual model. For a worldly 
situated subject of creation though, such an idea might be the most pivotal anchor 
point to exist and evolve over its complete creative life – even if it will always be 
the most difficult aspect of creation to specify or explain. 
Before extending the notion of the idea into the pre-evental part of the life of 
a subject of creation, let us consider what it designates, according to Badiou, for 
the post-evental procedure of fidelity. He states that the experience of an idea is 
what authorises the creation of the present of this experience, which is to say that 
an idea authorises and guides the procedure of fidelity that creates the present 
of its own experience. What in our model authorises and guides the pre-evental 
procedure that is to culminate in an event? We stated above that this guiding 
authorisation derives from both of materialist abstraction’s modes, conceptual 
and social abstraction. On the conceptual side, we demonstrated that the abstract 
possibility of a radical outside and the generic conception of procedure of creation 
(that instantiates radical novelty on the basis of this outside) can serve as authori-
sation for subjects to start problematising their present in the first place – that the 
powerful thought of the outside alone can lend faith to a subject for and rational 
belief in its quest for creation. On the side of non-theoretical, social abstraction, it 
15 We recall his statement from the closing pages of Logics of Worlds: “If we agree to call ‘Idea’ 
what both manifests itself in the world—what sets forth the being-there of a body—and is an 
exception to its transcendental logic, we will say, in line with Platonism, that to experience in 
the present the eternity that authorizes the creation of this present is to experience an Idea. We 
must therefore accept that for the materialist dialectic, ‘to live’ and ‘to live for an Idea’ are one 
and the same thing.” (LW: 510)
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is the problematisation of the present which can produce an orientation or guid-
ance, through attention, care for and problematisation of what makes a subject’s 
world and the resulting awareness of this world’s contingent (non-necessary) 
logical organisation – specifically when experienced from the impasse exposed by 
a (site of) struggle. Of this awareness of contingency we stated that it constitutes 
an abstract possibility (derived from conceptual abstraction), or a prolepsis of the real 
possibility (derived from social abstraction) for radical change of the world’s logical 
organisation. That this possibility is merely abstract and not yet real has to do with 
the logic of the world not allowing for such possibility – the abstract possibility 
concerns the outside in regard to the world’s logic, presenting radical difference. 
This possibility can become real only once the totality of a world allows for such 
a possibility, once it is supplemented with the result of a successful evental produc-
tion (hence its field of possibility has been expanded). The pre-evental phase of an 
idea can then be thought to designate the labour of making the abstract possibility 
for genuine novelty real, a development that culminates in this possibility tipping 
over to become a real possibility in the given world, through the production of 
an event. What a pre-evental idea guides – and arguably evolves alongside with 
– is the contraction of the world towards a site of struggle and further to the 
experimental, prototypical relation that constitutes an event. This guidance can 
be understood to be one of a specification of negation – or of contraction, as discussed 
above –, it specifies and brings to the (tipping) point what in the world constitutes 
a real impasse and therefore the reason and seed for abandoning and radically 
transforming the organising principle of that world. Once an event has been effec-
tuated, the idea is secured as real possibility for radical novelty and its guidance 
takes now the form of a specification of affirmation – or expansion –, the affirmation 
and development of the prototypical relation that fosters the coming organising 
principle of the new world under creation. 
Within our conceptual model, an idea must be understood to be completely 
anonymous, its generic conception has no power to lend it any specificity other 
than a general form of guidance for the subject of creation. The specifics of an 
idea are exclusively attained in the world the idea is employed and developed 
in, but even so, those specifics might never be easily expressible (in language, 
thought, concepts). That an idea can guide a subject of creation on its journey 
towards the production of an event and in the following creation of a new world 
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requires this idea to develop alongside its subject’s enactment in the world – since 
it cannot be given on the basis of an existing logic or knowledge. An idea can be 
thought to evolve in interplay with the subject of creation, with its operation of 
relating that is, in a circular way, the precarious enactment of this idea – since the idea 
is what guides the operation of relating. In this way, the subject of creation and 
the idea that guides its operation – from its first steps of contractive negation to 
the expansive affirmation of creation – are locked in mutual, evolving dependence 
and determination.
We can now return to Badiou’s statement that “‘to live’ and ‘to live for an 
Idea’ are one and the same thing” (LW: 510). In Badiou’s materialist dialectic, 
the capacity to live is exclusively exercised in the wake of a rare, aleatory event. 
Subjectivity and living are attained by the recognition of and fidelity to an event 
but the event itself lies beyond the grasp of a subject to come, the latter has no 
power at all to cause an event – and has therefore no command over the constitu-
tion of its own subjectivity and living. With the notion of the subject of creation 
put forward in this thesis, we attempted to provide an alternative conception of 
the subject, one that not only allows but indeed requires subjectivity to emerge 
a long way before an event – an event, as has been argued, which the subject of 
creation is capable to produce. That Badiou considers the living of a subject to be 
for an Idea reflects that an Idea designates the truth which a faithful subject comes 
to unfold in an infinite procedure of fidelity; a truth that is by definition never 
reached, can never be known. This evolving nature of the idea is shared with 
our own conception of it. However, the crucial difference from Badiou revolves 
around the way an idea relates to the subject. He states that to live is to live for an 
Idea, which is a concise way of saying that the subject is operative in the procedure 
of bringing about the truth this idea will come to denote – in a future infinitely far 
away, ever beyond reach. In that sense, the subject is instrumental for the idea, in 
that it constitutes the operational entity that gives form to the latter. In a similar 
but reversed sense, we can see that in our conception of the subject of creation it is 
rather the idea that is instrumental for the subject. The idea is born together with 
the subject of creation – in the first act of not relating to its world indifferently 
anymore – as initially vague but evolving guide for the operations of relating the 
subject performs. However indistinct in the beginning, the idea is what a subject 
turns to for support in its formation of relations, it constitutes the pivotal vessel 
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that orients the subject’s actions in the world. In short, for a subject of creation to 
live is then to live according to an idea, an idea that is not given – not now and not 
‘never’ (in a future infinitely far away) – but that is born and evolves in mutual 
dependence and determination with the subject in its quest for creation.
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Conclusion
The previous chapters have provided a close reading and discussion of Badiou’s 
onto-logical work and, following the issues encountered, an attempt to engage 
some of his central conceptual vocabulary in an alternative, rudimentary sketch 
for the framework and procedure of creation. The following conclusion will revisit 
the key questions and arguments and will try to address one major rift that has 
been examined with unsatisfactory results so far. This is the split between crea-
tion’s ultimate foundation in the nothing or outside of a world – which can only 
be thought generically, not validated by experience – and any actual process of radical 
transformation of a concrete situation, which requires precisely this opening to 
the outside of its experienced immanence. Turning to contemporary proponents 
of communisation theory might prove helpful at that point, since there exists on 
one side a set of shared theoretical assumptions and conceptions with the present 
thesis and on the other side a strong explicit emphasis on the immanence of the 
theory within the struggles it theorises.
The thesis opened with the hypothesis that radical novelty can come to exist, 
that its occurrence can be caused and given form, and that this designates the pro-
cedure of creation. By instantiating radical difference vis-à-vis the world and the 
immediate experiences we can have of it, genuine novelty poses a challenge for 
thought since it asserts a hitherto unimaginable, impossible form – indeed a new 
world. It has been argued that such radical difference is possible to unfold only 
once a world became supplemented with something outside of it, with something 
that inexists or can only be considered as non-sense within it. Creation is therefore 
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to be understood in its strongest sense as creation ex nihilo. Creation begets form 
out of nothing, since nothingness – as that which is exclusively thinkable of the 
proper outside of what exists and makes sense – is the foundation of everything 
genuinely new. Nothing, strictly speaking, is the condition of possibility of radical 
difference.
The pivotal role of the void in Badiou’s ontology and his conception of the 
evental supplementation and subsequent transformation of its situation provided 
the rationale for the close reading and discussion of Being and Event and Logics 
of Worlds in the first two chapters. However, Badiou’s rigorous but complicated 
attempt in Logics to establish the compatibility between – and prescription of – 
ontic worlds by their ‘underlying’ ontological situations had ultimately to be con-
sidered insufficiently founded. This problem became apparent by exposing the 
paradoxical nature of the concept of retroaction of appearing on being, which 
Badiou posits to ensure that radical changes effectuated by a subject in the world 
will alter the ontological multiple composition that appears as and underlies this 
world. Retroaction came to reveal the fundamental omission of Badiou’s system, 
namely that he nowhere adequately accounts for the process of formation of the 
ontological situations that come to appear as worlds – whilst denying appearance 
any role in the formation of what exists, apart from it serving as mere waypoint 
(via retroaction) in an otherwise fundamentally ontological conception of change. 
Following his idea of retroaction through undoes in the end the work of his ontol-
ogy from the point of its foundational assumption. Badiou holds fast to his Pla-
tonic commitment – which has been summarised under the notion of ontological 
prescription – that being is primary, yet does not present a conception that would 
answer how being itself comes to be presented in a situation in the first place. In 
turn, Badiou’s insistence on formulating a coherent ontological-logical system on 
this basis, evidenced in Briefings on Existence and Logics of Worlds, is what allows us to 
notice and uncover the problematic gravity of his ontological prescription.
The third and fourth chapter attempted to construct a sketch or working 
hypothesis of a rudimentary model of creation that is based on central concepts 
of Badiou’s system (event, faithful subject, logical organisation of worlds, inexist-
ent) whilst transposing their foundation onto a more minimalist notion of being, 
drawn from Meillassoux’s work in After Finitude. The latter, it has been argued, 
can supply a theoretical framework in which being as such can be thought to 
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provide the minimal condition for existence – namely that there has to exist some-
thing, some facticity, precisely because contingency is the only absolute necessity 
– without further conditioning or prescribing the composition of what exists. In 
my approach of materialist abstraction, the generic conception of worlds has been 
proposed as the relational topology that results from the material operations of 
subjects relating objects of their worldly situation into a coherent logic – taking 
cues from both Foucault’s conception of power relations and power structures, 
as well as Badiou’s transcendental organisation and logics of worlds. Worlds are 
therefore founded ‘from below’, where being provides existence in the form of a 
contingent, objective universe, and ‘from above’, as the result of the material oper-
ations that establish and incessantly reproduce the logic of a world on the basis 
of this objectively existing universe. That a world is a logical augmentation of the 
universe implies, has been argued, that the specific form of a world’s logic – and 
therefore any world as such – is non-necessary or contingent. The contingency of 
worlds and their organisation ultimately allows for founding the inexistent of a 
world on a materialist basis. The basis for the inexistent rests on the proposal of an 
object being the pairing of an objective or universal referent and the localisation of 
this referent within the relational network of a world’s logic. Since the inexistent 
is a paradoxical object (but an object nonetheless), it can be termed a materialist 
notion in the double sense that it has an objectively existing referent and is the 
product of the material process of logical localisation. If a world is understood as 
the logical organisation of objects that are localised through a relational network 
in the former, and objects to have an objective referent in the material universe, 
then the inexistent of a world can be thought as an as of yet inconceivable, out-
er-worldly localisation of an objective referent of an object in the existing world.1 
The span from minimalist conception of being to generic conception of worlds 
and objects constitutes, within the rudimentary model of the procedure of crea-
tion, the conceptual framework of material reality from which and into which the 
procedure of creation intervenes. The inexistent can be thought to present the 
link between this framework and the formalism of the subject, since the inexistent 
1 This idea hinges on the conceptual pairing that makes up an object: an objective referent of the 
material universe (a thing in itself, material or mathematical) and the localisation that places it 
within a world. The inexistent concerns the referent of an existing object in the world, whilst 
the localisation of this referent is not (yet) of this same world, not in accordance with and 
unthinkable within this world’s logical organisation.
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is an object (part of the conceptual framework) but requires a subjective interven-
tion (part of the subjective formalism) to become actually apprehensible as such. 
The derivation of the subject can be summarised as follows.
That worlds appear consistent and ‘natural’ is due to their immanent logical 
organisation, which can be asserted with Badiou’s idea of the transcendental in 
Logics. In contrast to his conception of worldly logic though, it has been shown 
that what makes the logic of a world is the operation of localising, of relating 
objects, which establishes the topology of the world. Localisation works by putting 
objects in relation to other objects, which establishes a complex, manifold rela-
tional network between objects, which, in itself, expresses the logic of a world. In 
redefining the subject, it has been stated that the subject is, qua subject, the agent 
that carries out these operations of relating and thereby upholds or keeps alive 
its world.2 Whereas the operation of relating performed by an indifferent subject 
is affirming and upholding the world’s logical principle, the faithful, post-evental 
subject produces relations in radical difference to the established logical principle 
and thereby creates a genuinely new world.
After having established the theoretical framework of material reality and the 
subjective formalism, with the inexistent allowing their conceptual linkage, we 
proceeded to address the question of material efficacy of this hypothesis of the 
procedure of creation. That is to say the problem how thought (in form of the 
outlined model) can gain traction on the actual practices in specific worlds and 
struggles it set out to theorise. It has been argued that it is not the concept’s suc-
cessful prescription of an act or procedure in the world that would need to be 
demonstrated, but that we had to bind the concept of creation to a worldly sub-
jective capacity that exists and operates independently of any conceptualisation of 
it, whilst still being able to be informed by such conceptual understanding of the 
concrete procedures. This subjective capacity for creation has been hypothesized 
to arise from the social mode of materialist abstraction, or indeed a form of prob-
lematisation, in Foucault’s terms, through which a subject acquires a sense of con-
2 The redefinition of the subject was necessary since, contrary to Badiou’s definition, our subject 
not only exists before an event but is the very guarantor of worlds in the first place, since it 
is the indifferent subject that relentlessly relates according to the world’s existing logic and 
thereby ensures the world’s existence and subsistence.
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tingency and potential plasticity regarding the specific configuration of its world.3 
Such problematisation of one’s present is to be conceived as critical engagement 
with and effort towards the world, and more specifically the site of struggle that 
frames and necessitates this specific problematisation in the first place.4 With the 
capacity for creation, a subject attains the sense and urgency that the operation of 
relating can and must be carried out in radical difference to the prevailing logical 
principle, even though this difference is not yet accessible before an event. In 
absence of an actual opening for radical difference, the insight from conceptual 
abstraction – the existence of a radical outside from which such difference can 
emerge, even be produced – can function as support for the capacity for creation 
immanent to a worldly situation.
The event itself, in opposition to Badiou’s conception, no longer constitutes an 
illegal and momentary rupture of being, but designates the process of exposition 
of the inexistent within a world. Crucially, this exposition of the inexistent, as 
has been argued, might well be caused in a subjective effort we termed evental 
production, which takes place at a site of struggle. In an evental production, the 
operation of relating carried out by a subject takes on an experimental form, 
which is to say that it not any longer adheres to the logical principle of the given 
world but produces nonsensical (according to the given world’s logic) or other-
worldly relations that involve the site of struggle, with the ultimate goal to create 
3 The social mode of materialist abstraction basically establishes an arguably affective perspec-
tive for the subject on its own localisation in the world, on what positions it in this world, ulti-
mately resulting in the sensible awareness of the non-necessity of this localisation or position-
ing. The point in calling this mode of abstraction social and non-theoretical is to demonstrate 
its independence from abstract conceptual thought (whilst not ignoring that we make sense 
of the world, even on the most immediate level, through concepts). Performed in a world, 
abstraction is thought to be employed in a multitude of degrees and modes between its con-
ceptual and social poles. 
4 In a recent talk, Badiou somewhat reconciled with critical theory – of course and unsurpris-
ingly only in the sense of prescribing what it ought to be, as critical activity – by remarking 
that: “the field of critical activity is always to work at the limit of the possible and the impos-
sible with the idea that this limit is not a stable limit, it is a limit which in some sense can be 
modified, can be transformed. The work of critical thinking is precisely the work on this limit. 
… we can open up a new access to the transformation of the limit itself. So, it is not only the 
activity of the defining of the limit but the activity of the change of the limit itself” (Badiou, 
2014). This conception of critical activity comes very close to what Foucault termed critical 
practice or limit-attitude in, for example, “What is Enlightenment?” (Foucault, 1997), see also 
our discussion in Chapter 3.
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the seed for a new logical principle and world.5 Such an experimental relation is 
then probed for its potential to serve as the prototypical relation for a new logical 
principle, a logical principle radically different to the existing one. If this probing 
results in the affirmative, an inexistent of the site of struggle has been exposed 
and as consequence, the world has now been supplemented with what consti-
tutes a real possibility for this world’s radical transformation.6 Hereafter, the post-
evental, faithful subject performs the operation of relating according to the idea of 
a new logical principle – an idea originating from the prototypical, experimental 
relation – thereby engaging in the creation of a new world. The creation of a new 
world and the development of this world’s logical principle are thought to evolve 
in mutual dependence and reciprocal determination.
In order to give a name to the subject that undertakes the outlined development 
from indifferent subject to faithful subject, we proposed the term subject of crea-
tion. The latter is born by parting from the indifferent subject through the rising 
awareness of the non-necessity of its world’s specific organisation attained from 
the problematisation of its present – possibly supported or triggered by concep-
tual abstraction’s demonstration of the outside. Contracting its world via a site 
of struggle, the subject of creation engages in an evental production. If an event 
occurs out of this evental production, the subject proceeds in the mode of the 
faithful subject in the creation of a new world. The journey of a subject of creation 
can be understood as intertwined evolution with an idea, an idea that gradually 
acquires form and comes to orient the subject. The enactment of such an evolving 
idea is then what drives and guides a subject of creation.
5 The notion of experimental practice is mainly derived from the discussion of Foucault’s 
account of ethical practices and the exercise of freedom in Chapter 3. It should be recalled 
that these practices are framed by their specific problematisation of the present (in a way like 
a site of struggle) in respect to what they belabour in their exercises. At the same time they 
are exercising freedom in how they establish relations to and form conduct in regard of their 
specific framing, which is a form of indifference to existing laws or rules of conduct (something 
Badiou would term subtraction, see Badiou, 2007a) or indeed self-determination – the latter is 
one of the main goals of the activities subsumed under the care of the self.
6 Badiou puts the consequences of this supplementation forcefully: “Let us not underestimate 
the fact that there is something that appears as such and that in a way was not there before, so 
that there is a supplementation, or a creation, a positive dimension, and that remains the point 
around which everything hangs together. But, at the same time, we would not understand 
what is at issue, if we did not see that this supernumerary element has a completely deregulat-
ing function in the regime of appearance of the situation itself and, thus, in a certain sense, it 
does destroy something after all, namely, it destroys a regime of existence, if I can say so, which 
was previously given.” (Bosteels and Badiou, 2005)
159
Let us at this point briefly return to two overarching notions from the subheading 
of this thesis, materialist abstraction and enactment of ideas. Materialist abstrac-
tion has been introduced in order to address the question how conceptualisations 
of processes in the world can be founded in, or be constructed in compatibility 
with the world and processes that both constitute and change this world.7 The 
attempt to secure this connection between world and conceptualisation of it pro-
ceeded by two modes of materialist abstraction, conceptual and social, non-theo-
retical. 
First, conceptual abstraction produces the generic framework and procedure of 
creation, starting with the conception of worlds via a double determination, from 
‘below’ and ‘above’, as it were. On one side (‘below’) being is asserted to merely 
provide for the material universe to exist in-itself, and on the other side (‘above’) 
the logical augmentation of this universe that constitutes a world is the result of 
the material processes (enacted by subjects) of re/producing such a logical organi-
sation. On the basis of this conception of worlds, the inexistent is established as the 
paradoxical object that has an objective (universal) referent in the present world 
but is localised according to a different (global) logical principle, and therefore in a 
different, as of yet inaccessible or non-existing world. The inexistent presents the 
pivotal concept for the generic procedure of creation in that – once exposed by the 
subject through an evental production, and in form of a prototypical relation of a 
genuinely new logical principle – it instructs the immanent operation of relating 
towards the radical transformation of a world.
Second, social abstraction is what gives rise to the subjective capacity for crea-
tion from within a given world, it is an immanent process non-reliant on theoreti-
cal construction – although, as has been argued, the conceptual understanding of 
the existence of the outside and abstract possibility of radical novelty can support 
or even trigger the formation of the subjective capacity for creation. The subjec-
tive capacity for creation is what enables the subject to differ, as it were, from the 
indifferent subject and to engage in the problematisation of the present and an 
evental production, within a (site of) struggle. Social abstraction is therefore the 
7 Brassier puts the problematic behind this question concisely: “The challenge for materialism is 
to acknowledge the reality of abstraction without conceding to idealism that reality possesses 
irreducible conceptual form. Thus materialism must be able to explain what constitutes the 
reality of conceptually formed abstraction without hypostatising that form.” (Brassier, 2014)
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immanent process that allows the generic concept of the procedure of creation to 
be bound to any given worldly situation.
An idea has been proposed as the most compressed account of what gives ori-
entation and subsistence to the concrete and situated procedure of creation. The 
authorisation and orientation of the procedure of creation has been argued to 
derive from both of materialist abstraction’s modes, conceptual and social abstrac-
tion. Completely anonymous and generic in its conception, an idea is thought to 
come to contain the guiding orientation for any actual procedure of creation from 
the situated, real processes of contracting the world to a site of struggle down to 
the evental production (exposition of the inexistent) and from there expanding 
the prototypical logical principle through the creation of a new world. The enact-
ment of an idea is therefore synonymous with the procedure of creation carried 
out by a subject of creation.
In this sense, materialist abstraction and enactment of ideas present the two 
major, entwined notions (or brackets) for the procedure of creation in that they 
denote, on one side, the abstract but materially anchored condition of possibility 
of creation and, on the other side, the compressed functional figure of the con-
crete, subjective procedure of creation – which is in turn authorised and oriented 
by the two modes of materialist abstraction.
Contribution of this thesis to contemporary discourse
The main proposition of this thesis regards the general viability of situated acts of 
creation, namely that creation in the strong sense of bringing radical novelty into 
existence is indeed thinkable and possible. This abstract and generic possibility 
has been posited as the initial hypothesis and has been corroborated by the rudi-
mentary conceptual framework developed in the previous chapters. With the vali-
dation of the abstract possibility of radical novelty, the proposed model of creation 
confirms the act of creation – in its radical sense, creation ex nihilo – as an intelligible 
undertaking. As such, it can act as authorisation and can offer a rational basis for 
a kind of faith to engage in the creation of a genuinely different world – against 
common sense and immanent experience but based on rational belief – since the 
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 possibility in thought revives the reasonable hope for real, radical difference vis-
à-vis the apparently firm and natural coherence of any given world. 
Further, the scope of transformation that the process of creation entails has 
been somewhat delimited in that we came to understand that the creation of a 
new world does not entail the complete destruction of the world it originates from 
– down to the infinity of local branches of a world’s logical organisation. What 
really changes are not so much all the small things we hold on to, and neither 
does a new world mean the eradication of everything we know, value and live and 
struggle for. Radical change operates on the global logic of a world and revolves 
around the singular, site-specific term the event exposes – which precisely presents 
a framing of the subsequent transformation by what has been lived and struggled 
for so far by the subjects engaged in this transformation. Genuine transformation 
of a world’s logic most radically affects what is related, or has to be related, under 
the new logical principle, to the evental site – the site of struggle supplemented 
by its inexistent. Most relations or regions of the pre-evental world might merely 
require modifications in order to be accommodated under a new logic, a logic that 
is nonetheless radically different on the global level and the logical principle that 
informs its construction.
In regard of the compatibility of the model of creation with actual, situated 
operations of creation, it has been argued that it cannot be a matter of prescribing 
a specific act by its generic conceptualisation but rather that a worldly capacity 
that exists independently from the theorisation of it can link up with and employ 
generic conceptions in the specific ways an actual procedure requires. Arising 
from the subjective capacity for creation, actual engagements in the procedure of 
creation can derive crucial conceptual anchor points from the generic concept that 
can assist in developing orientation and modes of navigation, as well as to inter-
rogate and revise the operations of the procedure, once stepping back in order to 
abstract from and reflect on our doings. It is due to the model’s generic nature that 
this model can be of use for actual operations of creation that are often not quite 
consistent, unfold in the flurry of happenings, and are too immersed and entan-
gled. It can do so by helping to formulate relevant ‘global’ questions in regard to 
specific ‘local’ circumstances, movements and orientations, if this or that problem 
is really connected to the struggle at hand, or if a certain engagement does in fact 
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 constitute a quest for genuine transformation and not mere modification, desire 
for inclusion, and so forth.
Then again, is it really enough to posit the compatibility and applicability of 
the generic conception of creation to actual processes of transformation on the 
claim to theorise the world generically from a materialist perspective, suggesting 
traction on reality, no matter for which specific situation, process or struggle? 
In other words, does the notion of materialist abstraction suffice to ensure the 
concept of creation having any real purchase on the worldly procedures it tries to 
grasp and support? In order to explore this problematic, some positions within 
the current of communisation will be briefly examined, for it might be inform-
ative to understand how the latter’s refusal to specify any positive content for 
the process of realising communism – rather foregrounding generic conceptions 
for revolutionary change, required by the wholesale negation of the capitalist 
class relation constitutive of the totality of our present experience – still yields a 
constructive force that is claimed to have efficacy in specific circumstances and 
struggles (under conditions arising from the latter).
Having emerged “from currents of the French ultra-left in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s,” Benjamin Noys writes, communisation “has gained resonance as a 
way of posing the problem of struggle today” (Noys, 2012: 8). This problem is 
more precisely class struggle in its present historical specificity, where class, far 
from having become an obsolete concept, still remains one of the central notions 
for understanding capitalist social relations. Although class-belonging has lost any 
positive capacity for identification or empowerment, it can be understood as a 
constitutive “element that is foreign to everyone’s life: the hostile embodiment of the 
dominating power of capital” (de Mattis, 2014; my emphasis). It is the apparent imma-
nence of the capitalist class relation8 that makes it impossible today to seriously 
consider any of the traditional notions of political emancipation like alternative, 
autonomy or secession from this defining relation. Our subjection by the class 
relation produces us as existing and acting as (potential) value within capital-
ist social relations, which is actualised and extracted through the exploitation of 
8 That the capitalist class relation has become entirely immanent to our present has become 
apparent as such only after the erosion of the worker’s movement and arguably more so with 
the global triumph of neoliberal capitalism in the 1990s (see: de Mattis, 2014; Thoburn, 2013: 
9).
163
labour. Any struggle that either seeks to employ this capitalist subject (the worker) 
for positive identification or to cast a zone of autonomy, resistance or alternative 
in which such a capitalist subject, and the social relations it reproduces with it, 
would somehow magically become unbound from this very subjection, is bound 
to fail. This is because it is ignoring either that the affirmation of the capitalist 
subject, of class-belonging, cannot but reproduce the capitalist class relation, or 
that the latter is constitutive of the totality of our present,9 that there is no outside 
of the class relation (within a world), no alternative, no autonomy. To break from 
this relation can therefore only take the form of annulling what is reproducing it, 
that is ourselves. As the group Endnotes writes:
… in any actual supersession of the capitalist class relation we ourselves 
must be overcome; ‘we’ have no ‘position’ apart from the capitalist class 
relation. What we are is, at the deepest level, constituted by this relation, 
and it is a rupture with the reproduction of what we are that will necessarily 
form the horizon of our struggles. (Endnotes, 2012: 31)
In other words, we have to become active agents of our own self-abolition, by 
divesting what constitutes us (capitalist class relation) of the substrate that the 
capitalist class relation needs to have itself reproduced (us ourselves, capitalist 
subjects). The supersession of the capitalist class relation concerns the world as a 
whole, since the latter is what we incessantly reproduce according to the former 
relation that constitutes us. Communisation, therefore, “is a movement at the 
level of the totality, through which that totality is abolished” (Endnotes, 2012: 
28). With no possible positive content or form to instruct struggles within that 
totality, the movement “turns instead on the limits to struggle, where the limit is 
less a boundary that solicits transgression than the immanent horizon of self-over-
coming” (Thoburn, 2013: 11). The limit, as horizon that appears through an 
impasse of its time, is generative of, is the very condition of possibility for that 
 
9 It might be instructive at this point to recall our discussion – for its parallels to the present issue 
– of determination by and reproduction of a given power structure and discursive framework 
in the work of Foucault, in Chapter 3.
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time’s struggles10 – it is where communisation occurs: “in the rift that opens as this 
struggle meets its limit and is pushed beyond it” (Endnotes, 2012: 28). 
What do these analyses then entail for the practices and struggles they theo-
rise? When there is no positive content or form that can be derived from within 
a present, and when communisation, understood as the immediate enactment of 
communism, can only take place once a struggle is pushed beyond its limit – a 
push that cannot be prefigured or prescribed, since such revolutionary opening 
results from a qualitative shift in the dynamics of a concrete struggle itself – in 
what way can these negative definitions and empty forms be understood to 
instruct a concrete struggle? Arguably they do instruct struggles on precisely the 
generic and abstract level at which they are proposed and in that way present 
rigorous criteria for and allow general purchase on any given concrete struggle. 
If communisation “does not have any positive existence prior to a revolutionary 
situation” (ibid.), what is required in any contemporary struggle is, rather simply, 
that it expose and is pushed beyond its own, specific limit so to open to a revolu-
tionary situation in which communisation can unfold. This is nothing other than 
the supplementation of a struggle with a real, yet fragile possibility for the radical 
transformation of its situation.11 Or as de Mattis puts it: 
Before the tipping-point, communist measures are by their essence ephem-
eral: they exist only within the space of the struggle, and are snuffed out if 
they do not generalise themselves. They are simply moments when overcom-
ing is possible but not yet secured. (de Mattis, 2014) 
To bring about this tipping-point, to expose and push beyond the limits of a given 
struggle, is the task of every struggle, which is defined, again, primarily negatively 
10 See also Research & Destroy’s “Limit Analysis and its Limits”: “Each historical moment, in this 
sense, has a form of transcendence specific to the limits it presents for proletarian struggles—
communisation, then, is that form of overcoming which opens from the particulars of today’s 
struggles.” (Research & Destroy, 2014)
11 The exposure and going beyond the limit of a struggle is somewhat reminiscent of Badiou’s 
notion of an evental rupture (exposition of the void/inexistent opening for the revolutionary 
transformation of the situation via a truth procedure). It also seems to work analogous to the 
model developed in the previous chapters, where the world is supplemented by the inexistent 
(something truly beyond the situation and site of struggle), which transforms the abstract pos-
sibility of radical novelty into a real possibility, opening for the creation of a new world.
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in that nothing “implicated in the reproduction of the capitalist class relation [will 
be] instruments of the revolution, since they are part of that which is to be abol-
ished” (Endnotes, 2012: 28).12 
Whilst there exists, as has been noted, close to no positive content or form that 
could guide a struggle, de Mattis develops the notion of a communist measure, 
which denotes “an elementary form of the production of communism … whose 
objective is precisely to make of the enactment of communism a means of strug-
gle” (de Mattis, 2014). Starkly compressed, a communist measure can be under-
stood as function specific to a struggle, a deed that is conditioned by the specifics 
of a struggle and collectively implies those that carry it out. A communist measure 
“generalises itself” once “in a given situation it corresponds to whatever the situa-
tion demands, and it is thus one of the forms (perhaps not the only possible one) 
which respond to the necessities imposed by the situation (intense struggle against 
capital)” (ibid.). Communist measures present in this sense a positive vision of the 
production of communism, de Mattis argues. The particular conception of com-
munist measures though is not entirely clear, we are given an account of what they 
do, where they arise from and by what they are conditioned but when it comes to 
what a communist measure could be, we are provided with rather disappointing 
set of common place notions.13 When stripping these from the conception of com-
12 The production of limit-exposure or revolutionary openings in a struggle can be compared 
with what has been termed evental production within a site of struggle in the previous chap-
ters.
13 Most of the examples given by de Mattis describe common sense ideas of emancipatory move-
ments (precisely not specific but general notions), if not merely a set of tactics, where it is not 
quite clear how communist measures thus understood could actually rupture or even specif-
ically contribute to opening a struggle towards a revolutionary present: “Getting off on the 
sound of your own voice proclaiming the abolition of value, of social class or of capitalism 
is not a communist measure. Sharing out resources seized from the enemy, or producing in 
common whatever the struggle against capital needs—that could be. … Likely to be commu-
nist, then, are measures taken, here or there, in order to seize means which can be used to 
satisfy the immediate needs of a struggle. Likely to be communist also are measures which par-
ticipate in the insurrection without reproducing the forms, the schemas of the enemy. Likely 
to be communist are measures which aim to avoid the reproduction within the struggle of the 
divisions within the proletariat which result from its current atomisation. Likely to be commu-
nist are measures which try to eliminate the dominations of gender and of race. Likely to be 
communist are measures which aim to co-ordinate without hierarchy. Likely to be communist 
are measures which tend to strip from themselves, one way or another, all ideology which 
could lead to the re-establishment of classes. Likely to be communist are measures which erad-
icate all tendencies towards the recreation of communities which treat each other like strangers 
or enemies.” (de Mattis, 2014)
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munist measures, the latter would become an anonymous container that simply 
describes generically that which, under the respectively specific circumstances 
of a given struggle, produces, holds, revises and discards orientations, rules of 
conduct or visions that come to be enacted in that struggle.14 Such an anonymous 
– or generic – conception of communist measures seems not only more apt to de 
Mattis’ general argument but also prevents it from being reduced, from the outset, 
to dogmatic or pragmatic common sense without much revolutionary capacity. 
The generic formulation of communisation then means, seemingly paradoxi-
cal, that on one side it theorises its operations in general terms whilst allowing for 
maximal adaptation to the specifics of a given struggle.15 On the other side it is 
able to uphold the strong criteria of communisation against the immersed turmoil 
of struggles, which is to say preventing the very project of communisation from 
being relativised and diminished by the specific difficulties (limits) met within the 
process of a struggle. More specifically, with the emphasis on the destruction of 
the capitalist class relation (the abolition of the proletariat by the proletariat itself), 
the theory of communisation links an element of the current class struggles 
(the end of the affirmation of the proletariat and the decline of workers’ 
identity) to a conception of the revolution (the destruction of the class relation 
by the proletariat.) (de Mattis, 2014)
Whilst the latter point makes a case for theoretical abstraction (in the form of 
generic conceptions) having any instructive value for practices and struggles in 
the field of social abstraction, what is still not clear is how communisation theory 
can be thought to be linked with and gain traction on capitalist reality. Endnotes 
address this in a dense and impressive section, which is worth quoting at length 
in the follwing: 
14 This adjustment of the concept of communist measure is based on the notion of idea and its 
enactment, as it has been developed in Chapter 5 and summarised above.
15 A quality that Thoburn characterizes, for the theory of the limit, as follows: “the absence of 
tactical or subjective content from the theory of the limit has decided benefits, for it compels 
an immanent appreciation of the specific and mutating nature and quality of limits in particular 
situations of struggle” (Thoburn, 2013: 11).
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Communist theory sets out not from the false position of some voluntarist 
subject, but from the posited supersession of the totality of forms which are 
implicated in the reproduction of this subject. As merely posited, this super-
session is necessarily abstract, but it is only through this basic abstraction 
that theory takes as its content the determinate forms which are to be super-
seded; forms which stand out in their determinacy precisely because their 
dissolution has been posited. (Endnotes, 2012: 34)
The posited supersession is the consequence of the analysis of what reproduces 
capitalist social relations (the capitalist subject, the worker) and the necessary 
conclusion that the destruction of the constitutive capitalist class relation can only 
coincide with the abolition of the subjects that reproduce it. This self-abolition is 
abstract in the sense that it is not apparent to immanent experience and that it 
leaves nothing to affirm, no (as of yet) perceivable option or path open to choice 
for it to be accomplished, but it is nevertheless based on a conclusion in thought 
of a materialist analysis of the concrete present situation:
This positing is not only a matter of methodology, or some kind of necessary 
postulate of reason, for the supersession of the capitalist class relation is not 
a mere theoretical construct. Rather, it runs ahead of thought, being posited 
incessantly by this relation itself; it is its very horizon as an antagonism, 
the real negative presence which it bears. Communist theory is produced 
by – and necessarily thinks within – this antagonistic relation; it is thought 
of the class relation, and it grasps itself as such. It attempts to conceptually 
reconstruct the totality which is its ground, in the light of the already-posited 
supersession of this totality, and to draw out the supersession as it presents 
itself here. (ibid.)
By understanding to be produced by the relation it theorises, communist theory 
can indeed say to not merely meditate some phenomena from an outside position 
but to think this relation from within, from a position immanent of the problem it 
seeks to overcome. The passage continues:
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Since it is a relation which has no ideal ‘homeostatic’ state, but one which is 
always beyond itself, with capital facing the problem of labor at every turn 
– even in its victories – the adequate thought of this relation is not of some 
equilibrium state, or some smoothly self-positing totality; it is of a funda-
mentally impossible relation, something that is only insofar as it is ceasing to 
be; an internally unstable, antagonistic relation. Communist theory thus has 
no need of an external, Archimedean point from which to take the measure 
of its object, and communization has no need of a transcendent standpoint of 
‘withdrawal’ or ‘secession’ from which to launch its ‘attack’. (ibid.)
By thinking communist theory as necessarily operating from within the antago-
nistic, impossible class relation renders it immanent to revolutionary practice (the 
destruction of this relation), which, Brassier notes, “is supposed to bind theoreti-
cal abstraction to the reality of social abstraction independently of the representa-
tional recourse to an objective correspondence relation (which would require an 
‘external, Archimedean point from which to take measure of its object’)” (Brassier, 
2014). The traction of communist theory on capitalist reality is therefore achieved 
by the posited supersession of the totality constituted by the impossible class rela-
tion, since the abstraction of the supersession allows the adequate and immanent 
theoretical construction of the determinate forms of the totality to be overcome.
One major open problem that this rigorous and consistent approach faces 
though lies in its refutation of thinking the process of actual supersession at all. As 
Thoburn concludes,
identifying communization so directly with the limit or rift risks leaving it 
with a somewhat anemic existence. … without theoretical purchase on the 
complex and overdetermined formations of life and struggle beyond affirma-
tion of the encounter with limits, the risk is that the rift lifts off into a concept 
with transcendent explanatory value (Thoburn, 2013: 11-2)
What conditions and produces this anemic state in regard to questions of the 
complexities of actual struggle and praxis, concretely the problem of construction 
of both a revolutionary rupture within a struggle and its subsequent transfor-
mation to communism, is the wholesale refutation of any positive content and 
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form within the totality constituted by the capitalist class relation that could be 
employed to this end. More precisely, the slightly reductive conception of subjec-
tive agency as inescapably determined by its situation16 is what disallows for an 
account of any pre-evental engagement in the production of such a revolutionary 
opening or limit-exposure.17 What has been developed in this thesis under the 
name of the subject and procedure of creation is quite possibly a contribution to 
the discussion of this impasse, especially concerning the production of rifts within 
struggles (evental production in a site of struggle) – although completely generic 
and somewhat rudimentary in its outline. 
This concluding, and very brief engagement with communisation theory has 
been undertaken in order to clarify how theory and its generic conceptions can be 
understood to secure traction on the reality it theorises. Based on the exposure of 
the capitalist class relation as immanent in and constitutive of the totality of cap-
italist social relations – derived from the impasses and encountered limits in the 
history of class struggles – communisation sets out from the posited supersession 
of the totality this relation constitutes: the self-abolition of the reproductive agents 
of the capitalist class relation is the defining feature of the revolution. This posited 
supersession allows in turn the identification of the determined forms that are to 
be overcome, which is to say the matter of the struggles in which an inherent limit 
might become exposed, pushing the struggle beyond it and thereby opening for 
the immediate creation of a communist present. “By taking the ‘posited superses-
sion’ of the capitalist totality as its starting point,” writes Brassier, “communist 
theorising secures its traction upon the antagonism constitutive of social reality” 
(Brassier, 2014). 
In a somewhat parallel fashion, although with a more general scope, the present 
thesis started out with the posited possibility of the creation of radical novelty, 
which is equally a supersession of the give world in its totality. This argument is 
based on the conception of worlds as logical augmentation of the universe that are 
16 See Endnotes’ critique of voluntarism (Endnotes, 2012: 32-3) and Brassier’s brief discussion 
of Endnote’s attempt (in Endnotes, 2013) to introduce spontaneous human activity as rescue 
against the paradox in the activity of self-abolition, which, in turn, risks “resuscitating a tran-
scendental voluntarism” (Brassier, 2014).
17 Not unlike Badiou’s notion of the subject, since both can be understood to be born from an 
evental occurrence, both subjects are in this way post-evental subjects.
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incessantly re/produced by material practices, by operations of relating that are 
constitutive of a world’s logic carried out of the subjects of such a world – which 
resonates with communisation’s idea of reproduction of capitalist class relations. 
The intelligibility of the creation of radical novelty hinges on the recognition 
of the contingency of a given world’s logical organisation, which consequently 
results in creation requiring the abolition of the totality of the world that is consti-
tuted by its immanent logical principle – again in a similar way to communisation 
theory. That the model of the procedure of creation can claim a purchase on 
material reality is then for two reasons, combined under the notion of materialist 
abstraction: 
First in that the theoretical understanding of both how worlds are reproduced 
as well as created derives, in the end, from the analyses of the situated, subjective 
practices that produce the totality of social abstractions we come to experience 
as the world.18 The tipping point between the reproduction of a world and the 
creation of a new world can be understood, in the vocabulary of communisa-
tion, when a struggle meets its limit and enables the self-abolition of the subjects 
that reproduce the given world. Self-abolition is the consequence of a successful 
evental production – a production that, in difference to communisation theory, 
has been argued to be generally possible and outlined both in its generic opera-
tion and in regard of its immanent subjective capacity. 
And second in that the condition of possibility of radical novelty, the inexistent, 
is conceptually enabled by the posited possibility of radical novelty (superses-
sion of the given world) whilst being founded, as a paradoxical case (paradox-
ical object) on the conception of a world as contingent logical augmentation of 
the objectively existing universe. This conceptual abstraction asserts the radical 
outside and ratifies thereby the condition of possibility for the creation of radical 
novelty, the possibility for a given world’s genuine transformation.
18 These analyses have been, in the present case, limited to the discussion of Foucault’s archeo-
logical and genealogical project through his late work in Chapter 3.
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* * * * *
… today, as Fredric Jameson perspicaciously remarked, nobody seriously 
considers possible alternatives to capitalism any longer, whereas popular 
imagination is persecuted by the visions of the forthcoming ‘breakdown of 
nature’, of the stoppage of all life on earth – it seems easier to imagine the 
‘end of the world’ than a far more modest change in the mode of production, 
as if liberal capitalism is the ‘real’ that will somehow survive even under 
conditions of a global ecological catastrophe. (Žižek, 1994; 1)
Let us return to the apparent contemporary inability to imagine and even con-
sider possible any real alternative to the present condition of capitalism, as already 
attested by Slavoj Žižek twenty years ago. With the model of creation and the 
concept of the subject of creation, this thesis too does not present any specific 
imagination of radical difference, of a real alternative to our contemporary con-
dition (like communisation I offer no specific content). What it does contribute 
to this problem is, that it makes a consistent argument for the abstract possibility 
of radical novelty – through creation – and entwines this abstract possibility with 
a worldly situated, immanent capacity that enables creation to materialise in, or 
more precisely as world. This thesis attempted to formulate a framework for 
thinking the possibility of reaching beyond what we know as our world today, 
and to consequently go beyond what grounds this thinking in the first place.
The proposed model of creation satisfies within reason the possibility of what 
is today neglected by every hegemonic, oppressive and reactive discourse: the 
possibility of radical novelty, thereby opposing the myth of modification and ref-
ormation as being the only way for ‘change’ to work. It authorises fundamental, 
productive negation and seeks to provide the speculative framework for the oper-
ation that gives form to what replaces (displaces) that which it became necessary 
to abandon: our world today. In this sense the thesis tries to contribute to the 
urgent questions and dilemmas of our days that have been outlined in the Intro-
duction – and, on the level of subjective experience, range from the personal 
(psychological, social) disasters of exhaustion, precarious wage labour under neo-
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liberal imperatives, to the deadlocked downward spiral of global parliamentary 
capitalism – to frame it in a more populist way for once. It answers affirmative to 
the question if we can reasonably hope for all this being overthrown by our own 
collective efforts and replaced by a radically different global organising principle, 
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